THE  EUROPEAN 
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G'LOWES'DICKINSON 


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THE    EUROPEAN    ANARCHY 


THE  MACMILLAN  CX)MPANY 

NTW   YOKE  •    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO   •  DALLAS 
ATLANTA   •  SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Looted 

LONDON   •  BOMBAY   •  CALCUTTA 
1IXLBOORNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


THE     EUROPEAN 
ANARCHY 


BY 

G.  LOWES  DICKINSON 


New  fork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1917 

All  rilkts  reserved 


1)5 


COPYIIOK,  IQl6 

By  the  macmillan  company 

Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  April,  1916. 
Reprinted  April,  1917. 


FOREWORD  TO  THE  AMERICAN 
EDITION 

These  pages  were  written  in  the  hope  that  they 
might  be  read  and  considered  by  the  more  reason- 
able section  of  the  British  public.  But  they  are 
likely  at  the  present  moment  to  find  more  re- 
sponse in  America  than  in  England.  The  sym- 
pathies of  Americans  appear  to  be,  generally  and 
warmly,  on  the  side  of  the  allies,  because  they  rec- 
ognize that  a  German  victory  would  imperil  the 
principles  and  the  spirit  for  which  America  stands. 
But  Americans  also  recognize  that  no  military 
victory  or  defeat  can  of  itself  secure  that  durable 
peace  by  which  alone  democratic  liberties  can 
be  assured  and  developed.  The  whole  system 
of  international  relations  must  be  transformed 
by  a  deliberate  act  of  policy  if  this  result  is  to 
be  achieved.  The  states  must  combine  not  in 
temporary  alliances  and  counter-alliances,  preg- 
nant with  new  wars,  but  in  a  union  to  develop 
the  law  of  nations  and  to  sustain  it  against  law- 

5 


6  FOREWORD 

breakers.  As  I  write,  this  country  is  engaged  in 
a  campaign  for  preparedness.  Preparedness  for 
what?  To  enter  that  European  competition 
in  armaments,  which  alone  is  a  sufficient  cause 
of  war?  Or  to  put  armaments,  jointly  with 
other  states,  behind  law  and  against  aggression, 
from  whatever  Power  aggression  may  be  threat- 
ened? To  do  the  former  would  be  merely  to 
add  to  the  dangers  of  war  a  new  factor.  To  do 
the  latter  might  start  the  nations  on  the  road 
to  a  durable  peace.  Anarchy  and  destruction, 
or  law  and  reconstruction,  is  the  choice  before 
the  world;  and  the  United  States  during  the 
next  months  may  largely  help  to  determine 
which  it  shall  be.  A  practical  proposal  for  mak- 
ing the  transition  from  anarchy  to  law  is  put 
forward  by  the  American  League  to  Enforce 
Peace.1  It  is  to  some  such  solution  that  this 
essay  points.  For  it  shows  how  behind  this 
war,  as  behind  wars  in  the  past,  lay  not  merely 
the  aggression  of  Germany,  but  the  whole  tradi- 

1  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  American  Branch,  70  Fifth 
Avenue,  New  York  City.  Hon.  William  Howard  Taft, 
President;  A.  Lawrence  Lowell,  Chairman  of  Executive 
Committee;  William  H.  Short,  Secretary. 


FOREWORD  7 

tion  and  practice  of  European  diplomacy.  To 
take  the  lead  in  introducing  into  international 
relations  that  new  policy  which  alone  can  guar- 
antee and  preserve  civilization  may  be  the  spe- 
cial mission  and  glory  of  the  United  States. 
On  their  action  at  this  crisis  of  the  race  the  future 
of  society  may  depend.  And  if  this  little  book 
shall  have  any  smallest  influence  in  clarifying 
and  concentrating  American  opinion  upon  the 
problem  to  be  solved,  it  will  have  fulfilled  the 
purpose  for  which  it  was  written. 

G.  Lowes  Dickinson. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

i.    Introduction       .....      13 
Europe  since  the  Fifteenth  Century — Machiavellian- 
ism— Empire  and  the  Balance  of  Power. 

2.  The  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Entente       .      17 

Belgian  Dispatches  of  1905-14. 

3.  Great  Britain     .  .  .  .  .23 

The  Policy  of  Great  Britain — Essentially  an  Overseas 
Power. 

4.  France      ......      27 

The  Policy  of  France  since  1870 — Peace  and  Imperial- 
ism— Conflicting  Elements. 

5.  Russia       ......      32 

The  Policy  of  Russia — Especially  towards  Austria. 

6.  Austria-Hungary  .  .  .  .37 

The  Policy  of  Austria-Hungary — Especially  towards  the 
Balkans. 

7.  Germany    ......      39 

The  Policy  of  Germany — From  1866  to  the  Decade 
1890-1900 — A  Change. 

8.  Opinion  in  Germany      .  .  .  .46 

German  "Romanticism" — New  Ambitions. 

9.  Opinion  about  Germany  .  .  .57 

Bourdon — Beyens — Cambon — Summary. 

10.    German  Policy  from  1890-1900         .  .      67 

Relation  to  Great  Britain — The  Navy. 
9 


IO 

CONTENTS 

PAGE 

II. 

Vain  Attempts  at  Harmony     . 

Great  Britain's  Efforts  for  Arbitration — Mutual  Suspi- 
cion. 

75 

12. 

Europe  since  the  Decade  1890-1900 

91 

13. 

Germany  and  Turkey    .... 

The  Bagdad  Railway. 

94 

14- 

Austria  and  the  Balkans 

IOI 

*5- 

Morocco    ...... 

108 

16. 

The  Last  Years  ..... 

Before  the  War— The  Outbreak  of  War. 

116 

17.  The  Responsibility  and  the  Moral  .  .127 

The  Pursuit  of  Power  and  Wealth. 

18.  The  Settlement  .  .  .  -133 

19.  The  Change  Needed      .  .  .141 

Change  of  Outlook  and  Change  of  System — An  Inter- 
national League — International  Law  and  Control. 


THE    EUROPEAN   ANARCHY 


THE    EUROPEAN    ANARCHY 

i.  Introduction 

In  the  great  and  tragic  history  of  Europe  there 
is  a  turning-point  that  marks  the  defeat  of  the 
ideal  of  a  world-order  and  the  definite  acceptance 
of  international  anarchy.  That  turning-point 
is  the  emergence  of  the  sovereign  State  at  the 
end  of  the  fifteenth  century.  And  it  is  sym- 
bolical of  all  that  was  to  follow  that  at  that  point 
stands,  looking  down  the  vista  of  the  centuries, 
the  brilliant  and  sinister  figure  of  Machiavelli. 
From  that  date  onwards  international  policy 
has  meant  Machiavellianism.  Sometimes  the 
masters  of  the  craft,  like  Catherine  de  Medici 
or  Napoleon,  have  avowed  it;  sometimes,  like 
Frederick  the  Great,  they  have  disclaimed  it. 
But  always  they  have  practised  it.  They  could 
not,  indeed,  practise  anything  else.  For  it  is 
as  true  of  an  aggregation  of  States  as  of  an  ag- 
gregation of  individuals  that,  whatever  moral 
sentiments  may  prevail,  if  there  is  no  common 
law  and  no  common  force  the  best  intentions 
will  be  defeated  by  lack  of  confidence  and  se- 
curity.   Mutual  fear  and  mutual  suspicion,  ag- 

*3 


H         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

gression  masquerading  as  defence  and  defence 
masquerading  as  aggression,  will  be  the  protag- 
onists in  the  bloody  drama;  and  there  will  be, 
what  Hobbes  truly  asserted  to  be  the  essence 
of  such  a  situation,  a  chronic  state  of  war,  open 
or  veiled.  For  peace  itself  will  be  a  latent  war; 
and  the  more  the  States  arm  to  prevent  a  con- 
flict the  more  certainly  will  it  be  provoked,  since 
to  one  or  another  it  will  always  seem  a  better 
chance  to  have  it  now  than  to  have  it  on  worse 
conditions  later.  Some  one  State  at  any  moment 
may  be  the  immediate  offender;  but  the  main 
and  permanent  offence  is  common  to  all  States. 
It  is  the  anarchy  which  they  are  all  responsible 
for  perpetuating. 

While  this  anarchy  continues  the  struggle 
between  States  will  tend  to  assume  a  certain 
stereotyped  form.  One  will  endeavour  to  ac- 
quire supremacy  over  the  others  for  motives  at 
once  of  security  and  of  domination,  the  others 
will  combine  to  defeat  it,  and  history  will  turn 
upon  the  two  poles  of  empire  and  the  balance 
of  power.  So  it  has  been  in  Europe,  and  so  it 
will  continue  to  be,  until  either  empire  is  achieved, 
as  once  it  was  achieved  by  Rome,  or  a  common 
law  and  a  common  authority  is  established  by 
agreement.  In  the  past  empire  over  Europe  has 
been  sought  by  Spain,  by  Austria,  and  by  France; 


INTRODUCTION  15 

and  soldiers,  politicians,  and  professors  in  Ger- 
many have  sought,  and  seek,  to  secure  it  now 
for  Germany.  On  the  other  hand,  Great  Britain 
has  long  stood,  as  she  stands  now,  for  the  bal- 
ance of  power.  As  ambitious,  as  quarrelsome, 
and  as  aggressive  as  other  States,  her  geograph- 
ical position  has  directed  her  aims  overseas  rather 
than  toward  the  Continent  of  Europe.  Since 
the  fifteenth  century  her  power  has  never  men- 
aced the  Continent.  On  the  contrary,  her  own 
interest  has  dictated  that  she  should  resist  there 
the  enterprise  of  empire,  and  join  in  the  defen- 
sive efforts  of  the  threatened  States.  To  any 
State  of  Europe  that  has  conceived  the  ambi- 
tion to  dominate  the  Continent  this  policy  of 
England  has  seemed  as  contrary  to  the  interests 
of  civilization  as  the  policy  of  the  Papacy  ap- 
peared in  Italy  to  an  Italian  patriot  like  Mach- 
iavelli.  He  wanted  Italy  enslaved,  in  order 
that  it  might  be  united.  And  so  do  some  Ger- 
mans now  want  Europe  enslaved,  that  it  may 
have  peace  under  Germany.  They  accuse  Eng- 
land of  perpetuating  for  egotistic  ends  the  state 
of  anarchy.  But  it  was  not  thus  that  Germans 
viewed  British  policy  when  the  Power  that 
was  to  give  peace  to  Europe  was  not  Germany, 
but  France.  In  this  long  and  bloody  game  the 
partners  are  always  changing,  and  as  partners 


16         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

change  so  do  views.  One  thing  only  does  not 
change,  the  fundamental  anarchy.  International 
relations,  it  is  agreed,  can  only  turn  upon  force. 
It  is  the  disposition  and  grouping  of  the  forces 
alone  that  can  or  does  vary. 

But  Europe  is  not  the  only  scene  of  the  con- 
flict between  empire  and  the  balance.  Since 
the  sixteenth  century  the  European  States  have 
been  contending  for  mastery,  not  only  over  one 
another,  but  over  the  world.  Colonial  empires 
have  risen  and  fallen.  Portugal,  Spain,  Hol- 
land, in  turn  have  won  and  lost.  England  and 
France  have  won,  lost,  and  regained.  In 
the  twentieth  century  Great  Britain  reaps  the 
reward  of  her  European  conflicts  in  the  Empire 
(wrongly  so-called)  on  which  the  sun  never  sets. 
Next  to  her  comes  France,  in  Africa  and  the 
East;  while  Germany  looks  out  with  discontented 
eyes  on  a  world  already  occupied,  and,  cherish- 
ing the  same  ambitions  all  great  States  have 
cherished  before  her,  finds  the  time  too  mature 
for  their  accomplishment  by  the  methods  that 
availed  in  the  past.  Thus,  not  only  in  Europe 
but  on  the  larger  stage  of  the  world  the  inter- 
national rivalry  is  pursued.  But  it  is  the  same 
rivalry  and  it  proceeds  from  the  same  cause: 
the  mutual  aggression  and  defence  of  beings  liv- 
ing in  a  "state  of  nature." 


ALLIANCE  AND  ENTENTE  17 

Without  this  historical  background  no  spe- 
cial study  of  the  events  that  led  up  to  the 
present  war  can  be  either  just  or  intelligible. 
The  feeling  of  every  nation  about  itself  and 
its  neighbours  is  determined  by  the  history 
of  the  past  and  by  the  way  in  which  that 
history  is  regarded.  The  picture  looks  dif- 
ferent from  every  point  of  view.  Indeed, 
a  comprehension  of  the  causes  of  the  war  could 
only  be  fully  attained  by  one  who  should 
know,  not  only  the  most  secret  thoughts 
of  the  few  men  who  directly  brought  it  about, 
but  also  the  prejudices  and  preconceptions 
of  the  public  opinion  in  each  nation.  There 
is  nobody  who  possesses  these  qualifications. 
But  in  the  absence  of  such  a  historian  these 
imperfect  notes  are  set  down  in  the  hope 
that  they  may  offer  a  counterpoise  to  some 
of  the  wilder  passions  that  sweep  over  all 
peoples  in  time  of  war  and  threaten  to  pre- 
pare for  Europe  a  future  even  worse  than  its 
past  has  been. 

2.  The  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Entente 

First,  let  us  remind  ourselves  in  general  of 
the  situation  that  prevailed  in  Europe  during 
the    ten    years    preceding    the    war.      It    was 


18  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

in  that  period  that  the  Entente  between  France, 
Russia,  and  England  was  formed  and  consoli- 
dated, over  against  the  existing  Triple  Alliance 
between  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy.  Neither 
of  these  combinations  was  in  its  origin  and  pur- 
pose aggressive.1 

1  The  alliance  between  Germany  and  Austria,  which 
dates  from  1879,  was  formed  to  guarantee  the  two  States 
against  an  attack  by  Russia.    Its  terms  are: — 

"1.  If,  contrary  to  what  is  to  be  expected  and  con- 
trary to  the  sincere  desire  of  the  two  high  contracting 
parties,  one  of  the  two  Empires  should  be  attacked  by 
Russia,  the  two  high  contracting  parties  are  bound  re- 
ciprocally to  assist  one  another  with  the  whole  military 
force  of  their  Empire,  and  further  not  to  make  peace 
except  conjointly  and  by  common  consent. 

"2.  If  one  of  the  high  contracting  Powers  should  be 
attacked  by  another  Power,  the  other  high  contracting 
party  engages  itself,  by  the  present  act,  not  only  not 
to  support  the  aggressor  against  its  ally,  but  at  least 
to  observe  a  benevolent  neutrality  with  regard  to  the 
other  contracting  party.  If,  however,  in  the  case  sup- 
posed the  attacking  Power  should  be  supported  by  Rus- 
sia, whether  by  active  co-operation  or  by  military  meas- 
ures which  should  menace  the  Power  attacked,  then  the 
obligation  of  mutual  assistance  with  all  military  forces, 
as  stipulated  in  the  preceding  article,  would  immediately 
come  into  force,  and  the  military  operations  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  would  be  in  that  case  conducted 
jointly  until  the  conclusion  of  peace." 

Italy  acceded  to  the  Alliance  in  1882.    The  engage- 


ALLIANCE  AND  ENTENTE  19 

And,  so  far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  the 
relations  she  entered  into  with  France  and  with 
Russia  were  directed  in  each  case  to  the  set- 
tlement of  long  outstanding  differences  with- 
out special  reference  to  the  German  Powers. 
But  it  is  impossible  in  the  European  an- 
archy that  any  arrangements  should  be  made 

ment  is  defensive.  Each  of  the  three  parties  is  to  come  to 
the  assistance  of  the  others  if  attacked  by  a  third  party. 

The  treaty  of  Germany  with  Austria  was  supple- 
mented in  1884  by  a  treaty  with  Russia,  known  as  the 
"Reinsurance  Treaty,"  whereby  Germany  bound  her- 
self not  to  join  Austria  in  an  attack  upon  Russia.  This 
treaty  lapsed  in  the  year  1890,  and  the  lapse,  it  is  pre- 
sumed, prepared  the  way  for  the  rapprochement  between 
Russia  and  France. 

The  text  of  the  treaty  of  1894  between  France  and 
Russia  has  never  been  published.  It  is  supposed  to  be 
a  treaty  of  mutual  defence  in  case  of  an  aggressive  attack. 
The  Power  from  whom  attack  is  expected  is  probably 
named,  as  in  the  treaty  between  Germany  and  Austria. 
It  is  probably  for  that  reason  that  the  treaty  was  not 
published.  The  accession  of  Great  Britain  to  what  then 
became  known  as  the  "Triple  Entente"  is  determined  by 
the  treaty  of  1904  with  France,  whereby  France  abandoned 
her  opposition  to  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt  in 
return  for  a  free  hand  in  Morocco;  and  by  the  treaty  of 
1907  with  Russia,  whereby  the  two  Powers  regulated 
their  relations  in  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  Thibet.  There 
is  no  mention  in  either  case  of  an  attack,  or  a  defence 
against  attack,  by  any  other  Power. 


20         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

between  any  States  which  do  not  arouse  sus- 
picion in  others.  And  the  drawing  together 
of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  did  in  fact  appear 
to  Germany  as  a  menace.  She  believed  that 
she  was  being  threatened  by  an  aggressive  com- 
bination, just  as,  on  the  other  hand,  she  herself 
seemed  to  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  a  danger 
to  be  guarded  against.  This  apprehension  on  the 
part  of  Germany  is  sometimes  thought  to  have 
been  mere  pretence,  but  there  is  every  reason  to 
suppose  it  to  have  been  genuine.  The  policy  of 
the  Entente  did  in  fact,  on  a  number  of  occasions, 
come  into  collision  with  that  of  Germany.  The 
arming  and  counter-arming  was  continuous.  And 
the  very  fact  that  from  the  side  of  the  Entente 
it  seemed  that  Germany  was  always  the  aggressor, 
should  suggest  to  us  that  from  the  other  side 
the  opposite  impression  would  prevail.  That,  in 
fact,  it  did  prevail  is  clear  not  only  from  the 
constant  assertions  of  German  statesmen  and  of 
the  German  Press,  but  from  contemporary  ob- 
servations made  by  the  representatives  of  a  State 
not  itself  involved  in  either  of  the  opposing  com- 
binations. The  dispatches  of  the  Belgian  am- 
bassadors at  Berlin,  Paris,  and  London  during 
the  years  1005  to  191 4  l  show  a  constant  impres- 

1  These   were   published   by    the   Norddeutsche   Allge- 
meine  Zeitung,  and  are  reprinted  under  the  title  "Bel- 


ALLIANCE  AND  ENTENTE  21 

sion  that  the  Entente  was  a  hostile  combination 
directed  against  Germany  and  engineered,  in  the 
earlier  years,  for  that  purpose  by  King  Ed- 
ward VII.  This  impression  of  the  Belgian  rep- 
resentatives is  no  proof,  it  is  true,  of  the  real 
intentions  of  the  Entente,  but  it  is  proof  of  how 
they  did  in  fact  appear  to  outsiders.  And  it  is 
irrelevant,  whether  or  no  it  be  true,  to  urge  that 
the  Belgians  were  indoctrinated  with  the  Ger- 
man view;  since  precisely  the  fact  that  they 
could  be  so  indoctrinated  would  show  that  the 
view  was  on  the  face  of  it  plausible.  We  see, 
then,  in  these  dispatches  the  way  in  which  the 
policy  of  the  Entente  could  appear  to  observers 
outside  it.  I  give  illustrations  from  Berlin,  Paris, 
and  London. 

On   May   30,    1908,   Baron   Greindl,   Belgian 
Ambassador  at  Berlin,  writes  as  follows : — 

Call  it  an  alliance,  entente,  or  what  you  will,  the  group- 
ing of  the  Powers  arranged  by  the  personal  intervention 

gische  Aktenstiicke,"  1905-14  (Ernst  Siegfried  Mittler 
and  Sons,  Berlin).  Their  authenticity,  as  far  as  I  know, 
has  not  been  disputed.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be 
assumed  that  they  have  been  very  carefully  "edited" 
by  the  German  to  make  a  particular  impression.  My 
view  of  the  policy  of  Germany  or  of  the  Entente  is  in 
no  sense  based  upon  them.  I  adduce  them  as  evidence 
of  contemporary  feeling  and  opinion. 


22         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

of  the  King  of  England  exists,  and  if  it  is  not  a  direct 
and  immediate  threat  of  war  against  Germany  (it  would 
be  too  much  to  say  that  it  was  that),  it  constitutes  none 
the  less  a  diminution  of  her  security.  The  necessary 
pacifist  declarations,  which,  no  doubt,  will  be  repeated 
at  Reval,  signify  very  little,  emanating  as  they  do  from 
three  Powers  which,  like  Russia  and  England,  have  just 
carried  through  successfully,  without  any  motive  except 
the  desire  for  aggrandizement,  and  without  even  a  plau- 
sible pretext,  wars  of  conquest  in  Manchuria  and  the 
Transvaal,  or  which,  like  France,  is  proceeding  at  this 
moment  to  the  conquest  of  Morocco,  in  contempt  of 
solemn  promises,  and  without  any  title  except  the  cession 
of  British  rights,  which  never  existed. 

On  May  24,  1907,  the  Comte  de  Lalaing, 
Belgian  Ambassador  at  London,  writes: — 

A  certain  section  of  the  Press,  called  here  the  Yellow 
Press,  bears  to  a  great  extent  the  responsibility  for  the 
hostile  feeling  between  the  two  nations.  ...  It  is  plain 
enough  that  official  England  is  quietly  pursuing  a  policy 
opposed  to  Germany  and  aimed  at  her  isolation,  and 
that  King  Edward  has  not  hesitated  to  use  his  personal 
influence  in  the  service  of  this  scheme.  But  it  is  cer- 
tainly exceedingly  dangerous  to  poison  public  opinion 
in  the  open  manner  adopted  by  these  irresponsible  jour- 
nals. 

Again,  on  July  28,  191 1,  in  the  midst  of  the 
Morocco  crisis,  Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Am- 
bassador at  Paris,  writes: — 


GREAT  BRITAIN  23 

I  have  great  confidence  in  the  pacific  sentiments  of 
the  Emperor  William,  in  spite  of  the  too  frequent  exag- 
geration of  some  of  his  gestures.  He  will  not  allow  himself 
to  be  drawn  on  farther  than  he  chooses  by  the  exuberant 
temperament  and  clumsy  manners  of  his  very  intelligent 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  (Kiderlen-Waechter).  I  feel, 
in  general,  less  faith  in  the  desire  of  Great  Britain  for 
peace.  She  would  not  be  sorry  to  see  the  others  eat  one 
another  up.  .  .  .  As  I  thought  from  the  beginning,  it 
is  in  London  that  the  key  to  the  situation  lies.  It  is  there 
only  that  it  can  become  grave.  The  French  will  yield  on 
all  the  points  for  the  sake  of  peace.  It  is  not  the  same  with 
the  English,  who  will  not  compromise  on  certain  prin- 
ciples and  certain  claims. 

3.  Great  Britain 

Having  established  this  general  fact  that  a 
state  of  mutual  suspicion  and  fear  prevailed 
between  Germany  and  the  Powers  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  let  us  next  consider  the  positions  and 
purposes  of  the  various  States  involved.  First, 
let  us  take  Great  Britain,  of  which  we  ought  to 
know  most.  Great  Britain  is  the  head  of  an 
Empire,  and  of  one,  in  point  of  territory  and 
population,  the  greatest  the  world  has  ever  seen. 
This  Empire  has  been  acquired  by  trade  and 
settlement,  backed  or  preceded  by  military 
force.  And  to  acquire  and  hold  it,  it  has  been 
necessary  to  wage  war  after  war,  not  only  over- 


24         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

seas  but  on  the  continent  of  Europe.  It  is, 
however,  as  we  have  already  noticed,  a  fact, 
and  a  cardinal  fact,  that  since  the  fifteenth 
century  British  ambitions  have  not  been  di- 
rected to  extending  empire  over  the  continent 
of  Europe.  On  the  contrary,  we  have  resisted 
by  arms  every  attempt  made  by  other  Powers 
in  that  direction.  That  is  what  we  have  meant 
by  maintaining  the  "balance  of  power."  We 
have  acted,  no  doubt,  in  our  own  interest,  or 
in  what  we  thought  to  be  such;  but  in  doing 
so  we  have  made  ourselves  the  champions  of 
those  European  nations  that  have  been  threat- 
ened by  the  excessive  power  of  their  neighbours. 
British  imperialism  has  thus,  for  four  centuries, 
not  endangered  but  guaranteed  the  independ- 
ence of  the  European  States.  Further,  our 
Empire  is  so  large  that  we  can  hardly  extend  it 
without  danger  of  being  unable  to  administer 
and  protect  it.  We  claim,  therefore,  that  we 
have  neither  the  need  nor  the  desire  to  wage 
wars  of  conquest.  But  we  ought  not  to  be  sur- 
prised if  this  attitude  is  not  accepted  without 
reserve  by  other  nations.  For  during  the  last 
half -century  we  have,  in  fact,  waged  wars  to 
annex  Egypt,  the  Soudan,  the  South  African 
Republics,  and  Burmah,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
succession  of  minor  wars  which  have  given  us 


GREAT  BRITAIN  25 

Zululand,  Rhodesia,  Nigeria,  and  Uganda.  Odd 
as  it  does,  I  believe,  genuinely  seem  to  most 
Englishmen,  we  are  regarded  on  the  Continent 
as  the  most  aggressive  Power  in  the  world,  al- 
though our  aggression  is  not  upon  Europe.  We 
cannot  expect,  therefore,  that  our  professions 
of  peaceableness  should  be  taken  very  seri- 
ously by  outsiders.  Nevertheless  it  is,  I  believe, 
true  that,  at  any  rate  during  the  last  fifteen 
years,  those  professions  have  been  genuine. 
Our  statesmen,  of  both  parties,  have  honestly 
desired  and  intended  to  keep  the  peace  of  the 
world.  And  they  have  been  assisted  in  this 
by  a  genuine  and  increasing  desire  for  peace 
in  the  nation.  The  Liberal  Government  in 
particular  has  encouraged  projects  of  arbitra- 
tion and  of  disarmament;  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
is  probably  the  most  pacific  Minister  that  ever 
held  office  in  a  great  nation.  But  our  past  in- 
evitably discredits,  in  this  respect,  our  future. 
And  when  we  profess  peace  it  is  not  unnatural 
that  other  nations  should  suspect  a  snare. 

Moreover,  this  desire  for  peace  on  our 
part  is  conditional  upon  the  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo  and  of  our  naval  supremacy. 
Our  vast  interests  in  every  part  of  the  world 
make  us  a  factor  everywhere  to  be  reckoned 
with.     East,  west,  north,  and  south,  no  other 


26         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

Power  can  take  a  step  without  finding  us  in 
the  path.  Those  States,  therefore,  which,  un- 
like ourselves,  are  desirous  farther  to  ex- 
tend their  power  and  influence  beyond  the 
seas,  must  always  reckon  with  us,  particu- 
larly if,  with  that  end  in  view,  by  increasing 
their  naval  strength  they  seem  to  threaten  our 
supremacy  at  sea.  This  attitude  of  ours  is 
not  to  be  blamed,  but  it  must  always  make 
difficult  the  maintenance  of  friendly  relations 
with  ambitious  Powers.  In  the  past  our  dif- 
ficulties have  been  mainly  with  Russia  and 
France.  In  recent  years  they  have  been  with 
Germany.  For  Germany,  since  1898,  for  the 
first  time  in  her  history,  has  been  in  a  position, 
and  has  made  the  choice,  to  become  a  World- 
Power.  For  that  reason,  as  well  as  to  protect 
her  commerce,  she  has  built  a  navy.  And  for 
that  reason  we,  pursuing  our  traditional  policy 
of  opposing  the  strongest  continental  Powers 
have  drawn  away  from  her  and  towards  Russia 
and  France.  We  did  not,  indeed,  enter  upon 
our  arrangements  with  these  latter  Powers  be- 
cause of  aggressive  intentions  towards  Germany. 
But  the  growth  of  German  sea-power  drove  us 
more  and  more  to  rely  upon  the  Entente  in  case 
it  should  be  necessary  for  us  to  defend  ourselves. 
All  this  followed  inevitably  from  the  logic  of  the 


FRANCE  27 

position,  given  the  European  anarchy.  I  state  it 
for  the  sake  of  exposition,  not  of  criticism,  and 
I  do  not  imagine  any  reader  will  quarrel  with  my 
statement. 

4.  France 

Let  us  turn  now  to  France.  Since  1870  we 
find  contending  there,  with  varying  fortunes 
and  strength,  two  opposite  currents  of  senti- 
ment and  policy.  One  was  that  of  revanche 
against  Germany,  inspired  by  the  old  tradi- 
tions of  glory  and  hegemony,  associated  with 
hopes  of  a  monarchist  or  imperialistic  revolu- 
tion, and  directed,  in  the  first  place,  to  a  re- 
covery of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  other  policy 
was  that  of  peace  abroad  and  socialistic  trans- 
formation at  home,  inspired  by  the  modern  ideals 
of  justice  and  fraternity,  and  supported  by  the 
best  of  the  younger  generation  of  philosophers, 
poets,  and  artists,  as  well  as  by  the  bulk  of  the 
working  class.  Nowhere  have  these  two  cur- 
rents of  contemporary  aspiration  met  and  con- 
tended as  fiercely  as  in  France.  The  Dreyfus 
case  was  the  most  striking  act  in  the  great 
drama.  But  it  was  not  the  concluding  one. 
French  militarism,  in  that  affair,  was  scotched 
but  not  killed,  and  the  contest  was  never  fiercer 
than  in   the  years   immediately  preceding   the 


28         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

war.  The  fighters  for  peace  were  the  Socialists, 
under  their  leader,  Jaures,  the  one  great  man 
in  the  public  life  of  Europe.  While  recogniz- 
ing the  urgent  need  for  adequate  national  de- 
fence, Jaures  laboured  so  to  organize  it  that 
it  could  not  be  mistaken  for  nor  converted  into 
aggression.  He  laboured,  at  the  same  time, 
to  remove  the  cause  of  the  danger.  In  the  year 
1 91 3,  under  Swiss  auspices,  a  meeting  of  French 
and  German  pacifists  was  arranged  at  Berne. 
To  this  meeting  there  proceeded  167  French 
deputies  and  48  senators.  The  Baron  d'Estour- 
nelles  de  Constant  was  president  of  the  French 
bureau,  and  Jaures  one  of  the  vice-presidents. 
The  result  was  disappointing.  The  German 
participation  was  small  and  less  influential  than 
the  French,  and  no  agreement  could  be  reached 
on  the  burning  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
But  the  French  Socialists  continued,  up  to  the 
eve  of  the  war,  to  fight  for  peace  with  an  en- 
ergy, an  intelligence,  and  a  determination  shown 
in  no  other  country.  The  assassination  of  Jaures 
was  a  symbol  of  the  assassination  of  peace;  but 
the  assassin  was  a  Frenchman. 

For  if,  in  France,  the  current  for  peace 
ran  strong  in  these  latter  years,  so  did  the  cur- 
rent for  war.  French  chauvinism  had  waxed 
and    waned,    but    it    was    never    extinguished. 


FRANCE  29 

After  1870  it  centred  not  only  about  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  but  also  about  the  colonial  ex- 
pansion which  took  from  that  date  a  new 
lease  of  life  in  France,  as  it  had  done  in 
England  after  the  loss  of  the  American  colo- 
nies. Directly  encouraged  by  Bismarck,  France 
annexed  Tunis  in  1881.  The  annexation  of 
Tunis  led  up  at  last  to  that  of  Morocco.  Other 
territory  had  been  seized  in  the  Far  East,  and 
France  became,  next  to  ourselves,  the  greatest 
colonial  Power.  This  policy  could  not  be  pur- 
sued without  friction,  and  the  principal  friction 
at  the  beginning  was  with  ourselves.  Once 
at  least,  in  the  Fashoda  crisis,  the  two  coun- 
tries were  on  the  verge  of  war,  and  it  was  not 
till  the  Entente  of  1904  that  their  relations  were 
adjusted  on  a  basis  of  give-and-take.  But  by 
that  time  Germany  had  come  into  the  colonial 
field,  and  the  Entente  with  England  meant 
new  friction  with  Germany,  turning  upon  French 
designs  in  Morocco.  In  this  matter  Great  Britain 
supported  her  ally,  and  the  incident  of  Agadir 
in  191 1  showed  the  solidity  of  the  Entente.  This 
demonstration  no  doubt  strengthened  the  hands 
of  the  aggressive  elements  in  France,  and  later 
on  the  influence  of  M.  Delcass6  and  M.  Poin- 
care  was  believed  in  certain  quarters  to  have 
given  new  energy   to   this  direction  of  French 


30  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

policy.  This  tendency  to  chauvinism  was  recog- 
nized as  a  menace  to  peace,  and  we  find  reflec- 
tions of  that  feeling  in  the  Belgian  dispatches. 
Thus,  for  instance,  Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian 
minister  at  Paris,  writes  on  February  21,  191 3, 
of  M.  PoincarS: — 

It  is  under  his  Ministry  that  the  military,  and  slightly 
chauvinistic  instincts  of  the  French  people  have  awakened. 
His  hand  can  be  seen  in  this  modification;  it  is  to  be  hoped 
that  his  political  intelligence,  practical  and  cool,  will 
save  him  from  all  exaggeration  in  this  course.  The  notable 
increase  of  German  armaments  which  supervenes  at  the 
moment  of  M.  Poincare's  entrance  at  the  Elysee  will 
increase  the  danger  of  a  too  nationalistic  orientation  of 
the  policy  of  France. 

Again,  on  March  3,  1913: — 

The  German  Ambassador  said  to  me  on  Saturday: 
"The  political  situation  is  much  improved  in  the  last 
forty-eight  hours;  the  tension  is  generally  relaxed;  one 
may  hope  for  a  return  to  peace  in  the  near  future.  But 
what  does  not  improve  is  the  state  of  public  opinion  in 
France  and  Germany  with  regard  to  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  We  are  persuaded  in  Germany 
that  a  spirit  of  chauvinism  having  revived,  we  have  to 
fear  an  attack  by  the  Republic.  In  France  they  express 
the  same  fear  with  regard  to  us.  The  consequence  of 
these  misunderstandings  is  to  ruin  us  both.  I  do  not 
know  where  we  are  going  on  this  perilous  route.  Will  not  a 
man  appear  of  sufficient  goodwill  and  prestige  to  recall 


FRANCE  31 

every  one  to  reason?  All  this  is  the  more  ridiculous 
because,  during  the  crisis  we  are  traversing,  the  two 
Governments  have  given  proof  of  the  most  pacific  senti- 
ments, and  have  continually  relied  upon  one  another  to 
avoid  conflicts." 

On  this  Baron  Guillaume  comments: — 

Baron  Schoen  is  perfectly  right.  I  am  not  in  a  position 
to  examine  German  opinion,  but  I  note  every  day  how 
public  opinion  in  France  becomes  more  suspicious  and 
chauvinistic.  One  meets  people  who  assure  one  that  a 
war  with  Germany  in  the  near  future  is  certain  and  in- 
evitable. People  regret  it,  but  make  up  their  minds 
to  it.  .  .  .  They  demand,  almost  by  acclamation,  an 
immediate  vote  for  every  means  of  increasing  the  defen- 
sive power  of  France.  The  most  reasonable  men  assert 
that  it  is  necessary  to  arm  to  the  teeth  to  frighten  the 
enemy  and  prevent  war. 

On  April  16th  he  reports  a  conversation  with 
M.  Pichon,  in  which  the  latter  says: — 

Among  us,  too,  there  is  a  spirit  of  chauvinism  which 
is  increasing,  which  I  deplore,  and  against  which  we 
ought  to  react.  Half  the  theatres  in  Paris  now  play 
chauvinistic  and  nationalistic  pieces. 

The  note  of  alarm  becomes  more  urgent  as 
the  days  go  on.  On  January  16,  1914,  the  Baron 
writes: — 

I  have  already  had  the  honour  to  tell  you  that  it  is 
MM.   Poincare,   Delcasse,  Millerand  and  their  friends 


32         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

who  have  invented  and  pursued  the  nationalistic  and 
chauvinistic  policy  which  menaces  to-day  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  of  which  we  have  noted  the  renaissance. 
It  is  a  danger  for  Europe  and  for  Belgium.  I  see  in  it 
the  greatest  peril,  which  menaces  the  peace  of  Europe 
to-day;  not  that  I  have  the  right  to  suppose  that  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  is  disposed  deliberately  to 
trouble  the  peace,  rather  I  believe  the  contrary;  but  the 
attitude  that  the  Barthou  Cabinet  has  taken  up  is,  in  my 
judgment,  the  determining  cause  of  an  excess  of  mil- 
itaristic tendencies  in  Germany. 

It  is  clear  from  these  quotations,  and  it  is 
for  this  reason  alone  that  I  give  them,  that  France, 
supported  by  the  other  members  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  could  appear,  and  did  appear,  as  much 
a  menace  to  Germany  as  Germany  appeared  a 
menace  to  France;  that  in  France,  as  in  other 
countries,  there  was  jingoism  as  well  as  pacifism; 
and  that  the  inability  of  French  public  opinion 
to  acquiesce  in  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was 
an  active  factor  in  the  unrest  of  Europe.  Once 
more  I  state  these  facts,  I  do  not  criticize  them. 
They  are  essential  to  the  comprehension  of  the 
international  situation. 

5.  Russia 

We  have  spoken  so  far  of  the  West.  But 
the  Entente  between  France  and  Russia,  dat- 


RUSSIA  33 

ing  from  1894,  brought  the  latter  into  direct 
contact  with  Eastern  policy.  The  motives  and 
even  the  terms  of  the  Dual  Alliance  are  imper- 
fectly known.  Considerations  of  high  finance 
are  supposed  to  have  been  an  important  factor 
in  it.  But  the  main  intention,  no  doubt,  was 
to  strengthen  both  Powers  in  the  case  of  a  pos- 
sible conflict  with  Germany.  The  chances  of 
war  between  Germany  and  France  were  thus 
definitely  increased,  for  now  there  could  hardly 
be  an  Eastern  war  without  a  Western  one. 
Germany  must  therefore  regard  herself  as  com- 
pelled to  wage  war,  if  war  should  come,  on  both 
fronts;  and  in  all  her  fears  or  her  ambitions  this 
consideration  must  play  a  principal  part.  Fric- 
tion in  the  East  must  involve  friction  in  the 
West,  and  vice  versa.  What  were  the  causes 
of  friction  in  the  West  we  have  seen.  Let  us 
now  consider  the  cause  of  friction  in  the  East. 
The  relations  of  Russia  to  Germany  have 
been  and  are  of  a  confused  and  complicated 
character,  changing  as  circumstances  and  per- 
sonalities change.  But  one  permanent  factor 
has  been  the  sympathy  between  the  governing 
elements  in  the  two  countries.  The  governing 
class  in  Russia,  indeed,  has  not  only  been  in- 
spired by  German  ideas,  it  has  been  largely 
recruited  from  men  of   German  stock;  and  it 


34         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

has  manifested  all  the  contempt  and  hatred 
which  is  characteristic  of  the  German  bureaucracy 
for  the  ideals  of  democracy,  liberty,  and  free 
thought.  The  two  Governments  have  always 
been  ready  to  combine  against  popular  insur- 
rections, and  in  particular  against  every  attempt 
of  the  Poles  to  recover  their  liberty.  They  have 
been  drawn  and  held  together  by  a  common 
interest  in  tyranny,  and  the  renewal  of  that 
co-operation  is  one  of  the  dangers  of  the  future. 
On  the  other  hand,  apart  from  and  in  opposi- 
tion to  this  common  political  interest,  there 
exists  between  the  two  nations  a  strong  racial 
antagonism.  The  Russian  temperament  is  rad- 
ically opposed  to  the  German.  The  one  expresses 
itself  in  Panslavism,  the  other  in  Pangerman- 
ism.  And  this  opposition  of  temperament  is 
likely  to  be  deeper  and  more  enduring  than  the 
sympathy  of  the  one  autocracy  with  the  other. 
But  apart  from  this  racial  factor,  there  is  in 
the  south-east  an  opposition  of  political  ambi- 
tion. Primarily,  the  Balkan  question  is  an  Austro- 
Russian  rather  than  a  Russo-German  one.  Bis- 
marck professed  himself  indifferent  to  the  fate 
of  the  Balkan  peoples,  and  even  avowed  a  will- 
ingness to  see  Russia  at  Constantinople.  But 
recent  years  have  seen,  in  this  respect,  a  great 
change.     The   alliance   between    Germany   and 


RUSSIA  35 

Austria,  dating  from  1879,  has  become  closer 
and  closer  as  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  have 
drawn  together  in  what  appeared  to  be  a  men- 
acing combination.  It  has  been,  for  some  time 
past,  a  cardinal  principle  of  German  policy  to 
support  her  ally  in  the  Balkans,  and  this  deter- 
mination has  been  increased  by  German  ambi- 
tions in  the  East.  The  ancient  dream  of  Russia 
to  possess  Constantinople  has  been  countered 
by  the  new  German  dream  of  a  hegemony  over 
the  near  East  based  upon  the  through  route 
from  Berlin  via  Vienna  and  Constantinople  to 
Bagdad;  and  this  political  opposition  has  been 
of  late  years  the  determining  factor  in  the  re- 
lationship of  the  two  Powers.  The  danger  of 
a  Russo-German  conflict  has  thus  been  very 
great,  and  since  the  Russo-French  Entente  Ger- 
many, as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  has  seen 
herself  menaced  on  either  front  by  a  war  which 
would  immediately  endanger  both. 

Turning  once  more  to  the  Belgian  dispatches, 
we  find  such  hints  as  the  following.  On  Octo- 
ber 24,  191 2,  the  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Belgian 
Ambassador  to  London,  writes  as  follows: — 

The  French  Ambassador,  who  must  have  special  rea- 
sons for  speaking  thus,  has  repeated  to  me  several  times 
that  the  greatest  danger  for  the  maintenance  of  the  peace 
of  Europe  consists  in  the  indiscipline  and  the  personal 


36         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

policy  of  the  Russian  agents.  They  are  almost  all  ardent 
Panslavists,  and  it  is  to  them  that  must  be  imputed  the 
responsibility  for  the  events  that  are  occurring.  Beyond 
a  doubt  they  will  make  themselves  the  secret  instigators 
for  an  intervention  of  their  country  in  the  Balkan  conflict. 

On  November  30,  191 2,  Baron  de  Beyens 
writes  from  Berlin : — 

At  the  end  of  last  week  a  report  was  spread  in  the 
chancelleries  of  Europe  that  M.  Sazonov  had  aban- 
doned the  struggle  against  the  Court  party  which  wishes 
to  drag  Russia  into  war. 

On  June  9,  1914,  Baron  Guillaume  writes 
from  Paris: — 

Is  it  true  that  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  has  im- 
posed upon  this  country  [France]  the  adoption  of  the  law 
of  three  years,  and  would  now  bring  to  bear  the  whole 
weight  of  its  influence  to  ensure  its  maintenance?  I 
have  not  been  able  to  obtain  light  upon  this  delicate 
point,  but  it  would  be  all  the  more  serious,  inasmuch  as 
the  men  who  direct  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars  cannot  be 
unaware  that  the  effort  thus  demanded  of  the  French  na- 
tion is  excessive,  and  cannot  be  long  sustained.  Is,  then, 
the  attitude  of  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  based  upon 
the  conviction  that  events  are  so  imminent  that  it  will  be 
possible  to  use  the  tool  it  intends  to  put  into  the  hands  of 
its  ally? 

What  a  sinister  vista  is  opened  up  by  this 
passage!     I  have  no  wish  to  insinuate  that  the 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  37 

suspicion  here  expressed  was  justified.  It  is 
the  suspicion  itself  that  is  the  point.  Dimly  we 
see,  as  through  a  mist,  the  figures  of  the  ar- 
chitects of  war.  We  see  that  the  forces  they 
wield  are  ambition  and  pride,  jealousy  and  fear; 
that  these  are  all-pervasive;  that  they  affect 
all  Governments  and  all  nations,  and  are  fostered 
by  conditions  for  which  all  alike  are  responsible. 
It  will  be  understood,  of  course,  that  in  bring- 
ing out  the  fact  that  there  was  national  chauvin- 
ism in  Russia  and  that  this  found  its  excuse 
in  the  unstable  equiHbrium  of  Europe,  I  am 
making  no  attack  on  Russian  policy.  I  do  not 
pretend  to  know  whether  these  elements  of  opin- 
ion actually  influenced  the  policy  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. But  they  certainly  influenced  Ger- 
man fears,  and  without  a  knowledge  of  them 
it  is  impossible  to  understand  German  policy. 
The  reader  must  bear  in  mind  this  source  of 
friction  along  with  the  others  when  we  come 
to  consider  that  policy  in  detail. 

6.  Austria-Hungary 

Turning  now  to  Austria-Hungary,  we  find 
in  her  the  Power  to  whom  the  immediate  occa- 
sion of  the  war  was  due,  the  Power,  moreover, 
who  contributed  in  large  measure  to  its  remoter 


38         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

causes.  Austria-Hungary  is  a  State,  but  not  a 
nation.  It  has  no  natural  bond  to  hold  its  popula- 
tions together,  and  it  continues  its  political 
existence  by  force  and  fraud,  by  the  connivance 
and  the  self-interest  of  other  States,  rather  than 
by  any  inherent  principle  of  vitality.  It  is  in 
relation  to  the  Balkan  States  that  this  insta- 
bility has  been  most  marked  and  most  danger- 
ous. Since  the  kingdom  of  Serbia  acquired  its 
independent  existence  it  has  been  a  centre  draw- 
ing to  itself  the  discontent  and  the  ambitions 
of  the  Slav  populations  under  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy. The  realization  of  those  ambitions  im- 
plies the  disruption  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
State.  But  behind  the  Southern  Slavs  stands 
Russia,  and  any  attempt  to  change  the  political 
status  in  the  Balkans  has  thus  meant,  for  years 
past,  acute  risk  of  war  between  the  two  Em- 
pires that  border  them.  This  political  rivalry 
has  accentuated  the  racial  antagonism  between 
German  and  Slav,  and  was  the  immediate  origin 
of  the  war  which  presents  itself  to  Englishmen 
as  one  primarily  between  Germany  and  the  West- 
ern Powers. 

On  the  position  of  Italy  it  is  not  necessary 
to  dwell.  It  had  long  been  suspected  that  she 
was  a  doubtful  factor  in  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
the  event  has  proved  that  this  suspicion  was 


GERMANY  1866-1870  39 

correct.  But  though  Italy  has  participated  in 
the  war,  her  action  had  no  part  in  producing 
it.  And  we  need  not  here  indicate  the  course 
and  the  motives  of  her  policy. 

7.  Germany 

Having  thus  indicated  briefly  the  position, 
the  perils,  and  the  ambitions  of  the  other  Great 
Powers  of  Europe,  let  us  turn  to  consider  the 
proper  subject  of  this  essay,  the  policy  of  Ger- 
many. And  first  let  us  dwell  on  the  all-important 
fact  that  Germany,  as  a  Great  Power,  is  a  crea- 
tion of  the  last  fifty  years.  Before  1866  there 
was  a  loose  confederation  of  German  States, 
after  1870  there  was  an  Empire  of  the  Germans. 
The  transformation  was  the  work  of  Bismarck, 
and  it  was  accomplished  by  "blood  and  iron." 
Whether  it  could  have  been  accomplished  other- 
wise is  matter  of  speculation.  That  it  was  ac- 
complished so  is  a  fact,  and  a  fact  of  tragic  sig- 
nificance. For  it  established  among  Germans 
the  prestige  of  force  and  fraud,  and  gave  them 
as  their  national  hero  the  man  whose  most  char- 
acteristic act  was  the  falsification  of  the  Ems 
telegram.  If  the  unification  could  have  been 
achieved  in  1848  instead  of  in  1870,  if  the  free 
and  generous  idealism  of  that  epoch  could  have 


40         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

triumphed,  as  it  deserved  to,  if  Germans  had 
not  bartered  away  their  souls  for  the  sake  of 
the  kingdom  of  this  world,  we  might  have  been 
spared  this  last  and  most  terrible  act  in  the 
bloody  drama  of  European  history.  If  even, 
after  1866,  1870  had  not  been  provoked,  the 
catastrophe  that  is  destroying  Europe  before 
our  eyes  might  never  have  overwhelmed  us. 
In  the  crisis  of  1870  the  French  minister  who 
fought  so  long  and  with  such  tenacity  for  peace 
saw  and  expressed,  with  the  lucidity  of  his  na- 
tion, what  the  real  issue  was  for  Germany  and 
for  Europe: — 

There  exists,  it  is  true,  a  barbarous  Germany,  greedy 
of  battles  and  conquest,  the  Germany  of  the  country 
squires;  there  exists  a  Germany  pharisaic  and  iniquitous, 
the  Germany  of  all  the  unintelligible  pedants  whose 
empty  lucubrations  and  microscopic  researches  have 
been  so  unduly  vaunted.  But  these  two  Germanies  are 
not  the  great  Germany,  that  of  the  artists,  the  poets, 
the  thinkers,  that  of  Bach,  Mozart,  Beethoven,  Goethe, 
Schiller,  Heine,  Leibnitz,  Kant,  Hegel,  Liebig.  This 
latter  Germany  is  good,  generous,  humane,  pacific;  it 
finds  expression  in  the  touching  phrase  of  Goethe,  who 
when  asked  to  write  against  us  replied  that  he  could 
not  find  it  in  his  heart  to  hate  the  French.  If  we  do  not 
oppose  the  natural  movement  of  German  unity,  if  we 
allow  it  to  complete  itself  quietly  by  successive  stages, 
it  will  not  give  supremacy  to  the  barbarous  and  sophistical 
Germany,  it  will  assure  it  to  the  Germany  of  intellect 


GERMANY  1866-1870  41 

and  culture.  War,  on  the  other  hand,  would  establish, 
during  a  time  impossible  to  calculate,  the  domination 
of  the  Germany  of  the  squires  and  the  pedants.1 

The  generous  dream  was  not  to  be  realized. 
French  chauvinism  fell  into  the  trap  Bismarck 
had  prepared  for  it.  Yet  even  at  the  last  mo- 
ment his  war  would  have  escaped  him  had  he 
not  recaptured  it  by  fraud.  The  publication 
of  the  Ems  telegram  made  the  conflict  inevi- 
table, and  one  of  the  most  hideous  and  sinister 
scenes  in  all  history  is  that  in  which  the  three 
conspirators,  Bismarck,  Moltke,  and  Roon, 
"suddenly  recovered  their  pleasure  in  eating 
and  drinking,"  because,  by  publishing  a  lie, 
they  had  secured  the  certain  death  in  battle  of 
hundreds  and  thousands  of  young  men.  The 
spirit  of  Bismarck  has  infected  the  whole  public 
life  of  Germany  and  of  Europe.  It  has  given 
a  new  lease  to  the  political  philosophy  of  Mach- 
iavelli,  and  made  of  every  budding  statesman 
and  historian  a  solemn  or  a  cynical  defender  of 
the  gospel  of  force.  But,  though  this  be  true, 
we  have  no  right  therefore  to  assume  that  there 
is  some  peculiar  wickedness  which  marks  off 
German  policy  from  that  of  all  other  nations. 
Machiavellianism    is    the    common    heritage   of 

1  Emile  Ollivier,  "L'Empire  Liberal." 


42         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

Europe.  It  is  the  translation  into  idea  of  the 
fact  of  international  anarchy.  Germans  have 
been  more  candid  and  brutal  than  others  in  their 
expression  and  application  of  it,  but  statesmen, 
politicians,  publicists,  and  historians  in  every 
nation  accept  it,  under  a  thicker  or  thinner  veil 
of  plausible  sophisms.  It  is  everywhere  the  iron 
hand  within  the  silken  glove.  It  is  the  great 
European  tradition. 

Although,  moreover,  it  was  by  these  methods 
that  Bismarck  accomplished  the  unification  of 
Germany,  his  later  policy  was,  by  common  con- 
sent, a  policy  of  peace.  War  had  done  its  part, 
and  the  new  Germany  required  all  its  energies 
to  build  up  its  internal  prosperity  and  strength. 
In  1875,  it  is  true,  Bismarck  was  credited  with 
the  intention  to  fall  once  more  upon  France. 
The  fact  does  not  seem  to  be  clearly  established. 
At  any  rate,  if  such  was  his  intention,  it  was 
frustrated  by  the  intervention  of  Russia  and  of 
Great  Britain.  During  the  thirty-nine  years 
that  followed  Germany  kept  the  peace. 

While  France,  England,  and  Russia  waged 
wars  on  a  great  scale,  and  while  the  former  Powers 
acquired  enormous  extensions  of  territory,  the 
only  military  operations  undertaken  by  Germany 
were  against  African  natives  in  her  dependencies 
and  against  China  in  1900.    The  conduct  of  the 


GERMANY   1890-1900  43 

German  troops  appears,  it  is  true,  to  have  been 
distinguished,  in  this  latter  expedition,  by  a  bru- 
tality which  stood  out  in  relief  even  in  that  orgy 
of  slaughter  and  loot.  But  we  must  remember 
that  they  were  specially  ordered  by  their  Imperial 
master,  in  the  name  of  Jesus  Christ,  to  show 
no  mercy  and  give  no  quarter.  Apart  from  this, 
it  will  not  be  disputed,  by  any  one  who  knows 
the  facts,  that  during  the  first  twenty  years  or 
so  after  1875  Germany  was  the  Power  whose 
diplomacy  was  the  least  disturbing  to  Europe. 
The  chief  friction  during  that  period  was  between 
Russia  and  France  and  Great  Britain,  and  it 
was  one  or  other  of  these  Powers,  according  to 
the  angle  of  vision,  which  was  regarded  as  offer- 
ing the  menace  of  aggression.  If  there  has  been 
a  German  plot  against  the  peace  of  the  world,  it 
does  not  date  from  before  the  decade  1 890-1 900. 
The  close  of  that  decade  marks,  in  fact,  a  new 
epoch  in  German  policy.  The  years  of  peace 
had  been  distinguished  by  the  development  of 
industry  and  trade  and  internal  organization. 
The  population  increased  from  forty  millions  in 
1870  to  over  sixty-five  millions  at  the  present 
date.  Foreign  trade  increased  more  than  ten- 
fold. National  pride  and  ambition  grew  with 
the  growth  of  prosperity  and  force,  and  senti- 
ment as  well  as  need  impelled  German  policy 


44         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

to  claim  a  share  of  influence  outside  Europe  in 
that  greater  world  for  the  control  of  which  the 
other  nations  were  struggling.  Already  Bis- 
marck, though  with  reluctance  and  scepticism, 
had  acquired  for  his  country  by  negotiation  large 
areas  in  Africa.  But  that  did  not  satisfy  the 
ambitions  of  the  colonial  party.  The  new  Kaiser 
put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  new  movement, 
and  announced  that  henceforth  nothing  must  be 
done  in  any  part  of  the  world  without  the  cog- 
nizance and  acquiescence  of  Germany. 

Thus  there  entered  a  new  competitor  upon 
the  stage  of  the  world,  and  his  advent  of  necessity 
was  disconcerting  and  annoying  to  the  earlier 
comers.  But  is  there  reason  to  suppose  that, 
from  that  moment,  German  policy  was  definitely 
aiming  at  empire,  and  was  prepared  to  provoke 
war  to  achieve  it?  Strictly,  no  answer  can  be 
given  to  this  question.  The  remoter  intentions 
of  statesmen  are  rarely  avowed  to  others,  and, 
perhaps,  rarely  to  themselves.  Their  policy  is, 
indeed,  less  continuous,  less  definite,  and  more 
at  the  mercy  of  events  than  observers  or  critics 
are  apt  to  suppose.  It  is  not  probable  that  Ger- 
many, any  more  than  any  other  country  in  Eu- 
rope, was  pursuing  during  those  years  a  definite 
plan,  thought  out  and  predetermined  in  every 
point. 


GERMANY  45 

In  Germany,  as  elsewhere,  both  in  home  and 
foreign  affairs,  there  was  an  intense  and  unceas- 
ing conflict  of  competing  forces  and  ideas.  In 
Germany,  as  elsewhere,  policy  must  have  adapted 
itself  to  circumstances,  different  personalities 
must  have  given  it  different  directions  at  different 
times.  We  have  not  the  information  at  our  dis- 
posal which  would  enable  us  to  trace  in  detail 
the  devious  course  of  diplomacy  in  any  of  the 
countries  of  Europe.  What  we  know  something 
about  is  the  general  situation,  and  the  action, 
in  fact,  taken  at  certain  moments.  The  rest 
must  be,  for  the  present,  mainly  matter  of 
conjecture.  With  this  word  of  caution,  let  us 
now  proceed  to  examine  the  policy  of  Ger- 
many. 

The  general  situation  we  have  already  indi- 
cated. We  have  shown  how  the  armed  peace, 
which  is  the  chronic  malady  of  Europe,  had  as- 
sumed during  the  ten  years  from  1904  to  1914 
that  specially  dangerous  form  which  grouped 
the  Great  Powers  in  two  opposite  camps — the 
Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente.  We 
have  seen,  in  the  case  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  and  Austria-Hungary,  how  they  came 
to  take  their  places  in  that  constellation.  We 
have  now  to  put  Germany  in  its  setting  in  the 
picture. 


46         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

Germany,  then,  in  the  first  place,  like  the 
other  Powers,  had  occasion  to  anticipate 
war.  It  might  be  made  from  the  West,  on  the 
question  of  Alsace-Lorraine;  it  might  be  made 
from  the  East,  on  the  question  of  the  Bal- 
kans. In  either  case,  the  system  of  alliances 
was  likely  to  bring  into  play  other  States 
than  those  immediately  involved,  and  the  Ger- 
man Powers  might  find  themselves  attacked  on 
all  fronts,  while  they  knew  in  the  latter  years 
that  they  could  not  count  upon  the  support  of 
Italy. 

A  reasonable  prudence,  if  nothing  else,  must 
keep  Germany  armed  and  apprehensive.  But 
besides  the  maintenance  of  what  she  had,  Ger- 
many was  now  ambitious  to  secure  her  share  of 
"world-power."  Let  us  examine  in  what  spirit 
and  by  what  acts  she  endeavoured  to  make  her 
claim  good. 

First,  what  was  the  tone  of  public  opinion 
in  Germany  during  these  critical  years? 

8.  Opinion  in  Germany 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  pamph- 
let literature  in  the  countries  of  the  Entente 
has  been  full  of  citations  from  German  po- 
litical writers.      In  England,  in  particular,  the 


OPINION  IN  GERMANY  47 

names  and  works  of  Bernhardi  and  of  Treitschke 
have  become  more  familiar  than  they  appear  to 
have  been  in  Germany  prior  to  the  war.  This 
method  of  selecting  for  polemical  purposes  certain 
tendencies  of  sentiment  and  theory,  and  ignoring 
all  others,  is  one  which  could  be  applied,  with 
damaging  results,  to  any  country  in  the  world. 
Mr.  Angell  has  shown  in  his  "Prussianism  in 
England"  how  it  might  be  applied  to  ourselves; 
and  a  German,  no  doubt,  into  whose  hands  that 
book  might  fall  would  draw  conclusions  about 
public  opinion  here  similar  to  those  which  we 
have  drawn  about  public  opinion  in  Germany. 
There  is  jingoism  in  all  countries,  as  there  is 
pacifism  in  all  countries.  Nevertheless,  I  think 
it  is  true  to  say  that  the  jingoism  of  Germany 
has  been  peculiar  both  in  its  intensity  and  in 
its  character.  This  special  quality  appears  to 
be  due  both  to  the  temperament  and  to  the 
recent  history  of  the  German  nation.  The 
Germans  are  romantic,  as  the  French  are  im- 
pulsive, the  English  sentimental,  and  the  Rus- 
sians religious.  There  is  some  real  meaning 
in  these  generalisations.  They  are  easily  to 
be  felt  when  one  comes  into  contact  with  a 
nation,  though  they  may  be  hard  to  establish 
or  define.  When  I  say  that  the  Germans  are 
romantic,  I   mean  that  they  do  not  easily  or 


48         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

willingly  see  things  as  they  are.  Their  tempera- 
ment is  like  a  medium  of  coloured  glass.  It 
magnifies,  distorts,  conceals,  transmutes.  And 
this  is  as  true  when  their  intellectual  attitude 
is  realistic  as  when  it  is  idealistic.  In  the  Ger- 
many of  the  past,  the  Germany  of  small  States, 
to  which  all  non-Germans  look  back  with  such 
sympathy  and  such  regret,  their  thinkers  and 
poets  were  inspired  by  grandiose  intellectual 
abstractions.  They  saw  ideas,  like  gods,  mov- 
ing the  world,  and  actual  men  and  women,  actual 
events  and  things,  were  but  the  passing  symbols 
of  these  supernatural  powers;  1866  and  1870 
ended  all  that.  The  unification  of  Germany, 
in  the  way  we  have  discussed,  diverted  all  their 
interest  from  speculation  about  the  universe, 
life,  and  mankind,  to  the  material  interests  of 
their  new  country.  Germany  became  the  pre- 
occupation of  all  Germans.  From  abstractions 
they  turned  with  a  new  intoxication  to  what 
they  conceived  to  be  the  concrete.  Entering 
thus  late  upon  the  stage  of  national  politics, 
they  devoted  themselves,  with  their  accustomed 
thoroughness,  to  learning  and  bettering  what 
they  conceived  to  be  the  principles  and  the  prac- 
tice which  had  given  success  to  other  nations. 
In  this  quest  no  scruples  should  deter  them,  no 
sentimentality  hamper,   no  universal  ideas  dis- 


OPINION  IN  GERMANY  49 

tract.  Yet  this,  after  all,  was  but  German  ro- 
manticism assuming  another  form.  The  objects, 
it  is  true,  were  different.  "Actuality"  had  taken 
the  place  of  ideals,  Germany  of  Humanity.  But 
by  the  German  vision  the  new  objects  were  no 
less  distorted  than  the  old.  In  dealing  with 
"Real-politik"  (which  is  the  German  transla- 
tion of  Machiavellianism),  with  "expansion," 
with  "survival  of  the  fittest,"  and  all  the  other 
shibboleths  of  world-policy,  their  outlook  re- 
mained as  absolute  and  abstract  as  before,  as 
contemptuous  of  temperament  and  measure,  as 
blind  to  those  compromises  and  qualifications, 
those  decencies,  so  to  speak,  of  nature,  by  which 
reality  is  constituted.  The  Germans  now  saw 
men  instead  of  gods,  but  they  saw  them  as  trees 
walking. 

German  imperialism,  then,  while  it  involves 
the  same  intellectual  presuppositions,  the  same 
confusions,  the  same  erroneous  arguments,  the 
same  short-sighted  ambitions,  as  the  imperial- 
ism of  other  countries,  exhibits  them  all  in  an 
extreme  degree.  All  peoples  admire  themselves. 
But  the  self-adoration  of  Germans  is  so  naive, 
so  frank,  so  unqualified,  as  to  seem  sheerly  ridicu- 
lous to  more  experienced  nations.1    The  English 

1  As  I  write  I  come  across  the  following,  cited  from  a 


50         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

and  the  French,  too,  believe  their  civilization 
to  be  the  best  in  the  world.  But  English  common- 
sense  and  French  sanity  would  prevent  them 
from  announcing  to  other  peoples  that  they  pro- 
posed to  conquer  them,  morally  or  materially, 
for  their  good.  All  Jingoes  admire  and  desire 
war.  But  nowhere  else  in  the  modern  world  is 
to  be  found  such  a  debauch  of  " romantic' '  en- 
thusiasm, such  a  wilful  blindness  to  all  the  reali- 
ties of  war,  as  Germany  has  manifested  both 
before  and  since  the  outbreak  of  this  world- 
catastrophe.  A  reader  of  German  newspapers 
and  tracts  gets  at  last  a  feeling  of  nausea  at  the 
very  words  Wir  Deutsche,  followed  by  the  eter- 
nal Helden,  Heldenthum,  Heldenthat,  and  is  in- 
clined to  thank  God  if  he  indeed  belong  to  a 
nation  sane  enough  to  be  composed  of  Handler. 

The  very  antithesis  between  Helden  (heroes) 
and  Handler   (hucksters),   with  which  all   Ger- 

book  of  songs  composed  for  German  combatants  under 
the  title  "Der  deutsche  Zorn:"— 

Wir  sind  die  Meister  aller  Welt 
In  alien  ernsten  Dingen, 

Was  Man  als  fremd  euch  hochlichst  preist 
Um  eurer  Einfalt  Willen, 
1st  deutschen  Ursprungs  allermeist, 
Und  tragt  nur  fremde  Hullen. 


OPINION  IN  GERMANY  51 

many  is  ringing,  is  an  illustration  of  the  romantic 
quality  that  vitiates  their  x  intelligence.  In  spite 
of  the  fact  that  they  are  one  of  the  greatest  trad- 
ing and  manufacturing  nations  of  the  world, 
and  that  precisely  the  fear  of  losing  their  trade 
and  markets  has  been,  as  they  constantly  assert, 
a  chief  cause  that  has  driven  them  to  war,  they 
speak  as  though  Germany  were  a  kind  of  knight- 
errant,  innocent  of  all  material  ambitions,  wan- 
dering through  the  world  in  the  pure,  disinter- 
ested service  of  God  and  man.  On  the  other 
hand,  because  England  is  a  great  commercial 
Power,  they  suppose  that  no  Englishman  lives 
for  anything  but  profit.  Because  they  them- 
selves have  conscription,  and  have  to  fight  or 
be  shot,  they  infer  that  every  German  is  a  noble 
warrior.  Because  the  English  volunteer,  they 
assume  that  they  only  volunteer  for  their  pay. 
Germany,  to  them,  is  a  hero  clad  in  white  armour, 
magnanimous,  long-suffering,  and  invincible. 
Other  nations  are  little  seedy  figures  in  black 
coats,  inspired  exclusively  by  hatred  and  jeal- 
ousy of  the  noble  German,  incapable  of  a  gen- 
erous emotion  or  an  honourable  act,  and  destined, 
by  the  judgment  of  history,  to  be  saved,  if  they 
can  be  saved  at  all,  by  the  great  soul  and  domi- 
nating intellect  of  the  Teuton. 
It  is  in  this  intoxicating  atmosphere  of  tern- 


52  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

perament  and  mood  that  the  ideas  and  ambi- 
tions of  German  imperialists  work  and  move. 
They  are  essentially  the  same  as  those  of  im- 
perialists in  other  countries.  Their  philosophy 
of  history  assumes  an  endless  series  of  wars,  due 
to  the  inevitable  expansion  of  rival  States.  Their 
ethics  means  a  belief  in  force  and  a  disbelief  in 
everything  else.  Their  science  is  a  crude  mis- 
application of  Darwinism,  combined  with  in- 
vincible ignorance  of  the  true  bearings  of  science 
upon  life,  and  especially  of  those  facts  and  de- 
ductions about  biological  heredity  which,  once 
they  are  understood,  will  make  it  plain  that 
war  degrades  the  stock  of  all  nations,  victorious 
and  vanquished  alike,  and  that  the  decline  of 
civilizations  is  far  more  plausibly  to  be  attrib- 
uted to  this  cause  than  to  the  moral  decadence 
of  which  history  is  always  ready,  after  the  event, 
to  accuse  the  defeated  Power.  One  peculiarity, 
perhaps,  there  is  in  the  outlook  of  German  im- 
perialism, and  that  is  its  emphasis  on  an  un- 
intelligible and  unreal  abstraction  of  :race." 
Germans,  it  is  thought,  are  by  biological  quality 
the  salt  of  the  earth.  Every  really  great  man  in 
Europe,  since  the  break-up  of  the  Roman  Em- 
pire, has  been  a  German,  even  though  it  might 
appear,  at  first  sight,  to  an  uninstructed  ob- 
server, that  he  was  an  Italian  or  a  Frenchman 


OPINION  IN  GERMANY  53 

or  a  Spaniard.  Not  all  Germans,  however,  are, 
they  hold,  as  yet  included  in  the  German  Em- 
pire, or  even  in  the  German-Austrian  combination. 
The  Flemish  are  Germans,  the  Dutch  are  Ger- 
mans, the  English  even  are  Germans,  or  were 
before  the  war  had  made  them,  in  Germany's 
eyes,  the  offscouring  of  mankind.  Thus,  a  great 
task  lies  before  the  German  Empire:  on  the 
one  hand,  to  bring  within  its  fold  the  German 
stocks  that  have  strayed  from  it  in  the  wan- 
derings of  history;  on  the  other,  to  reduce  under 
German  authority  those  other  stocks  that  are 
not  worthy  to  share  directly  in  the  citizenship 
of  the  Fatherland.  The  dreams  of  conquest 
which  are  the  real  essence  of  all  imperialism 
are  thus  supported  in  Germany  by  arguments 
peculiar  to  Germans.  But  the  arguments  put 
forward  are  not  the  real  determinants  of  the 
attitude.  The  attitude,  in  any  country,  what- 
ever it  may  be  called,  rests  at  bottom  on  sheer 
national  vanity.  It  is  the  belief  in  the  inherent 
superiority  of  one's  own  civilization,  and  the 
desire  to  extend  it,  by  force  if  need  be,  through- 
out the  world.  It  matters  little  what  arguments 
in  its  support  this  passion  to  dominate  may 
garner  from  that  twilight  region  in  which  the 
advanced  guard  of  science  is  labouring  patiently 
to    comprehend    Nature    and    mankind.      Men 


54         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

take  from  the  treasury  of  truth  what  they  are 
able  to  take.  And  what  imperialists  take  is  a 
mirror  to  their  own  ambition  and  pride. 

Now,  as  to  the  ambitions  of  this  German 
jingoism  there  is  no  manner  of  doubt.  Ger- 
mans are  nothing  if  not  frank.  And  this  kind 
of  German  does  want  to  conquer  and  annex, 
not  only  outside  Europe  but  within  it.  We 
must  not,  however,  infer  that  the  whole  of  Ger- 
many has  been  infected  with  this  virus.  The 
summary  I  have  set  down  in  the  last  few  pages 
represents  the  impression  made  on  an  unsym- 
pathetic mind  by  the  literature  of  Pangerman- 
ism.  Emerging  from  such  reading — and  it  is 
the  principal  reading  of  German  origin  which 
has  been  offered  to  the  British  public  since  the 
war — there  is  a  momentary  illusion,  "That  is 
Germany!"  Of  course  it  is  not,  any  more  than 
the  Morning  Post  or  the  National  Review  is  Eng- 
land. Germans,  in  fact,  during  recent  years 
have  taken  a  prominent  place  in  pacifism  as 
well  as  in  imperialism.  Men  like  Schvicking  and 
Quidde  and  Fried  are  at  least  as  well  known  as 
men  like  Treitschke  and  Bernhardi.  Opinion 
in  Germany,  as  in  every  other  country,  has 
been  various  and  conflicting.  And  the  pacific 
tendencies  have  been  better  organized,  if  not 
more  active,  there  than  elsewhere,  for  they  have 


OPINION  IN  GERMANY  55 

been  associated  with  the  huge  and  disciplined 
forces  of  the  Social-Democrats.  Indeed,  the 
mass  of  the  people,  left  alone,  is  everywhere 
pacific.  I  do  not  forget  the  very  important 
fact  that  German  education,  elementary  and 
higher,  has  been  deliberately  directed  to  incul- 
cate patriotic  feeling,  that  the  doctrine  of  armed 
force  as  the  highest  manifestation  of  the  State 
has  been  industriously  propagated  by  the  au- 
thorities, and  that  the  unification  of  Germany 
by  force  has  given  to  the  cult  of  force  a  meaning 
and  a  popularity  probably  unknown  in  any  other 
country.  But  in  most  men,  for  good  or  for  evil, 
the  lessons  of  education  can  be  quickly  obliter- 
ated by  the  experience  of  life.  In  particular, 
the  mass  of  the  people  everywhere,  face  to  face 
with  the  necessities  of  existence,  knowing  what 
it  is  to  work  and  to  struggle,  to  co-operate  and 
to  compete,  to  suffer  and  to  relieve  suffering, 
though  they  may  be  less  well-informed  than 
the  instructed  classes,  are  also  less  liable  to 
obsession  by  abstractions.  They  see  little,  but 
they  see  it  straight.  And  though,  being  men, 
with  the  long  animal  inheritance  of  men  behind 
them,  their  passions  may  be  roused  by  any  cry 
of  battle,  though  they  are  the  fore-ordained 
dupes  of  those  who  direct  the  policy  of  nations, 
yet  it  is  not  their  initiative  that  originates  wars. 


56         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

They  do  not  desire  conquest,  they  do  not  trouble 
about  "race"  or  chatter  about  the  "survival 
of  the  fittest."  It  is  their  own  needs,  which  are 
also  the  vital  needs  of  society,  that  preoccupy 
their  thoughts;  and  it  is  real  goods  that  direct 
and  inspire  their  genuine  idealism. 

We  must,  then,  disabuse  ourselves  of  the 
notion  so  naturally  produced  by  reading,  and 
especially  by  reading  in  time  of  war,  that  the 
German  Jingoes  are  typical  of  Germany.  They 
are  there,  they  are  a  force,  they  have  to  be  reck- 
oned with.  But  exactly  how  great  a  force? 
Exactly  how  influential  on  policy?  That  is  a 
question  which  I  imagine  can  only  be  answered 
by  guesses.  Would  the  reader,  for  instance, 
undertake  to  estimate  the  influence  during  the 
last  fifteen  years  on  British  policy  and  opinion 
of  the  imperialist  minority  in  this  country? 
No  two  men,  I  think,  would  agree  about  it. 
And  few  men  would  agree  with  themselves  from 
one  day  or  one  week  to  another.  We  are  re- 
duced to  conjecture.  But  the  conjectures  of  some 
people  are  of  more  value  than  those  of  others,  for 
they  are  based  on  a  wider  converse.  I  think  it 
therefore  not  without  importance  to  recall  to  the 
reader  the  accounts  of  the  state  of  opinion  in  Ger- 
many given  by  well -qualified  foreign  observers  in 
the  years  immediately  preceding  the  war. 


OPINION  ABOUT  GERMANY         57 

9.  Opinion  about  Germany 

After  the  crisis  of  Agadir,  M.  Georges  Bourdon 
visited  Germany  to  make  an  inquiry  for  the 
Figaro  newspaper  into  the  state  of  opinion  there. 
His  mission  belongs  to  the  period  between  Agadir 
and  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Balkan  war.  He 
interviewed  a  large  number  of  people,  states- 
men, publicists,  professors,  politicians.  He  does 
not  sum  up  his  impressions,  and  such  summary 
as  I  can  give  here  is  no  doubt  affected  by  the 
emphasis  of  my  own  mind.  His  book,1  how- 
ever, is  now  translated  into  English,  and  the 
reader  has  the  opportunity  of  correcting  the 
impression  I  give  him. 

Let  us  begin  with  Pangermanism,  on  which 
M.  Bourdon  has  a  very  interesting  chapter. 
He  feels  for  the  propaganda  of  that  sect  the 
repulsion  that  must  be  felt  by  every  sane  and 
liberal-minded  man : — 

Wretched,  choleric  Pangermans,  exasperated  and  un- 
balanced, brothers  of  all  the  exasperated,  wretched  wind- 
bags whose  tirades,  in  all  countries,  answer  to  yours, 
and  whom  you  are  wrong  to  count  your  enemies!  Pan- 
germans of  the  Spree  and  the  Main,  who,  on  the  other 
side  of  the  frontier,  receive  the  fraternal  effusions  of 
Russian  Pan-Slavism,  Italian  irredentism,  English  im- 


1 « 


L'Enigme  Allemande,"  1914. 


58         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

pcrialism,   French  nationalism!     What  is  it   that  you 
want? 

They  want,  he  replies,  part  of  Austria,  Switzer- 
land, Flanders,  Luxemburg,  Denmark,  Holland, 
for  all  these  are  "Germanic"  countries!  They 
want  colonies.  They  want  a  bigger  army  and 
a  bigger  navy.  "An  execrable  race,  these  Pan- 
germans!"  "They  have  the  yellow  skin,  the 
dry  mouth,  the  green  complexion  of  the  bilious. 
They  do  not  live  under  the  sky,  they  avoid  the 
light.  Hidden  in  their  cellars,  they  pore  over 
treaties,  cite  newspaper  articles,  grow  pale  over 
maps,  measure  angles,  quibble  over  texts  or 
traces  of  frontiers."  "The  Pangerman  is  a  prop- 
agandist and  a  revivalist."  "But,"  M.  Bour- 
don adds,  "when  he  shouts  we  must  not  think 
we  hear  in  his  tones  the  reverberations  of  the 
German  soul."  The  organs  of  the  party  seemed 
few  and  unimportant.  The  party  itself  was 
spoken  of  with  contempt.  "They  talk  loud," 
M.  Bourdon  was  told,  "but  have  no  real  fol- 
lowing; it  is  only  in  France  that  people  attend 
to  them."  Nevertheless,  M.  Bourdon  concluded 
they  were  not  negligible.  For,  in  the  first  place, 
they  have  power  to  evoke  the  jingoism  of  the 
German  public — a  jingoism  which  the  violent 
patriotism  of  the  people,  their  tradition  of  vic- 
torious force,   their  education,   their  dogma  of 


OPINION  ABOUT  GERMANY         59 

race,  continually  keep  alive.  And,  secondly, 
the  Government,  when  it  thinks  it  useful,  turns 
to  the  Pangermans  for  assistance,  and  lets  loose 
their  propaganda  in  the  press.  Their  influence 
thus  waxes  and  wanes,  as  it  is  favoured,  or  not, 
by  authority.  "Like  the  giant  Antaeus,"  a  corre- 
spondent wrote  to  M.  Bourdon,  "Pangermanism 
loses  its  force  when  it  quits  the  soil  of  govern- 
ment." 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  the 
Pangerman  propaganda  purports  to  be  based 
upon  fear.  If  they  urge  increased  armaments, 
it  is  with  a  view  to  defence.  "I  considered  it 
a  patriotic  duty,"  wrote  General  Keim,  "in 
my  quality  of  president  of  the  German  League 
for  Defence,  to  demand  an  increase  of  effectives 
such  that  France  should  find  it  out  of  the  ques- 
tion to  dream  of  a  victorious  war  against  us, 
even  with  the  help  of  other  nations."  "To  the 
awakening  of  the  national  sentiment  in  France 
there  is  only  one  reply — the  increase  of  the 
German  forces."  "I  have  the  impression," 
said  Count  Reventlow,  "that  a  warlike  spirit 
which  is  new  is  developing  in  France.  There 
is  the  danger."  Thus  in  Germany,  as  else- 
where, even  jingoism  took  the  mask  of  necessary 
precaution.  And  so  it  must  be,  and  will  be 
everywhere,  as  long  as  the  European  anarchy 


60         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

continues.  For  what  nation  has  ever  admitted 
an  intention  or  desire  to  make  aggressive  war? 

M.  Bourdon,  then,  takes  full  account  of  Pan- 
germanism.  Nor  does  he  neglect  the  general 
militaristic  tendencies  of  German  opinion.  He 
found  pride  in  the  army,  a  determination  to 
be  strong,  and  that  belief  that  it  is  in  war  that 
the  State  expresses  itself  at  the  highest  and  the 
best,  which  is  part  of  the  tradition  of  German 
education  since  the  days  of  Treitschke.  Yet, 
in  spite  of  all  this,  to  which  M.  Bourdon  does 
full  justice,  the  general  impression  made  by 
the  conversations  he  records  is  that  the  bulk 
of  opinion  in  Germany  was  strongly  pacific. 
There  was  apprehension  indeed,  apprehension 
of  France  and  apprehension  of  England.  "Eng- 
land certainly  preoccupies  opinion  more  than 
France.  People  are  alarmed  by  her  movements 
and  her  armaments."  "The  constant  interven- 
tions of  England  have  undoubtedly  irritated 
the  public."  Germany,  therefore,  must  arm 
and  arm  again.  "A  great  war  may  be  delayed, 
but  not  prevented,  unless  German  armaments 
are  such  as  to  put  fear  into  the  heart  of  every 
possible  adversary." 

Germany  feared  that  war  might  come,  but 
she  did  not  want  it — that,  in  sum,  was  M.  Bour- 
don's   impression.      From    soldiers,    statesmen, 


OPINION  ABOUT  GERMANY         61 

professors,  business  men,  again  and  again,  the 
same  assurance.  "The  sentiment  you  will  find 
most  generally  held  is  undoubtedly  that  of  peace." 
"Few  think  about  war.  We  need  peace  too 
much."  "War!  War  between  us!  What  an 
idea!  Why,  it  would  mean  a  European  war, 
something  monstrous,  something  which  would 
surpass  in  horror  anything  the  world  has  ever 
seen!  My  dear  sir,  only  madmen  could  desire 
or  conceive  such  a  calamity!  It  must  be  avoided 
at  all  costs."  "Wha't  counts  above  all  here 
is  commercial  interest.  All  who  live  by  it  are, 
here  as  elsewhere,  almost  too  pacific."  "Under 
the  economic  conditions  prevailing  in  Germany, 
the  most  glorious  victory  she  can  aspire  to — 
it  is  a  soldier  who  says  it — is  peace!" 

The  impression  thus  gathered  from  M.  Bour- 
don's observations  is  confirmed  at  every  point 
by  those  of  Baron  Beyens,  who  went  to  Berlin 
as  Belgian  minister  after  the  crisis  of  Agadir.1 
Of  the  world  of  business  he  says : — 

All  these  gentlemen  appeared  to  be  convinced  parti- 
sans of  peace.  .  .  .  According  to  them,  the  tranquillity 
of  Europe  had  not  been  for  a  moment  seriously  menaced 
during  the  crisis  of  Agadir.  .  .  .  Industrial  Germany 
required  to  live  on  good  terms  with  France.    Peace  was 

1  See  "  L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  pp.  97  seq.  and 
170  seq.    Bruxelles,  1915. 


62         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

necessary  to  business,  and  German  finance  in  particular 
had  every  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  its  profitable 
relations  with  French  finance.1  At  the  end  of  a  few 
months  I  had  the  impression  that  these  pacifists  personified 
then — in  191 2 — the  most  common,  the  most  widely  spread, 
though  the  least  noisy,  opinion,  the  opinion  of  the  ma- 
jority, understanding  by  the  majority,  not  that  of  the 
governing  classes  but  that  of  the  nation  as  a  whole  (p.  172). 

The  mass  of  the  people,  Beyens  held,  loved 
peace,  and  dreaded  war.  That  was  the  case, 
not  only  with  all  the  common  people,  but  also 
with  the  managers  and  owners  of  businesses 
and  the  wholesale  and  retail  merchants.  Even 
in  Berlin  society  and  among  the  ancient  Ger- 
man nobility  there  were  to  be  found  sincere 
pacifists.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  cer- 
tainly a  bellicose  minority.  It  was  composed 
largely  of  soldiers,  both  active  and  retired;  the 
latter  especially  looking  with  envy  and  disgust 
on  the  increasing  prosperity  of  the  commercial 
classes,  and  holding  that  a  "blood-letting  would 
be  wholesome  to  purge  and  regenerate  the  so- 

1 A  Frenchman,  M.  Maurice  Ajam,  who  made  an 
inquiry  among  business  men  in  19 13  came  to  the  same 
conclusion.  "Peace!  I  write  that  all  the  Germans  with- 
out exception,  when  they  belong  to  the  world  of  business, 
are  fanatical  partisans  of  the  maintenance  of  European 
peace."  See  Yves  Guyot,  "  Les  causes  et  les  consequences 
de  la  guerre,"  p.  226. 


OPINION  ABOUT  GERMANY         63 

cial  body" — a  view  not  confined  to  Germany, 
and  one  which  has  received  classical  expression 
in  Tennyson's  "Maud."  To  this  movement 
belonged  also  the  high  officials,  the  Conserva- 
tive parties,  patriots  and  journalists,  and  of 
course  the  armament  firms,  deliberate  fomen- 
ters  of  war  in  Germany,  as  everywhere  else, 
in  order  to  put  money  into  their  pockets.  To 
these  must  be  added  the  "intellectual  flower 
of  the  universities  and  the  schools."  "The 
professors  at  the  universities,  taken  en  bloc, 
were  one  of  the  most  violent  elements  in  the 
nation."  "Almost  all  the  young  people  from 
one  end  of  the  Empire  to  the  other  have  had 
brought  before  them  in  the  course  of  their  studies 
the  dilemma  which  Bernhardi  summed  up  to 
his  readers  in  the  three  words  'world-power  or 
decadence.'  Yet  with  all  this,  the  resolute  parti- 
sans of  war  formed  as  I  thought  a  very  small 
minority  in  the  nation.  That  is  the  impres- 
sion I  obstinately  retain  of  my  sojourn  in  Ber- 
lin and  my  excursions  into  the  provinces  of 
the  Empire,  rich  or  poor.  When  I  recall  the 
image  of  this  peaceful  population,  journeying 
to  business  every  week-day  with  a  movement 
so  regular,  or  seated  at  table  on  Sundays  in 
the  cafes  in  the  open  air  before  a  glass  of  beer, 
I  can  find  in  my  memories  nothing  but  placid 


64         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

faces  where  there  was  no  trace  of  violent  pas- 
sions, no  thought  hostile  to  foreigners,  not  even 
that  feverish  concern  with  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence which  the  spectacle  of  the  human  crowd  has 
sometimes  shown  me  elsewhere." 

A  similar  impression  is  given  by  the  dispatch 
from  M.  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  to  Berlin, 
written  on  July  30,  1913.1  He,  too,  finds  ele- 
ments working  for  war,  and  analyses  them  much 
as  Baron  Beyens  does.  There  are  first  the  "jun- 
kers," or  country  squires,  naturally  military  by 
all  their  traditions,  but  also  afraid  of  the  death- 
duties  "which  are  bound  to  come  if  peace  con- 
tinues." Secondly,  the  "higher  bourgeoisie" — 
that  is,  the  great  manufacturers  and  financiers, 
and,  of  course,  in  particular  the  armament  firms. 
Both  these  social  classes  are  influenced,  not  only 
by  direct  pecuniary  motives  but  by  the  fear  of 
the  rising  democracy,  which  is  beginning  to 
swamp  their  representatives  in  the  Reichstag. 
Thirdly,  the  officials,  the  "party  of  the  pen- 
sioned." Fourthly,  the  universities,  the  "his- 
torians, philosophers,  political  pamphleteers,  and 
other  apologists  of  German  Kultur."  Fifthly, 
rancorous  diplomatists,  with  a  sense  that  they 
had  been  duped.  On  the  other  hand,  there  were, 
as  M.  Cambon  insists,  other  forces  in  the  country 
1  See  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  5. 


OPINION  ABOUT  GERMANY         65 

making  for  peace.  What  were  these?  In  numbers 
the  great  bulk,  in  Germany  as  in  all  countries. 
"The  mass  of  the  workmen,  artisans  and  peas- 
ants, who  are  peace-loving  by  instinct."  Such 
of  the  great  nobles  as  were  intelligent  enough 
to  recognize  the  "disastrous  political  and  social 
consequences  of  war."  "Numerous  manufac- 
turers, merchants,  and  financiers  in  a  moderate 
way  of  business."  The  non-German  elements 
of  the  Empire.  Finally,  the  Government  and 
the  governing  classes  in  the  large  southern  States. 
A  goodly  array  of  peace  forces!  According  to 
M.  Cambon,  however,  all  these  latter  elements 
"are  only  a  sort  of  make-weight  in  political  mat- 
ters with  limited  influence  on  public  opinion,  or 
they  are  silent  social  forces,  passive  and  defence- 
less against  the  infection  of  a  wave  of  warlike 
feeling."  This  last  sentence  is  pregnant.  It 
describes  the  state  of  affairs  existing,  more  or 
less,  in  all  countries;  a  few  individuals,  a  few 
groups  or  cliques,  making  for  war  more  or  less 
deliberately;  the  mass  of  the  people  ignorant 
and  unconcerned,  but  also  defenceless  against 
suggestion,  and  ready  to  respond  to  the  call  to 
war,  with  submission  or  with  enthusiasm,  as 
soon  as  the  call  is  made  by  their  Govern- 
ment. 
On  the  testimony,  then,  of  these  witnesses, 


66         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

all  shrewd  and  competent  observers,  it  may  be 
permitted  to  sum  up  somewhat  as  follows: — 

In  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  war 
the  mass  of  the  people  in  Germany,  rich  and 
poor,  were  attached  to  peace  and  dreaded  war. 
But  there  was  there  also  a  powerful  minority 
either  desiring  war  or  expecting  it,  and,  in  either 
case,  preparing  it  by  their  agitation.  And  this 
minority  could  appeal  to  the  peculiarly  aggres- 
sive form  of  patriotism  inculcated  by  the  public 
schools  and  universities.  The  war  party  based 
its  appeal  for  ever  fresh  armaments  on  the  hostile 
preparations  of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente.  Its 
aggressive  ambition  masqueraded,  perhaps  even 
to  itself,  as  a  patriotism  apprehensively  concerned 
with  defence.  It  was  supported  by  powerful 
moneyed  interests;  and  the  mass  of  the  people, 
passive,  ill-informed,  preoccupied,  were  defence- 
less against  its  agitation.  The  German  Govern- 
ment found  the  Pangermans  embarrassing  or 
convenient  according  as  the  direction  of  its  policy 
and  the  European  situation  changed  from  crisis 
to  crisis.  They  were  thus  at  one  moment  neg- 
ligible, at  another  powerful.  For  long  they  agi- 
tated vainly,  and  they  might  long  have  continued 
to  do  so.  But  if  the  moment  should  come  at 
which  the  Government  should  make  the  fatal 
plunge,  their  efforts  would  have  contributed  to 


GERMANY  FROM   1890-1900  67 

the  result,  their  warnings  would  seem  to  have 
been  justified,  and  they  would  triumph  as  the 
party  of  patriots  that  had  foretold  in  vain  the 
coming  crash  to  an  unbelieving  nation. 

10.  German  Policy  from  1890-1900 

Having  thus  examined  the  atmosphere  of 
opinion  in  which  the  German  Government  moved, 
let  us  proceed  to  consider  the  actual  course  of 
their  policy  during  the  critical  years,  fifteen  or 
so,  that  preceded  the  war.  The  policy  admit- 
tedly and  openly  was  one  of  "expansion."  But 
"expansion"  where?  It  seems  to  be  rather 
widely  supposed  that  Germany  was  preparing 
war  in  order  to  annex  territory  in  Europe. 
The  contempt  of  German  imperialists,  from 
Treitschke  onward,  for  the  rights  of  small  States, 
the  racial  theories  which  included  in  "German" 
territory  Holland,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  and 
the  Scandinavian  countries,  may  seem  to  give 
colour  to  this  idea.  But  it  would  be  hazardous 
to  assume  that  German  statesmen  were  seriously 
influenced  for  years  by  the  lucubrations  of  Mr. 
Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain  and  his  followers. 
Nor  can  a  long-prepared  policy  of  annexation  in 
Europe  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  Belgium 
and  France  were  invaded  after  the  war  broke 


68  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

out,  or  even  from  the  present  demand  among 
German  parties  that  the  territories  occupied 
should  be  retained.  If  it  could  be  maintained 
that  the  seizure  of  territory  during  war,  or  even 
its  retention  after  it,  is  evidence  that  the  territory 
was  the  object  of  the  war,  it  would  be  legitimate 
also  to  infer  that  the  British  Empire  has  gone 
to  war  to  annex  German  colonies,  a  conclusion 
which  Englishmen  would  probably  reject  with 
indignation.  In  truth,  before  the  war,  the  view 
that  it  was  the  object  of  German  policy  to  annex 
European  territory  would  have  found,  I  think, 
few,  if  any,  supporters  among  well-informed  and 
unprejudiced  observers.  I  note,  for  instance, 
that  Mr.  Dawson,  whose  opinion  on  such  a  point 
is  probably  better  worth  having  than  that  of 
any  other  Englishman,  in  his  book,  "The  Evo- 
lution of  Modern  Germany,"1  when  discussing 
the  aims  of  German  policy  does  not  even  refer 
to  the  idea  that  annexations  in  Europe  are  con- 
templated. 

So  far  as  the  evidence  at  present  goes,  I  do 
not  think  a  case  can  be  made  out  for  the  view 
that  German  policy  was  aiming  during  these 
years  at  securing  the  hegemony  of  Europe  by 
annexing  European  territory.  The  expansion 
Germany  was  seeking  was  that  of  trade  and 

1  Published  in  1908. 


GERMANY  FROM   1890-1900  69 

markets.  And  her  statesmen  and  people,  like 
those  of  other  countries,  were  under  the  belief 
that,  to  secure  this,  it  was  necessary  to  acquire 
colonies.  This  ambition,  up  to  a  point,  she  was 
able,  in  fact,  to  fulfil,  not  by  force  but  by  agree- 
ment with  the  other  Powers  The  Berlin  Act 
of  1885  was  one  of  the  wisest  and  most  far-seeing 
achievements  of  European  policy.  By  it  the 
partition  of  a  great  part  of  the  African  continent 
between  the  Powers  was  peaceably  accomplished, 
and  Germany  emerged  with  possessions  to  the 
extent  of  377,000  square  miles  and  an  estimated 
population  of  1,700,000.  By  1906  her  colonial 
domain  had  been  increased  to  over  two  and  a 
half  million  square  miles,  and  its  population 
to  over  twelve  millions;  and  all  of  this  had  been 
acquired  without  war  with  any  civilized  nation. 
In  spite  of  her  late  arrival  on  the  scene  as  a  co- 
lonial Power,  Germany  had  thus  secured  with- 
out war  an  empire  overseas,  not  comparable, 
indeed,  to  that  of  Great  Britain  or  of  France, 
but  still  considerable  in  extent  and  (as  Germans 
believed)  in  economic  promise,  and  sufficient 
to  give  them  the  opportunity  they  desired  to 
show  their  capacity  as  pioneers  of  civilization. 
How  they  have  succeeded  or  failed  in  this  we 
need  not  here  consider.  But  when  Germans 
demand  a  "place  in  the  sun,"  the  considerable 


70         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

place  they  have  in  fact  acquired,  with  the  ac- 
quiescence of  the  other  colonial  Powers,  should, 
in  fairness  to  those  Powers,  be  remembered. 
But,  notoriously,  they  were  not  satisfied,  and 
the  extent  of  their  dissatisfaction  was  shown 
by  their  determination  to  create  a  navy.  This 
new  departure,  dating  from  the  close  of  the  dec- 
ade 1 890-1 900,  marks  the  beginning  of  that 
friction  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
which  was  a  main  cause  of  the  war.  It  is  there- 
fore important  to  form  some  just  idea  of  the 
motives  that  inspired  German  policy  to  take 
this  momentous  step.  The  reasons  given  by 
Prince  Bulow,  the  founder  of  the  policy,  and 
often  repeated  by  German  statesmen  and  pub- 
licists,1 are,  first,  the  need  of  a  strong  navy  to 
protect  German  commerce;  secondly,  the  need, 
as  well  as  the  ambition,  of  Germany  to  play  a 
part  proportional  to  her  real  strength  in  the 
determination  of  policy  beyond  the  seas.  These 
reasons,  according  to  the  ideas  that  govern  Euro- 
pean statesmanship,  are  valid  and  sufficient. 
They  are  the  same  that  have  influenced  all  great 
Powers;  and  if  Germany  was  influenced  by  them 
we  need  not  infer  any  specially  sinister  intentions 
on  her  part.    The  fact  that  during  the  present 

1  See,  e.  g.,  Dawson,  "Evolution  of  Modern  Germany," 
p.  348. 


GERMANY  FROM   1890-1900  71 

war  German  trade  has  been  swept  from  the  seas, 
and  that  she  is  in  the  position  of  a  blockaded 
Power,  will  certainly  convince  any  German  pa- 
triot, not  that  she  did  not  need  a  navy,  but  that 
she  needed  a  much  stronger  one;  and  the  retort 
that  there  need  have  been  no  war  if  Germany 
had  not  provoked  it  by  building  a  fleet  is  not 
one  that  can  be  expected  to  appeal  to  any  nation 
so  long  as  the  European  anarchy  endures.  For, 
of  course,  every  nation  regards  itself  as  menaced 
perpetually  by  aggression  from  some  other  Power. 
Defence  was  certainly  a  legitimate  motive  for 
the  building  of  the  fleet,  even  if  there  had  been 
no  other.  There  was,  however,  in  fact,  another 
reason  avowed.  Germany,  as  we  have  said,  de- 
sired to  have  a  voice  in  policy  beyond  the  seas. 
Here,  too,  the  reason  is  good,  as  reasons  go  in 
a  world  of  competing  States.  A  great  manu- 
facturing and  trading  Power  cannot  be  indiffer- 
ent to  the  parcelling  out  of  the  world  among 
its  rivals.  Wherever,  in  countries  economically 
undeveloped,  there  were  projects  of  protectorates 
or  annexations,  or  of  any  kind  of  monopoly  to 
be  established  in  the  interest  of  any  Power,  there 
German  interests  were  directly  affected.  She 
had  to  speak,  and  to  speak  with  a  loud  voice, 
if  she  was  to  be  attended  to.  And  a  loud  voice 
meant  a  navy.     So,  at  least,  the  matter  natu- 


72  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

rally  presented  itself  to  German  imperialists,  as, 
indeed,  it  would  to  imperialists  of  any  other 
country. 

The  reasons  given  by  German  statesmen  for 
building  their  fleet  were  in  this  sense  valid.  But 
were  they  the  only  reasons?  In  the  beginning 
most  probably  they  were.  But  the  formation 
and  strengthening  of  the  Entente,  and  Germany's 
consequent  fear  that  war  might  be  made  upon 
her  jointly  by  France  and  Great  Britain,  gave 
a  new  stimulus  to  her  naval  ambition.  She  could 
not  now  be  content  with  a  navy  only  as  big  as 
that  of  France,  for  she  might  have  to  meet  those 
of  France  and  England  conjoined.  This  defen- 
sive reason  is  good.  But  no  doubt,  as  always, 
there  must  have  lurked  behind  it  ideas  of  ag- 
gression. Ambition,  in  the  philosophy  of  States, 
goes  hand  in  hand  with  fear.  "The  war  may 
come,"  says  one  party.  "Yes,"  says  the  other; 
and  secretly  mutters,  "May  the  war  come!" 
To  ask  whether  armaments  are  for  offence  or 
for  defence  must  always  be  an  idle  inquiry.  They 
will  be  for  either,  or  both,  according  to  circum- 
stances, according  to  the  personalities  that  are 
in  power,  according  to  the  mood  that  politicians 
and  journalists,  and  the  interests  that  suborn 
them,  have  been  able  to  infuse  into  a  nation. 
But  what  may  be  said  with  clear  conviction  is, 


GERMANY  FROM   1890-1900  73 

that  to  attempt  to  account  for  the  clash  of  war 
by  the  ambition  and  armaments  of  a  single  Power 
is  to  think  far  too  simply  of  how  these  catas- 
trophes originate.  The  truth,  in  this  case,  is 
that  German  ambition  developed  in  relation  to 
the  whole  European  situation,  and  that,  just  as 
on  land  their  policy  was  conditioned  by  their 
relation  to  France  and  Russia,  so  at  sea  it  was 
conditioned  by  their  relation  to  Great  Britain. 
They  knew  that  their  determination  to  become 
a  great  Power  at  sea  would  arouse  the  suspicion 
and  alarm  of  the  English.  Prince  Billow  is  per- 
fectly frank  about  that.  He  says  that  the  difficulty 
was  to  get  on  with  the  shipbuilding  programme 
without  giving  Great  Britain  an  opportunity 
to  intervene  by  force  and  nip  the  enterprise  in 
the  bud.  He  attributes  here  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment a  policy  which  is  all  in  the  Bismarckian 
tradition.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  policy  urged  by 
some  voices  here,  voices  which,  as  is  always  the 
case,  were  carried  to  Germany  and  magnified 
by  the  megaphone  of  the  Press.1  That  no  British 
Government,  in  fact,  contemplated  picking  a 
quarrel  with  Germany  in  order  to  prevent  her 
becoming  a  naval  Power  I  am  myself  as  much 
convinced  as  any  other  Englishman,  and  I  count 

1Some  of  these  are  cited  in  Bulow's  "Imperial  Ger- 
many," p.  36. 


74         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

the  fact  as  righteousness  to  our  statesmen.  On 
the  other  hand,  I  think  it  an  unfounded  con- 
jecture that  Prince  Biilow  was  deliberately  build- 
ing with  a  view  to  attacking  the  British  Empire. 
I  see  no  reason  to  doubt  his  sincerity  when  he 
says  that  he  looked  forward  to  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion of  the  rivalry  between  Germany  and  our- 
selves, and  that  France,  in  his  view,  not  Great 
Britain,  was  the  irreconcilable  enemy.1  In  build- 
ing her  navy,  no  doubt,  Germany  deliberately 
took  the  risk  of  incurring  a  quarrel  with  England 
in  the  pursuit  of  a  policy  which  she  regarded  as 
essential  to  her  development.  It  is  quite  another 
thing,  and  would  require  much  evidence  to  prove 
that  she  was  working  up  to  a  war  with  the  ob- 
ject of  destroying  the  British  Empire. 

What  we  have  to  bear  in  mind,  in  estimating 
the  meaning  of  the  German  naval  policy,  is  a 
complex  series  of  motives  and  conditions:  the 
genuine  need  of  a  navy,  and  a  strong  one,  to  pro- 
tect trade  in  the  event  of  war,  and  to  secure  a 
voice  in  overseas  policy;  the  genuine  fear  of  an 
attack  by  the  Powers  of  the  Entente,  an  attack 
to  be  provoked  by  British  jealousy;  and  also 
that  indeterminate  ambition  of  any  great  Power 
which  may  be  influencing  the  policy  of  statesmen 

1  See  "Imperial  Germany,"  pp.  48,  71,  English  transla- 
tion. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  75 

even  while  they  have  not  avowed  it  to  themselves, 
and  which,  expressed  by  men  less  responsible 
and  less  discreet,  becomes  part  of  that  "public 
opinion"  of  which  policy  takes  account. 

n.  Vain  Attempts  at  Harmony 

It  may,  however,  be  reasonably  urged  that 
unless  the  Germans  had  had  aggressive  am- 
bitions they  would  have  agreed  to  some  of  the 
many  proposals  made  by  Great  Britain  to  ar- 
rest on  both  sides  the  constantly  expanding 
programmes  of  naval  constructions.  It  is  true 
that  Germany  has  always  opposed  the  policy 
of  limiting  armaments,  whether  on  land  or  sea. 
This  is  consonant  with  that  whole  militarist 
view  of  international  politics  which,  as  I  have 
already  indicated,  is  held  in  a  more  extreme 
and  violent  form  in  Germany  than  in  any  other 
country,  but  which  is  the  creed  of  jingoes  and 
imperialists  everywhere.  If  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  succeeded  in  coming  to  an  agree- 
ment with  Germany  on  this  question  they  would 
have  been  bnttsriy  assailed  by  that  party  at 
home.  Still,  the  Government  did  make  the 
attempt.  It  was  comparatively  easy  for  them, 
for  any  basis  to  which  they  could  have  agreed 
must  have  left  intact,  legitimately  and  neces- 


76         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

sarily,  as  we  all  agree,  the  British  supremacy 
at  sea.  The  Germans  would  not  assent  to  this. 
They  did  not  choose  to  limit  beforehand  their 
efforts  to  rival  us  at  sea.  Probably  they  did 
not  think  it  possible  to  equal,  still  less  to  out- 
strip us.  But  they  wanted  to  do  all  they  could. 
And  that  of  course  could  have  only  one  mean- 
ing. They  thought  a  war  with  England  pos- 
sible, and  they  wanted  to  be  as  well  prepared 
as  they  could  be.  It  is  part  of  the  irony  that 
attaches  to  the  whole  system  of  the  armed  peace 
that  the  preparations  made  against  war  are 
themselves  the  principal  cause  of  war.  For 
if  there  had  been  no  rival  shipbuilding,  there 
need  have  been  no  friction  between  the  two 
countries. 

"But  why  did  Germany  fear  war?  It  must 
have  been  because  she  meant  to  make  it."  So 
the  English  argue.  But  imagine  the  Germans 
saying  to  us,  "Why  do  you  fear  war?  There 
will  be  no  war  unless  you  provoke  it.  We  are 
quite  pacific.  You  need  not  be  alarmed  about 
us."  Would  such  a  promise  have  induced  us 
to  relax  our  preparations  for  a  moment?  No! 
Under  the  armed  peace  there  can  be  no  con- 
fidence. And  that  alone  is  sufficient  to  account 
for  the  breakdown  of  the  Anglo-German  negotia- 
tions, without  supposing  on  either  side  a  wish  or 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  77 

an  intention  to  make  war.  Each  suspected,  and 
was  bound  to  suspect,  the  purpose  of  the  other. 
Let  us  take,  for  example,  the  negotiations  of 
191 2,  and  put  them  back  in  their  setting. 

The  Triple  Alliance  was  confronting  the  Triple 
Entente.  On  both  sides  were  fear  and  sus- 
picion. Each  believed  in  the  possibility  of  the 
others  springing  a  war  upon  them.  Each  sus- 
pected the  others  of  wanting  to  lull  them  into 
a  false  security,  and  then  take  them  unpre- 
pared. In  that  atmosphere,  what  hope  was 
there  of  successful  negotiations?  The  essen- 
tial condition — mutual  confidence — was  lacking. 
What,  accordingly,  do  we  find?  The  Germans 
offer  to  reduce  their  naval  programme,  first, 
if  England  will  promise  an  unconditional  neu- 
trality; secondly,  when  that  was  rejected,  if 
England  will  promise  neutrality  in  a  war  which 
should  be  "forced  upon"  Germany.  There- 
upon the  British  Foreign  Office  scents  a  snare. 
Germany  will  get  Austria  to  provoke  a  war, 
while  making  it  appear  that  the  war  was  pro- 
voked by  Russia,  and  she  will  then  come  in 
under  the  terms  of  her  alliance  with  Austria, 
smash  France,  and  claim  that  England  must 
look  on  passively  under  the  neutrality  agree- 
ment! "No,  thank  you!"  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
accordingly,    makes   a    counter-proposal.     Eng- 


78         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

land  will  neither  make  nor  participate  in  an 
"unprovoked"  attack  upon  Germany.  This 
time  it  is  the  German  Chancellor's  turn  to  hang 
back.  "Unprovoked!  Hm!  What  does  that 
mean?  Russia,  let  us  suppose,  makes  war  upon 
Austria,  while  making  it  appear  that  Austria 
is  the  aggressor.  France  comes  in  on  the  side 
of  Russia.  And  England?  Will  she  admit  that 
the  war  was  'unprovoked'  and  remain  neutral? 
Hardly,  we  think!"  The  Chancellor  there- 
upon proposes  the  addition:  "England,  of  course, 
will  remain  neutral  if  war  is  forced  upon  Ger- 
many? That  follows,  I  presume?"  "No!" 
from  the  British  Foreign  Office.  Reason  as 
before.  And  the  negotiations  fall  through.  How 
should  they  not  under  the  conditions?  There 
could  be  no  understanding,  because  there  was 
no  confidence.  There  could  be  no  confidence 
because  there  was  mutual  fear.  There  was 
mutual  fear  because  the  Triple  Alliance  stood 
in  arms  against  the  Triple  Entente.  What  was 
wrong?  Germany?  England?  No.  The  Eu- 
ropean tradition  and  system. 

The  fact,  then,  that  those  negotiations  broke 
down  is  no  more  evidence  of  sinister  intentions 
on  the  part  of  Germany  than  it  is  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain.  Baron  Beyens,  to  my  mind 
the   most   competent   and   the   most   impartial, 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  79 

as  well  as  one  of  the  best-informed,  of  those 
who  have  written  on  the  events  leading  up  to 
the  war,  says  explicitly  of  the  policy  of  the  Ger- 
man Chancellor: — 

A  practicable  rapprochement  between  his  country  and 
Great  Britain  was  the  dream  with  which  M.  de  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  most  willingly  soothed  himself,  without  the 
treacherous  arriere-pensee  which  the  Prince  von  Btilow 
perhaps  would  have  had  of  finishing  later  on,  at  an  oppor- 
tune moment,  with  the  British  Navy.  Nothing  authorizes 
us  to  believe  that  there  was  not  a  basis  of  sincerity  in  the 
language  of  M.  de  Jagow  when  he  expressed  to  Sir  E. 
Goschen  in  the  course  of  their  last  painful  interview  his 
poignant  regret  at  the  crumbling  of  his  entire  policy  and 
that  of  the  Chancellor,  which  had  been  to  make  friends 
with  Great  Britain,  and  then  through  Great  Britain  to 
get  closer  to  France.1 

Meantime  the  considerations  I  have  here 
laid  before  the  reader,  in  relation  to  this  general 
question  of  Anglo-German  rivalry,  are,  I  sub- 
mit, all  relevant,  and  must  be  taken  into  fair 
consideration  in  forming  a  judgment.  The  facts 
show  clearly  that  Germany  was  challenging 
as  well  as  she  could  the  British  supremacy  at 
sea;  that  she  was  determined  to  become  a  naval 
as  well  as  a  military  Power;  and  that  her  policy 
was,  on  the  face  of  it,  a  menace  to  this  country; 

1  "L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  75,  and  British 
White  Paper,  No.  160. 


80         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

just  as  the  creation  on  our  part  of  a  great  con- 
script army  would  have  been  taken  by  Ger- 
many as  a  menace  to  her.  The  British  Govern- 
ment was  bound  to  make  counter-preparations. 
I,  for  my  own  part,  have  never  disputed  it.  I 
have  never  thought,  and  do  not  now  think,  that 
while  the  European  anarchy  continues,  a  single 
Power  can  disarm  in  the  face  of  the  others.  All 
this  is  beyond  dispute.  What  is  disputable, 
and  a  matter  of  speculative  inference,  is  the 
further  assumption  that  in  pursuing  this  policy 
Germany  was  making  a  bid  to  destroy  the  Brit- 
ish Empire.  The  facts  can  certainly  be  ac- 
counted for  without  that  assumption.  I  my- 
self think  the  assumption  highly  improbable. 
So  much  I  may  say,  but  I  cannot  say  more. 
Possibly  some  day  we  may  be  able  to  check 
conjecture  by  facts.  Until  then,  argument  must 
be  inconclusive. 

This  question  of  the  naval  rivalry  between 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  is,  however,  part 
of  the  general  question  of  militarism.  And  it 
may  be  urged  that  while  during  the  last  fifteen 
years  the  British  Government  has  shown  itself 
favourable  to  projects  of  arbitration  and  of 
limitation  of  armaments,  the  German  Govern- 
ment has  consistently  opposed  them.  There 
is  much  truth  in  this;  and  it  is  a  good  illustra- 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  81 

tion  of  what  I  hold  to  be  indisputable,  that  the 
militaristic  view  of  international  politics  is  much 
more  deeply  rooted  in  Germany  than  in  Great 
Britain.  It  is  worth  while,  however,  to  remind 
ourselves  a  little  in  detail  what  the  facts  were  since 
they  are  often  misrepresented  or  exaggerated. 

The  question  of  international  arbitration  was 
brought  forward  at  the  first  Hague  Conference 
in  1899.  *  From  the  beginning  it  was  recognized 
on  all  sides  that  it  would  be  idle  to  propose  gen- 
eral compulsory  arbitration  for  all  subjects. 
No  Power  would  have  agreed  to  it,  not  Great 
Britain  or  America  any  more  than  Germany. 
On  the  other  hand,  projects  for  creating  an  ar- 
bitration tribunal,  to  which  nations  willing  to 
use  it  should  have  recourse,  were  brought  for- 
ward by  both  the  British  and  the  American 
representatives.  From  the  beginning,  however, 
it  became  clear  that  Count  Minister,  the  head 
of  the  German  delegation,  was  opposed  to  any 
scheme  for  encouraging  arbitration.  "He  did 
not  say  that  he  would  oppose  a  moderate  plan 
of  voluntary  arbitration,  but  he  insisted  that 
arbitration  must  be  injurious  to  Germany;  that 

1  The  account  that  follows  is  taken  from  the  "Auto- 
biography" of  Andrew  D.  White,  the  chairman  of  the 
American  delegation.  See  vol.  ii.,  chap.  xlv.  and  follow- 
ing. 


82  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

Germany  is  prepared  for  war  as  no  other  coun- 
try is,  or  can  be;  that  she  can  mobilize  her  army 
in  ten  days;  and  that  neither  France,  Russia, 
nor  any  other  Power  can  do  this.  Arbitration, 
he  said,  would  simply  give  rival  Powers  time 
to  put  themselves  in  readiness,  and  would,  there- 
fore, be  a  great  disadvantage  to  Germany." 
Here  is  what  I  should  call  the  militarist  view 
in  all  its  simplicity  and  purity,  the  obstinate, 
unquestioning  belief  that  war  is  inevitable,  and 
the  determination  to  be  ready  for  it  at  all  costs, 
even  at  the  cost  of  rejecting  machinery  which 
if  adopted  might  obviate  war.  The  passage 
has  often  been  cited  as  evidence  of  the  German 
determination  to  have  war.  But  I  have  not 
so  often  seen  quoted  the  exactly  parallel  declara- 
tion made  by  Sir  John  (now  Lord)  Fisher.  "He 
said  that  the  Navy  of  Great  Britain  was  and 
would  remain  in  a  state  of  complete  preparation 
for  war;  that  a  vast  deal  depended  on  prompt 
action  by  the  Navy;  and  that  the  truce  afforded 
by  arbitration  proceedings  would  give  other 
Powers  time,  which  they  would  not  otherwise 
have,  to  put  themselves  into  complete  readi- 
ness." l    So  far  the  "militarist"  and  the  "marin- 

1  Mr.  Arthur  Lee,  late  Civil  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, 
at  Eastleigh: — 

"If  war  should  unhappily  break  out  under  existing 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  83 

ist"  adopt  exactly  the  same  view.  And  we  may 
be  sure  that  if  proposals  are  made  after  the  war 
to  strengthen  the  machinery  for  international 
arbitration,  there  will  be  opposition  in  this  coun- 
try of  the  same  kind,  and  based  on  the  same 
grounds,  as  the  opposition  in  Germany.  We 
cannot  on  this  point  condemn  Count  Munster 
without  also  condemning  Lord  Fisher. 

Minister's  opposition,  however,  was  only  the 
beginning.  As  the  days  went  on  it  became  clear 
that  the  Kaiser  himself  had  become  actively 
opposed  to  the  whole  idea  of  arbitration,  and 
was  influencing  Austria  and  Italy  and  Turkey 
in  that  sense.  The  delegates  of  all  the  other 
countries  were  in  favour  of  the  very  mild  ap- 
plication of  it  which  was  under  consideration. 
So,  however,  be  it  noted,  were  all  the  delegates 
from  Germany,  except  Count  Munster.  And 
even  he  was,  by  now,  so  far  converted  that  when 
orders  were  received  from  Germany  definitely  to 
refuse   co-operation,   he   postponed   the   critical 

conditions  the  British  Navy  would  get  its  blow  in  first, 
before  the  other  nation  had  time  even  to  read  in  the  papers 
that  war  had  been  declared"  {The  Times,  February  4, 

1905)- 

"The  British  fleet  is  now  prepared  strategically  for 
every  possible  emergency,  for  we  must  assume  that  all 
foreign  naval  Powers  are  possible  enemies"  {The  Times, 
February  7,  1905). 


84         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

sitting  of  the  committee,  and  dispatched  Pro- 
fessor Zorn  to  Berlin  to  lay  the  whole  matter 
before  the  Chancellor.  Professor  Zorn  was  ac- 
companied by  the  American  Dr.  Holls,  bearing 
an  urgent  private  letter  to  Prince  Hohenlohe 
from  Mr.  White.  The  result  was  that  the  Ger- 
man attitude  was  changed,  and  the  arbitration 
tribunal  was  finally  established  with  the  con- 
sent and  co-operation  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment. 

I  have  thought  it  worth  while  to  dwell  thus 
fully  upon  this  episode  because  it  illustrates 
how  misleading  it  really  is  to  talk  of  "Germany" 
and  the  "German"  attitude.  There  is  every 
kind  of  German  attitude.  The  Kaiser  is  an  un- 
stable and  changeable  character.  His  ministers 
do  not  necessarily  agree  with  him,  and  he  does 
not  always  get  his  way.  As  a  consequence  of 
discussion  and  persuasion  the  German  opposi- 
tion, on  this  occasion,  was  overcome.  There 
was  nothing,  in  fact,  fixed  and  final  about  it. 
It  was  the  militarist  prejudice,  and  the  preju- 
dice this  time  yielded  to  humanity  and  reason. 

The  subject  was  taken  up  again  in  the  Con- 
ference of  1907,  and  once  more  Germany  was 
in  opposition.  The  German  delegate,  Baron 
Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  while  he  was  not 
against   compulsory   arbitration   for   certain   se- 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  85 

lected  topics,  was  opposed  to  any  general  treaty. 
It  seems  clear  that  it  was  this  attitude  of  Ger- 
many that  prevented  any  advance  being  made 
beyond  the  Convention  of  1899.  Good  reasons, 
of  course,  could  be  given  for  this  attitude;  but 
they  are  the  kind  of  reasons  that  goodwill  could 
have  surmounted.  It  seems  clear  that  there 
was  goodwill  in  other  Governments,  but  not 
in  that  of  Germany,  and  the  latter  lies  legiti- 
mately under  the  prejudice  resulting  from  the 
position  she  then  took.  German  critics  have 
recognized  this  as  freely  as  critics  of  other  coun- 
tries. I  myself  feel  no  desire  to  minimize  the 
blame  that  attaches  to  Germany.  But  English- 
men who  criticize  her  policy  must  always  ask 
themselves  whether  they  would  support  a  Brit- 
ish Government  that  should  stand  for  a  general 
treaty  of  compulsory  arbitration. 

On  the  question  of  limitation  of  armaments 
the  German  Government  has  been  equally  in- 
transigeant.  At  the  Conference  of  1899,  in- 
deed, no  serious  effort  was  made  by  any  Power 
to  achieve  the  avowed  purpose  of  the  meeting. 
And,  clearly,  if  anything  was  intended  to  be 
done,  the  wrong  direction  was  taken  from  the 
beginning.  When  the  second  Conference  was 
to  meet  it  is  understood  that  the  German  Gov- 
ernment refused  participation  if  the  question  of 


86         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

armaments  was  to  be  discussed,  and  the  subject 
did  not  appear  on  the  official  programme.  Never- 
theless the  British,  French,  and  American  dele- 
gates took  occasion  to  express  a  strong  sense 
of  the  burden  of  armaments,  and  the  urgent 
need  of  lessening  it. 

The  records  of  the  Hague  Conferences  do, 
then,  clearly  show  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment was  more  obstinately  sceptical  of  any  ad- 
vance in  the  direction  of  international  arbi- 
tration or  disarmament  than  that  of  any  other 
Great  Power,  and  especially  of  Great  Britain 
or  the  United  States.  Whether,  in  fact,  much 
could  or  would  have  been  done,  even  in  the  ab- 
sence of  German  opposition,  may  be  doubted. 
There  would  certainly  have  been,  in  every  coun- 
try, very  strong  opposition  to  any  effective  meas- 
ures, and  it  is  only  those  who  would  be  willing 
to  see  their  own  Government  make  a  radical 
advance  in  the  directions  in  question  who  can 
honestly  attack  the  German  Government.  As 
one  of  those  who  believe  that  peaceable  pro- 
cedure may  and  can,  and,  if  civilization  is  to 
be  preserved,  must  be  substituted  for  war,  I 
have  a  right  to  express  my  own  condemnation 
of  the  German  Government,  and  I  unhesitat- 
ingly do  so.  But  I  do  not  infer  that  therefore 
Germany  was  all  the  time  working  up  to  an 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  87 

aggressive  war.  It  is  interesting,  in  this  con- 
nection, to  note  the  testimony  given  by  Sir  Edwin 
Pears  to  the  desire  for  good  relations  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  felt  and  expressed 
later  by  the  same  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieber- 
stein  who  was  so  unyielding  in  1907  on  the  ques- 
tion of  arbitration.  When  he  came  to  take  up 
the  post  of  German  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain, 
Sir  Edwin  reports  him  as  saying : — 

I  have  long  wanted  to  be  Ambassador  to  England, 
because,  as  you  know,  for  years  I  have  considered  it  a 
misfortune  to  the  world  that  our  two  countries  are  not 
really  in  harmony.  I  consider  that  I  am  here  as  a  man 
with  a  mission,  my  mission  being  to  bring  about  a  real 
understanding  between  our  two  nations. 

On  this  Sir  Edwin  comments  (19 15): — 

I  unhesitatingly  add  that  I  am  convinced  he  was  sincere 
in  what  he  said.    Of  that  I  have  no  doubt.1 

It  must,  in  fact,  be  recognized  that  in  the 
present  state  of  international  relations,  the  gen- 
eral suspicion  and  the  imminent  danger,  it  re- 
quires more  imagination  and  faith  than  most 
public  men  possess,  and  more  idealism  than  most 
nations  have  shown  themselves  to  be  capable  of, 

xSir  Edwin  Pears,  "Forty  Years  in  Constantinople," 
P-  330. 


88         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

to  take  any  radical  step  towards  reorganization. 
The  armed  peace,  as  we  have  so  often  had  to 
insist,  perpetuates  itself  by  the  mistrust  which 
it  establishes. 

Every  move  by  one  Power  is  taken  to  be  a 
menace  to  another,  and  is  countered  by  a  sim- 
ilar move,  which  in  turn  produces  a  reply.  And 
it  is  not  easy  to  say  "Who  began  it?"  since  the 
rivalry  goes  so  far  back  into  the  past.  What, 
for  instance,  is  the  real  truth  about  the  German, 
French,  and  Russian  military  laws  of  19 13?  Were 
any  or  all  of  them  aggressive?  Or  were  they 
all  defensive?  I  do  not  believe  it  is  possible  to 
answer  that  question.  Looking  back  from  the 
point  of  view  of  19 14,  it  is  natural  to  suppose 
that  Germany  was  already  intending  war.  But 
that  did  not  seem  evident  at  the  time  to  a  neutral 
observer,  nor  even,  it  would  seem,  to  the  British 
Foreign  Office.  Thus  the  Count  de  Lalaing, 
Belgian  Minister  in  London,  writes  as  follows 
on  February  24,  1913: — 

The  English  Press  naturally  wants  to  throw  upon 
Germany  the  responsibility  for  the  new  tension  which 
results  from  its  proposals,  and  which  may  bring  to  Europe 
fresh  occasions  of  unrest.  Many  journals  consider  that 
the  French  Government,  in  declaring  itself  ready  to 
impose  three  years'  service,  and  in  nominating  M.  Delcasse" 
to  St.  Petersburg,  has  adopted  the  only  attitude  worthy 


ATTEMPTS  AT  HARMONY  89 

of  the  great  Republic  in  presence  of  a  German  provoca- 
tion. At  the  Foreign  Office  I  found  a  more  just  and  calm 
appreciation  of  the  position.  They  see  in  the  reinforce- 
ment of  the  German  armies  less  a  provocation  than  the 
admission  of  a  military  situation  weakened  by  events 
and  which  it  is  necessary  to  strengthen.  The  Government 
of  Berlin  sees  itself  obliged  to  recognize  that  it  cannot 
count,  as  before,  on  the  support  of  all  the  forces  of  its 
Austrian  ally,  since  the  appearance  in  South-east  Europe 
of  a  new  Power,  that  of  the  Balkan  allies,  established  on 
the  very  flank  of  the  Dual  Empire.  Far  from  being  able 
to  count,  in  case  of  need,  on  the  full  support  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Vienna,  it  is  probable  that  Germany  will  have 
to  support  Vienna  herself.  In  the  case  of  a  European 
war  she  would  have  to  make  head  against  her  enemies  on 
two  frontiers,  the  Russian  and  the  French,  and  diminish 
perhaps  her  own  forces  to  aid  the  Austrian  army.  In 
these  conditions  they  do  not  find  it  surprising  that  the 
German  Empire  should  have  felt  it  necessary  to  increase 
the  number  of  its  Army  Corps.  They  add  at  the  Foreign 
Office  that  the  Government  of  Berlin  had  frankly  ex- 
plained to  the  Cabinet  of  Paris  the  precise  motives  of  its 
action. 


Whether  this  is  a  complete  account  of  the  mo- 
tives of  the  German  Government  in  introducing 
the  law  of  1913  cannot  be  definitely  established. 
But  the  motives  suggested  are  adequate  by  them- 
selves to  account  for  the  facts.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  part  of  the  cost  of  the  new  law  was  to 
be  defrayed  by  a  tax  on  capital.     And  those 


9o         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

who  believe  that  by  this  year  Germany  was  def- 
initely waiting  an  occasion  to  make  war  have  a 
right  to  dwell  upon  that  fact.  I  find,  myself, 
nothing  conclusive  in  these  speculations.  But 
what  is  certain,  and  to  my  mind  much  more 
important,  is  the  fact  that  military  preparations 
evoke  counter-preparations,  until  at  last  the 
strain  becomes  unbearable.  By  1913  it  was  al- 
ready terrific.  The  Germans  knew  well  that  by 
January,  191 7,  the  French  and  Russian  prepara- 
tions would  have  reached  their  culminating  point. 
But  those  preparations  were  themselves  almost 
unendurable  to  the  French. 

I  may  recall  here  the  passage  already  cited 
from  a  dispatch  of  Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  written  in  June,  19 14 
(p.  34).  He  suspected,  as  we  saw,  that  the 
hand  of  Russia  had  imposed  the  three  years' 
service  upon  France. 

What  Baron  Guillaume  thought  plausible  must 
not  the  Germans  have  thought  plausible?  Must 
it  not  have  confirmed  their  belief  in  the  "inevi- 
tability" of  a  war — that  belief  which,  by  itself, 
has  been  enough  to  produce  war  after  war,  and, 
in  particular,  the  war  of  1870?  Must  there  not 
have  been  strengthened  in  their  minds  that  par- 
ticular current  among  the  many  that  were  mak- 
ing for  war?     And  must  not  similar  suspicions 


EUROPE  SINCE   1890-1900  91 

have  been  active,  with  similar  results,  on  the 
side  of  France  and  Russia?  The  armaments 
engender  fear,  the  fear  in  turn  engenders  arma- 
ments, and  in  that  vicious  circle  turns  the  policy 
of  Europe,  till  this  or  that  Power  precipitates 
the  conflict,  much  as  a  man  hanging  in  terror 
over  the  edge  of  a  cliff  ends  by  losing  his 
nerve  and  throwing  himself  over.  That  is 
the  real  lesson  of  the  rivalry  in  armaments. 
That  is  certain.  The  rest  remains  conjec- 
ture. 

12.  Europe  since  the  Decade  1 800-1 900 

Let  us  now,  endeavouring  to  bear  in  our  minds 
the  whole  situation  we  have  been  analysing,  con- 
sider a  little  more  particularly  the  various  epi- 
sodes and  crises  of  international  policy  from  the 
year  1890  onwards.  I  take  that  date,  the  date 
of  Bismarck's  resignation,  for  the  reason  already 
given  (p.  42).  It  was  not  until  then  that  it  would 
have  occurred  to  any  competent  observer  to  ac- 
cuse Germany  of  an  aggressive  policy  calculated 
to  disturb  the  peace  of  Europe.  A  closer  rap- 
prochement with  England  was,  indeed,  the  first 
idea  of  the  Kaiser  when  he  took  over  the  reins  of 
power  in  1888.  And  during  the  ten  years  that 
followed  British  sympathies  were  actually  drawn 


92  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

towards  Germany  and  alienated  from  France.1 
It  is  well  known  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  favoured 

1  The  columns  of  The  Times  for  1899  are  full  of  attacks 
upon  France.  Once  more  we  may  cite  from  the  dispatch 
of  the  Comte  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  in  London, 
dated  May  24,  1907,  commenting  on  current  or  recalling 
earlier  events:  "A  certain  section  of  the  Press,  known  here 
under  the  name  of  the  Yellow  Press,  is  in  great  part  re- 
sponsible for  the  hostility  that  exists  between  the  two 
nations  (England  and  Germany).  What,  in  fact,  can  one 
expect  from  a  journalist  like  Mr.  Harmsworth,  now 
Lord  Northcliffe,  proprietor  of  the  Daily  Mail,  Daily 
Mirror,  Daily  Graphic,  Daily  Express,  Evening  News, 
and  Weekly  Dispatch,  who  in  an  interview  given  to  the 
Matin  says,  'Yes,  we  detest  the  Germans  cordially.  They 
make  themselves  odious  to  all  Europe.  I  will  never  allow 
the  least  thing  to  be  printed  in  my  journal  which  might 
wound  France,  but  I  would  not  let  anything  be  printed 
which  might  be  agreeable  to  Germany.'  Yet,  in  1899, 
this  same  man  was  attacking  the  French  with  the  same 
violence,  wanted  to  boycott  the  Paris  Exhibition,  and 
wrote:  "The  French  have  succeeded  in  persuading  John 
Bull  that  they  are  his  deadly  enemies.  England  long 
hesitated  between  France  and  Germany,  but  she  has  al- 
ways respected  the  German  character,  while  she  has 
come  to  despise  France.  A  cordial  understanding  cannot 
exist  between  England  and  her  nearest  neighbour.  We 
have  had  enough  of  France,  who  has  neither  courage  nor 
political  sense.'"  Lalaing  does  not  give  his  references, 
and  I  cannot  therefore  verify  his  quotations.  But  they 
hardly  require  it.  The  volteface  of  The  Times  is  sufficiently 
well  known.     And  only  too  well  known  is  the  way  in 


EUROPE  SINCE   1890-1900  93 

an  alliance  with  Germany,1  and  that  when  the 
Anglo- Japanese  treaty  was  being  negotiated  the 
inclusion  of  Germany  was  seriously  considered 
by  Lord  Lansdowne.  The  telegram  of  the  Kaiser 
to  Kruger  in  1895  no  doubt  left  an  unpleasant 
impression  in  England,  and  German  feeling,  of 
course,  at  the  time  of  the  Boer  War,  ran  strongly 
against  England,  but  so  did  feeling  in  France 
and  America,  and,  indeed,  throughout  the  civ- 
ilized world.  It  was  certainly  the  determination 
of  Germany  to  build  a  great  navy  that  led  to 
the  tension  between  her  and  England,  and  fi- 
nally to  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Entente,  as 

which  the  British  nation  allows  its  sentiments  for  other 
nations  to  be  dictated  to  it  by  a  handful  of  cantankerous 
journalists. 

1  "I  may  point  out  to  you  that,  at  bottom,  the  char- 
acter, the  main  character,  of  the  Teuton  race  differs 
very  slightly  indeed  frov.  the  character  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  (cheers),  and  the  same  sentiments  which  bring 
us  into  a  close  sympathy  with  the  United  States  of  America 
may  be  invoked  to  bring  us  into  closer  sympathy  with 
the  Empire  of  Germany."  He  goes  on  to  advocate  "a 
new  Triple  Alliance  between  the  Teutonic  race  and  the 
two  great  branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race"  (see  The 
Times,  December  1,  1899).  This  was  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Boer  War.  Two  years  later,  in  October,  1901, 
Mr.  Chamberlain  was  attacking  Germany  at  Edinburgh. 
This  date  is  clearly  about  the  turning-point  in  British 
sentiment  and  policy  towards  Germany. 


94         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

a  counterpoise  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  It  is  iooo, 
not  1888,  still  less  1870,  that  marks  the  period 
at  which  German  policy  began  to  be  a  disturbing 
element  in  Europe.  During  the  years  that  fol- 
lowed, the  principal  storm-centres  in  international 
policy  were  the  Far  and  Near  East,  the  Balkans, 
and  Morocco.  Events  in  the  Far  East,  important 
though  they  were,  need  not  detain  us  here,  for 
their  contribution  to  the  present  war  was  remote 
and  indirect,  except  so  far  as  concerns  the  par- 
ticipation of  Japan.  Of  the  situation  in  the  other 
areas,  the  tension  and  its  causes  and  effects,  we 
must  try  to  form  some  clear  general  idea.  This 
can  be  done  even  in  the  absence  of  that  detailed 
information  of  what  was  going  on  behind  the 
scenes  for  which  a  historian  will  have  to  wait. 

13.  Germany  ind  Turkey 

Let  us  begin  with  the  Near  East.  The  situa- 
tion there,  when  Germany  began  her  enterprise, 
is  thus  summed  up  by  a  French  writer1: — 

Astride  across  Europe  and  Asia,  the  Ottoman  Empire 
represented,  for  all  the  nations  of  the  old  continent, 
the  cosmopolitan  centre  where  each  had  erected,  by 
dint  of  patience  and  ingenuity,  a  fortress  of  interests, 
influences,  and   special   rights.     Each   fortress  watched 

1  Pierre  Albin,  "D'Agadir  a  Serajevo,"  p.  81. 


GERMANY  AND  TURKEY  95 

jealously  to  maintain  its  particular  advantages  in  face 
of  the  rival  enemy.  If  one  of  them  obtained  a  conces- 
sion, or  a  new  favour,  immediately  the  commanders 
of  the  others  were  seen  issuing  from  their  walls  to  claim 
from  the  Grand  Turk  concessions  or  favours  which  should 
maintain  the  existing  balance  of  power  or  prestige.  .  .  . 
France  acted  as  protector  of  the  Christians;  England, 
the  vigilant  guardian  of  the  routes  to  India,  maintained 
a  privileged  political  and  economic  position;  Austria- 
Hungary  mounted  guard  over  the  route  to  Salonica; 
Russia,  protecting  the  Armenians  and  Slavs  of  the  South 
of  Europe,  watched  over  the  fate  of  the  Orthodox.  There 
was  a  general  understanding  among  them  all,  tacit  or 
express,  that  none  should  better  its  situation  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  others. 

When  into  this  precariously  balanced  system 
of  conflicting  interests  Germany  began  to  throw 
her  weight,  the  necessary  result  was  a  disturbance 
of  equilibrium.  As  early  as  1839  German  ambi- 
tion had  been  directed  towards  this  region  by 
Von  Moltke;  but  it  was  not  till  1873  that  the 
process  of  "penetration"  began.  In  that  year 
the  enterprise  of  the  Anatolian  railway  was 
launched  by  German  financiers.  In  the  succeed- 
ing years  it  extended  itself  as  far  as  Konia;  and 
in  1899  and  1902  concessions  were  obtained  for 
an  extension  to  Bagdad  and  the  Persian  Gulf. 
It  was  at  this  point  that  the  question  became 
one    of    international   politics.     Nothing    could 


96         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

better  illustrate  the  lamentable  character  of  the 
European  anarchy  than  the  treatment  of  this 
matter  by  the  interests  and  the  Powers  affected. 
Here  had  been  launched  on  a  grandiose  scale 
a  great  enterprise  of  civilization.  The  Mesopo- 
tamian  plain,  the  cradle  of  civilization,  and  for 
centuries  the  granary  of  the  world,  was  to  be 
redeemed  by  irrigation  from  the  encroachment 
of  the  desert,  order  and  security  were  to  be  re- 
tored,  labour  to  be  set  at  work,  and  science  and 
power  to  be  devoted  on  a  great  scale  to  their 
only  proper  purpose,  the  increase  of  life.  Here 
was  an  idea  fit  to  inspire  the  most  generous  imagi- 
nation. Here,  for  all  the  idealism  of  youth  and 
the  ambition  of  maturity,  for  diplomatists,  engi- 
neers, administrators,  agriculturists,  educationists, 
an  opportunity  for  the  work  of  a  lifetime,  a  task 
to  appeal  at  once  to  the  imagination,  the  intel- 
lect, and  the  organizing  capacity  of  practical 
men,  a  scheme  in  which  all  nations  might  be 
proud  to  participate,  and  by  which  Europe  might 
show  to  the  backward  populations  that  the  power 
she  had  won  over  Nature  was  to  be  used  for 
the  benefit  of  man,  and  that  the  science  and  the 
arms  of  the  West  were  destined  to  recreate  the 
life  of  the  East.  What  happened,  in  fact?  No 
sooner  did  the  Germans  approach  the  other  na- 
tions for  financial  and  political  support  to  their 


GERMANY  AND  TURKEY  of 

scheme  than  there  was  an  outcry  of  jealousy,  sus- 
picion, and  rage.  All  the  vested  interests  of  the 
other  States  were  up  in  arms.  The  proposed  rail- 
way, it  was  said,  would  compete  with  the  Trans- 
Siberian,  with  the  French  railways,  with  the  ocean 
route  to  India,  with  the  steamboats  on  the  Tigris. 
Corn  in  Mesopotamia  would  bring  down  the  price 
of  corn  in  Russia.  German  trade  would  oust 
British  and  French  and  Russian  trade.  Nor 
was  that  all.  Under  cover  of  an  economic  enter- 
prise, Germany  was  nursing  political  ambitions. 
She  was  aiming  at  Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal, 
at  the  control  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  at  the  domina- 
tion of  Persia,  at  the  route  to  India.  Were  these 
fears  and  suspicions  justified?  In  the  European 
anarchy,  who  can  say?  Certainly  the  entry  of 
a  new  economic  competitor,  the  exploitation  of 
new  areas,  the  opening  out  of  new  trade  routes, 
must  interfere  with  interests  already  established. 
That  must  always  be  so  in  a  changing  world. 
But  no  one  would  seriously  maintain  that  that 
is  a  reason  for  abandoning  new  enterprises.  But, 
it  was  urged,  in  fact  Germany  will  take  the  oppor- 
tunity to  squeeze  out  the  trade  of  other  nations 
and  to  constitute  a  German  monopoly.  Ger- 
many, it  is  true,  was  ready  to  give  guarantees  of 
the  "open  door."  But  then,  what  was  the  value 
of  these  guarantees?    She  asserted  that  her  enter- 


98  THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

prise  was  economic,  and  had  no  ulterior  political 
gains.  But  who  would  believe  her?  Were  not 
German  Jingoes  already  rejoicing  at  the  near 
approach  of  German  armies  to  the  Egyptian 
frontiers?  In  the  European  anarchy  all  these 
fears,  suspicions,  and  rivalries  were  inevitable. 
But  the  British  Government  at  least  was  not 
carried  away  by  them.  They  were  willing  that 
British  capital  should  co-operate  on  condition 
that  the  enterprise  should  be  under  international 
control.  They  negotiated  for  terms  which  would 
give  equal  control  to  Germany,  England,  and 
France.  They  failed  to  get  these  terms,  why 
has  not  been  made  public.  But  Lord  Cranborne, 
then  Under-Secretary  of  State,  said  in  the  House 
of  Commons  that  "the  outcry  which  was  made 
in  this  matter — I  think  it  a  very  ill-formed 
outcry — made  it  exceedingly  difficult  for  us  to 
get  the  terms  we  required."1  And  Sir  Clinton 
Dawkins  wrote  in  a  letter  to  Herr  Gwinner,  the 
chief  of  the  Deutsche  Bank:  "The  fact  is  that 
the  business  has  become  involved  in  politics  here, 
and  has  been  sacrificed  to  the  very  violent  and 
bitter  feeling  against  Germany  exhibited  by  the 
majority  of  newspapers  and  shared  in  by  a  large 
number  of  people."2    British  co-operation,  there- 

1  Hansard,  1903,  vol.  126,  p.  120. 

2  Nineteenth  Century,  June,  1909,  vol.  65,  p.  1090. 


GERMANY  AND  TURKEY  99 

fore,  failed,  as  French  and  Russian  had  failed. 
The  Germans,  however,  persevered  with  their 
enterprise,  now  a  purely  German  one,  and  ul- 
timately with  success.  Their  differences  with 
Russia  were  arranged  by  an  agreement  about 
the  Turko-Persian  railways  signed  in  191 1.  An 
agreement  with  France,  with  regard  to  the  rail- 
ways of  Asiatic  Turkey,  was  signed  in  February, 
1 9 14,  and  one  with  England  (securing  our  interests 
on  the  Persian  Gulf)  in  June  of  the  same  year. 
Thus  just  before  the  war  broke  out  this  thorny 
question  had,  in  fact,  been  settled  to  the  satis- 
faction of  all  the  Powers  concerned.  And  on 
this  two  comments  may  be  made.  First,  that 
the  long  friction,  the  press  campaign,  the  rivalry 
of  economic  and  political  interests,  had  contrib- 
uted largely  to  the  European  tension.  Secondly, 
that  in  spite  of  that,  the  question  did  get  settled, 
and  by  diplomatic  means.  On  this  subject,  at 
any  rate,  war  was  not  "inevitable."  Further, 
it  seems  clear  that  the  British  Government,  so 
far  from  "hemming  in"  Germany  in  this  matter, 
were  ready  from  the  first  to  accept,  if  not  to 
welcome,  her  enterprise,  subject  to  their  quite 
legitimate  and  necessary  preoccupation  with  their 
position  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  was  the  British 
Press  and  what  lay  behind  it  that  prevented  the 
co-operation  of  British  capital.     Meantime  the 


ioo    THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

economic  penetration  of  Asia  Minor  by  Germany 
had  been  accompanied  by  a  political  penetration 
at  Constantinople.  Already,  as  early  as  1898, 
the  Kaiser  had  announced  at  Damascus  that  the 
"three  hundred  millions  of  Mussulmans  who 
live  scattered  over  the  globe  may  be  assured 
that  the  German  Emperor  will  be  at  all  times 
their  friend." 

This  speech,  made  immediately  after  the  Ar- 
menian massacres,  has  been  very  properly  rep- 
robated by  all  who  are  revolted  at  such  atrocities. 
But  the  indignation  of  Englishmen  must  be  tem- 
pered by  shame  when  they  remember  that  it 
was  their  own  minister,  still  the  idol  of  half  the 
nation,  who  reinstated  Turkey  after  the  earlier 
massacres  in  Bulgaria  and  put  back  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Macedonia  for  another  generation  under 
the  murderous  oppression  of  the  Turks.  The 
importance  of  the  speech  in  the  history  of  Europe 
is  that  it  signalled  the  advent  of  German  influence 
in  the  Near  East.  That  influence  was  strength- 
ened on  the  Bosphorus  after  the  Turkish  revolu- 
tion of  1908,  in  spite  of  the  original  Anglophil 
bias  of  the  Young  Turks,  and  as  some  critics 
maintain,  in  consequence  of  the  blundering  of 
the  British  representatives.  The  mission  of  Von 
der  Goltz  in  1008  and  that  of  Liman  von  Sanders 
in   1914  put  the  Turkish  army  under  German 


AUSTRIA  AND  THE  BALKANS      101 

command,  and  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war  German 
influence  was  predominant  in  Constantinople. 
This  political  influence  was,  no  doubt,  used,  and 
intended  to  be  used,  to  further  German  eco- 
nomic schemes.  Germany,  in  fact,  had  come  in  to 
play  the  same  game  as  the  other  Powers,  and 
had  played  it  with  more  skill  and  determination. 
She  was,  of  course,  here  as  elsewhere,  a  new  and 
disturbing  force  in  a  system  of  forces  which  al- 
ready had  difficulty  in  maintaining  a  precarious 
equihbrium.  But  to  be  a  new  and  disturbing 
force  is  not  to  commit  a  crime.  Once  more  the 
real  culprit  was  not  Germany  nor  any  other 
Power.  The  real  culprit  was  the  European  an- 
archy. 

14.  Austria  and  the  Balkans 

I  turn  now  to  the  Balkan  question.  This  is 
too  ancient  and  too  complicated  to  be  even  sum- 
marized here.  But  we  must  remind  ourselves 
of  the  main  situation.  Primarily,  the  Balkan 
question  is,  or  rather  was,  one  between  subject 
Christian  populations  and  the  Turks.  But  it 
has  been  complicated,  not  only  by  the  quarrels 
of  the  subject  populations  among  themselves, 
but  by  the  rival  ambitions  and  claims  of  Russia 
and  Austria.  The  interest  of  Russia  in  the  Bal- 
kans is  partly  one  of  racial  sympathy,  partly 


102         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

one  of  territorial  ambition,  for  the  road  to  Con- 
stantinople lies  through  Rumania  and  Bulgaria. 
It  is  this  territorial  ambition  of  Russia  that  has 
given  occasion  in  the  past  to  the  intervention 
of  the  Western  Powers,  for  until  recently  it  was 
a  fixed  principle,  both  of  French  and  British 
policy,  to  keep  Russia  out  of  the  Mediterranean. 
Hence  the  Crimean  War,  and  hence  the  disas- 
trous intervention  of  Disraeli  after  the  treaty  of 
San  Stefano  in  1878 — an  intervention  which 
perpetuated  for  years  the  Balkan  hell.  The 
interest  of  Austria  in  the  peninsula  depends 
primarily  on  the  fact  that  the  Austrian  Empire 
contains  a  large  Slav  population  desiring  its 
independence,  and  that  this  national  ambition 
of  the  Austrian  Slavs  finds  in  the  independent 
kingdom  of  Serbia  its  natural  centre  of  attrac- 
tion. The  determination  of  Austria  to  retain 
her  Slavs  as  unwilling  citizens  of  her  Empire 
brings  her  also  into  conflict  with  Russia,  so  far 
as  Russia  is  the  protector  of  the  Slavs.  The 
situation,  and  the  danger  with  which  it  is  preg- 
nant, may  be  realized  by  an  Englishman  if  he 
will  suppose  St.  George's  Channel  and  the  At- 
lantic to  be  annihilated,  and  Ireland  to  touch, 
by  a  land  frontier,  on  the  one  side  Great  Britain, 
on  the  other  the  United  States.  The  friction 
and  even  the  warfare  which  might  have  arisen 


AUSTRIA  AND  THE  BALKANS     103 

between  these  two  great  Powers  from  the  plots 
of  American  Fenians  may  readily  be  imagined. 
Something  of  that  kind  is  the  situation  of  Aus- 
tria in  relation  to  Serbia  and  her  protector, 
Russia.  Further,  Austria  fears  the  occupation 
by  any  Slav  State  of  any  port  on  the  coast  line 
of  the  Adriatic,  and  herself  desires  a  port  on 
the  ^Egean.  Add  to  this  the  recent  German 
dream  of  the  route  from  Berlin  to  Bagdad,  and 
the  European  importance  of  what  would  other- 
wise be  local  disputes  among  the  Balkan  States 
becomes  apparent. 

During  the  period  we  are  now  considering 
the  Balkan  factor  first  came  into  prominence 
with  the  annexation  by  Austria  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  in  1908.  Those  provinces,  it  will 
be  remembered,  were  handed  over  to  Austrian 
protection  at  the  Congress  at  Berlin  in  1878. 
Austria  went  in  and  policed  the  country,  much 
as  England  went  in  and  policed  Egypt,  and, 
from  the  material  point  of  view,  with  similarly 
successful  results.  But,  like  England  in  Egypt, 
Austria  was  not  sovereign  there.  Formal  sov- 
ereignty still  rested  with  the  Turk.  In  1909, 
during  the  Turkish  revolution,  Austria  took 
the  opportunity  to  throw  off  that  nominal  su- 
zerainty. Russia  protested,  Austria  mobilized 
against  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  and  war  seemed 


io4         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

imminent.  But  the  dramatic  intervention  of 
Germany  "in  shining  armour"  on  the  side  of 
her  ally  resulted  in  a  diplomatic  victory  for  the 
Central  Powers.  Austria  gained  her  point,  and 
war,  for  the  moment,  was  avoided.  But  such 
diplomatic  victories  are  dangerous.  Russia  did 
not  forget,  and  the  events  of  1009  were  an  opera- 
tive cause  in  the  catastrophe  of  1 914.  In  acting 
as  she  did  in  this  matter  Austria-Hungary  de- 
fied the  public  law  of  Europe,  and  Germany 
supported  her  in  doing  so. 

The  motives  of  Germany  in  taking  this  action 
are  thus  described,  and  probably  with  truth, 
by  Baron  Beyens:  "She  could  not  allow  the 
solidity  of  the  Triple  Alliance  to  be  shaken: 
she  had  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  pay  to  her  ally, 
who  had  supported  her  at  the  Congress  of  Al- 
geciras.  Finally,  she  believed  herself  to  be  the 
object  of  an  attempt  at  encirclement  by  France, 
England,  and  Russia,  and  was  anxious  to  show 
that  the  gesture  of  putting  her  hand  to  the  sword 
was  enough  to  dispel  the  illusions  of  her  adver- 
saries." l  These  are  the  kind  of  reasons  that 
all  Powers  consider  adequate  where  what  they 
conceive  to  be  their  interests  are  involved.  From 
any  higher,  more  international  point  of  view, 
they  are  no  reasons  at  all.    But  in  such  a  matter 

1  "L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  240. 


AUSTRIA  AND  THE  BALKANS     105 

no  Power  is  in  a  position  to  throw  the  first  stone. 
The  whole  episode  is  a  classical  example  for 
the  normal  working  of  the  European  anarchy. 
Austria-Hungary  was  primarily  to  blame,  but 
Germany,  who  supported  her,  must  take  her 
share.  The  other  Powers  of  Europe  acquiesced 
for  the  sake  of  peace,  and  they  could  probably 
do  no  better.  There  will  never  be  any  guaran- 
tee for  the  public  law  of  Europe  until  there  is 
a  public  tribunal  and  a  public  force  to  see  that 
its  decisions  are  carried  out. 

The  next  events  of  importance  in  this  region 
were  the  two  Balkan  wars.  We  need  not  here 
go  into  the  causes  and  results  of  these,  except 
so  far  as  to  note  that,  once  more,  the  rivalry 
of  Russia  and  Austria  played  a  disastrous  part. 
It  was  the  determination  of  Austria  not  to  give 
Serbia  access  to  the  Adriatic  that  led  Serbia 
to  retain  territories  assigned  by  treaty  to  Bul- 
garia, and  so  precipitated  the  second  Balkan 
war;  for  that  war  was  due  to  the  indignation 
caused  in  Bulgaria  by  the  breach  of  faith,  and 
is  said  to  have  been  directly  prompted  by  Aus- 
tria. The  bad  part  played  by  Austria  through- 
out this  crisis  is  indisputable.  But  it  must  be 
observed  that,  by  general  admission,  Germany 
throughout  worked  hand  in  hand  with  Sir  Ed- 


106        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

ward  Grey  to  keep  the  peace  of  Europe,  which, 
indeed,  otherwise  could  not  have  been  kept. 
And  nothing  illustrates  this  better  than  that 
episode  of  1913  which  is  sometimes  taken  to 
throw  discredit  upon  Germany.  The  episode 
was  thus  described  by  the  Italian  minister,  Gio- 
litti:  "On  the  9th  of  August,  19 13,  about  a  year 
before  the  war  broke  out,  I,  being  then  absent 
from  Rome,  received  from  my  colleague,  San 
Giuliano,  the  following  telegram:  'Austria  has 
communicated  to  us  and  to  Germany  her  in- 
tention to  act  against  Serbia,  and  defines  such 
action  as  defensive,  hoping  to  apply  the  casus 
foederis  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  I  consider 
inapplicable.  I  intend  to  join  forces  with  Ger- 
many to  prevent  any  such  action  by  Austria, 
but  it  will  be  necessary  to  say  clearly  that  we 
do  not  consider  such  eventual  action  as  defen- 
sive, and  therefore  do  not  believe  that  the  casus 
foederis  exists.  Please  telegraph  to  Rome  if  you 
approve.' 

"I  replied  that,  'if  Austria  intervenes  against 
Serbia,  it  is  evident  that  the  casus  foederis  does 
not  arise.  It  is  an  action  that  she  undertakes 
on  her  own  account,  since  there  is  no  question 
of  defence,  as  no  one  thinks  of  attacking  her. 
It  is  necessary  to  make  a  declaration  in  this 
sense  to  Austria  in  the  most  formal  way,  and 


AUSTRIA  AND  THE  BALKANS     107 

it  is  to  be  wished  that  German  action  may  dis- 
suade Austria  from  her  most  perilous  adven- 
ture.'" 1 

Now  this  statement  shows  upon  the  face  of 
it  two  things.  One,  that  Austria  was  prepared, 
by  attacking  Serbia,  to  unchain  a  European 
war;  the  other,  that  the  Italian  ministers  joined 
with  Germany  to  dissuade  her.  They  were 
successful.  Austria  abandoned  her  project,  and 
war  was  avoided.  The  episode  is  as  discredit- 
able as  you  like  to  Austria.  But,  on  the  face 
of  it,  how  does  it  discredit  Germany?  More, 
of  course,  may  lie  behind;  but  no  evidence  has 
been  produced,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  to  show 
that  the  Austrian  project  was  approved  or  sup- 
ported by  her  ally. 

The  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  which  concluded 
the  second  Balkan  War,  left  all  the  parties  con- 
cerned dissatisfied.  But,  in  particular,  it  left 
the  situation  between  Austria  and  Serbia  and 
between  Austria  and  Russia  more  strained  than 
ever.  It  was  this  situation  that  was  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  present  war.  For,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  quarrel  between  Austria  and  Russia  over 

1  It  is  characteristic  of  the  way  history  is  written  in 
time  of  war  that  M.  Yves  Guyot,  citing  Giolitti's  state- 
ment, omits  the  references  to  Germany.  See  "Les  causes 
et  les  consequences  de  la  guerre,"  p.  101. 


108    THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

the  Balkans  must,  given  the  system  of  alliances, 
unchain  a  European  war.  For  producing  that 
situation  Austria-Hungary  was  mainly  respon- 
sible. The  part  played  by  Germany  was  sec- 
ondary, and  throughout  the  Balkan  wars  Ger- 
man diplomacy  was  certainly  working,  with 
England,  for  peace.  "The  diplomacy  of  the 
Wilhelmstrasse,"  says  Baron  Beyens,  "applied 
itself,  above  all,  to  calm  the  exasperation  and 
the  desire  for  intervention  at  the  Ballplatz." 
"The  Cabinet  of  Berlin  did  not  follow  that  of 
Vienna  in  its  tortuous  policy  of  intrigues  at  Sofia 
and  Bucharest.  As  M.  Zimmermann  said  to 
me  at  the  time,  the  Imperial  Government  con- 
tented itself  with  maintaining  its  neutrality 
in  relation  to  the  Balkans,  abstaining  from  any 
intervention,  beyond  advice,  in  the  fury  of  their 
quarrels.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  sin- 
cerity of  this  statement."  * 

15.  Morocco 

Let  us  turn  now  to  the  other  storm-centre, 
Morocco.  The  salient  features  here  were,  first, 
the  treaty  of  1880,  to  which  all  the  Great  Powers, 
including,  of  course,  Germany,  were  parties, 
and  which  guaranteed  to  the  signatories  most- 

1  "L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  pp.  248,  262. 


MOROCCO  109 

favoured-nation  treatment;  secondly,  the  inter- 
est of  Great  Britain  to  prevent  a  strong  Power 
from  establishing  itself  opposite  Gibraltar  and 
threatening  British  control  over  the  Straits; 
thirdly,  the  interest  of  France  to  annex  Morocco 
and  knit  it  up  with  the  North  African  Empire; 
fourthly,  the  new  colonial  and  trading  interests 
of  Germany,  which,  as  she  had  formally  an- 
nounced, could  not  leave  her  indifferent  to  any 
new  dispositions  of  influence  or  territory  in  un- 
developed countries.  For  many  years  French 
ambitions  in  Morocco  had  been  held  in  check 
by  the  British  desire  to  maintain  the  status  quo. 
But  the  Anglo-French  Entente  of  1904  gave 
France  a  free  hand  there  in  return  for  the  aban- 
donment of  French  opposition  to  the  British 
position  in  Egypt.  The  Anglo-French  treaty 
of  1904  affirmed,  in  the  clauses  made  public, 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  Morocco;  but 
there  were  secret  clauses  looking  to  its  partition. 
By  these  the  British  interest  in  the  Straits  was 
guaranteed  by  an  arrangement  which  gave  to 
Spain  the  reversion  of  the  coast  opposite  Gibral- 
tar and  a  strip  on  the  north-west  coast,  while 
leaving  the  rest  of  the  country  to  fall  to  France. 
Germany  was  not  consulted  while  these  arrange- 
ments were  being  made,  and  the  secret  clauses 
of  the  treaty  were,  of  course,  not  communicated 


no        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

to  her.  But  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
they  became  known  to,  or  at  least  were  sus- 
pected by,  the  German  Government  shortly 
after  they  were  adopted.1  And  probably  it  was 
this  that  led  to  the  dramatic  intervention  of 
the  Kaiser  at  Tangier,2  when  he  announced 
that  the  independence  of  Morocco  was  under 
German  protection.  The  result  was  the  Con- 
ference of  Algeciras,  at  which  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  Morocco  was  once  more  affirmed 

1  See  "Morocco  in  Diplomacy,"  Chap.  XVI.  A  dis- 
patch written  by  M.  Leghait,  the  Belgian  minister  in 
Paris,  on  May  7,  1905,  shows  that  rumour  was  busy  on 
the  subject.  The  secret  clauses  of  the  Franco-Spanish 
treaty  were  known  to  him,  and  these  provided  for  an 
eventual  partition  of  Morocco  between  France  and  Spain. 
He  doubted  whether  there  were  secret  clauses  in  the 
Anglo-French  treaty — "but  it  is  supposed  that  there  is  a 
certain  tacit  understanding  by  which  England  would 
leave  France  sufficient  liberty  of  action  in  Morocco  under 
the  reserve  of  the  secret  clauses  of  the  Franco-Spanish 
arrangement,  clauses  if  not  imposed  yet  at  least  strongly 
supported  by  the  London  Cabinet." 

We  know,  of  course,  now,  that  the  arrangement  for 
the  partition  was  actually  embodied  in  secret  clauses  in 
the  Anglo-French  treaty. 

2  According  to  M.  Yves  Guyot,  when  the  Kaiser  was 
actually  on  his  way  to  Tangier,  he  telegraphed  from 
Lisbon  to  Prince  Biilow  abandoning  the  project.  Prince 
Bulow  telegraphed  back  insisting,  and  the  Kaiser  yielded. 


MOROCCO  in 

(the  clauses  looking  to  its  partition  being  still 
kept  secret  by  the  three  Powers  privy  to  them), 
and  equal  commercial  facilities  were  guaranteed 
to  all  the  Powers.  Germany  thereby  obtained 
what  she  most  wanted,  what  she  had  a  right 
to  by  the  treaty  of  1880,  and  what  otherwise 
might  have  been  threatened  by  French  occu- 
pation— the  maintenance  of  the  open  door.  But 
the  French  enterprise  was  not  abandoned.  Dis- 
putes with  the  natives  such  as  always  occur, 
or  are  manufactured,  in  these  cases,  led  to  fresh 
military  intervention.  At  the  same  time,  it 
was  difficult  to  secure  the  practical  application 
of  the  principle  of  equal  commercial  opportu- 
nity. An  agreement  of  1909  between  France 
and  Germany,  whereby  both  Powers  were  to 
share  equally  in  contracts  for  public  works, 
was  found  in  practice  not  to  work.  The  Ger- 
mans pressed  for  its  application  to  the  new  rail- 
ways projected  in  Morocco.  The  French  de- 
layed, temporized,  and  postponed  decision.1 
Meantime  they  were  strengthening  their  posi- 
tion in  Morocco.  The  matter  was  brought  to 
a  head  by  the  expedition  to  Fez.    Initiated  on 

1  See  Bourdon,  "L'finigme  Allemande,"  Chap.  II. 
This  account,  by  a  Frenchman,  will  not  be  suspected 
of  anti-French  or  pro-German  bias,  and  it  is  based  on 
French  official  records. 


ii2         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

the  plea  of  danger  to  the  European  residents 
at  the  capital  (a  plea  which  was  disputed  by 
the  Germans  and  by  many  Frenchmen),  it  clearly 
heralded  a  definite  final  occupation  of  the  coun- 
try. The  patience  of  the  Germans  was  exhausted, 
and  the  Kaiser  made  the  coup  of  Agadir.  There 
followed  the  Mansion  House  speech  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  the  Franco-German  agreement  of 
November,  191 1,  whereby  Germany  recognized 
a  French  protectorate  in  Morocco  in  return 
for  concessions  of  territory  in  the  French  Congo. 
These  are  the  bare  facts  of  the  Moroccan  epi- 
sode. Much,  of  course,  is  still  unrevealed,  par- 
ticularly as  to  the  motives  and  intentions  of 
the  Powers  concerned.  Did  Germany,  for  in- 
stance, intend  to  seize  a  share  of  Morocco  when 
she  sent  the  Panther  to  Agadir?  And  was  that 
the  reason  of  the  vigour  of  the  British  interven- 
tion? Possibly,  but  by  no  means  certainly; 
the  evidence  accessible  is  conflicting.  If  Ger- 
many had  that  intention,  she  was  frustrated 
by  the  solidarity  shown  between  France  and 
England,  and  the  result  was  the  final  and  definite 
absorption  of  Morocco  in  the  French  Empire, 
with  the  approval  and  active  support  of  Great 
Britain,  Germany  being  compensated  by  the 
cession  of  part  of  the  French  Congo.  Once  more 
a  difficult  question  had  been  settled  by  diplo- 


MOROCCO  113 

macy,  but  only  after  it  had  twice  brought  Europe 
to  the  verge  of  war,  and  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave 
behind  the  bitterest  feelings  of  anger  and  mis- 
trust in  all  the  parties  concerned. 

The  facts  thus  briefly  summarized  here  may 
be  studied  more  at  length,  with  the  relevant 
documents,  in  Mr.  Morel's  book  "Morocco  in 
Diplomacy."  The  reader  will  form  his  own 
opinion  on  the  part  played  by  the  various  Powers. 
But  I  do  not  believe  that  any  instructed  and  im- 
partial student  will  accept  what  appears  to  be 
the  current  English  view,  that  the  action  of 
Germany  in  this  episode  was  a  piece  of  sheer 
aggression  without  excuse,  and  that  the  other 
Powers  were  acting  throughout  justly,  hon- 
estly, and  straightforwardly. 

The  Morocco  crisis,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
produced  in  Germany  a  painful  impression,  and 
strengthened  there  the  elements  making  for  war. 
Thus  Baron  Beyens  writes: — 

The  Moroccan  conflicts  made  many  Germans  hitherto 
pacific  regard  another  war  as  a  necessary  evil.1 

And  again: — 

The  pacific  settiement  of  the  conflict  of  191 1  gave 
a  violent  impulse  to  the  war  party  in  Germany,  to  the 
propaganda  of  the  League  of  Defence  and  the  Navy 

1  "L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  216. 


ii4        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

League,  and  a  greater  force  to  their  demands.  To  their 
dreams  of  hegemony  and  domination  the  desire  for  revenge 
against  France  now  mingled  its  bitterness.  A  diplomatic 
success  secured  in  an  underground  struggle  signified  noth- 
ing. War,  war  in  the  open,  that  alone,  in  the  eyes  of  this 
rancorous  tribe,  could  settle  definitely  the  Moroccan 
question  by  incorporating  Morocco  and  all  French  Africa 
in  the  colonial  empire  they  hoped  to  create  on  the  shores 
of  the  Mediterranean  and  in  the  heart  of  the  Black  Con- 
tinent.1 

This  we  may  take  to  be  a  correct  descrip- 
tion of  the  attitude  of  the  Pangermans.  But 
there  is  no  evidence  that  it  was  that  of  the  na- 
tion. We  have  seen  also  that  Baron  Beyens' 
impression  of  the  attitude  of  the  German  people, 
even  after  the  Moroccan  affair,  was  of  a  general 
desire  for  peace.2  The  crisis  had  been  severe, 
but  it  had  been  tided  over,  and  the  Governments 
seem  to  have  made  renewed  efforts  to  come 
into  friendly  relations.  In  this  connection  the 
following  dispatch  of  Baron  Beyens  (June,  191 2) 
is  worth  quoting: — 

After  the  death  of  Edward  VII,  the  Kaiser,  as  well 
as  the  Crown  Prince,  when  they  returned  from  Eng- 
land, where  they  had  been  courteously  received,  were 
persuaded  that  the  coldness  in  the  relations  of  the  pre- 

1  "  L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  235. 

2  See  above,  p.  62. 


MOROCCO  115 

ceding  years  was  going  to  yield  to  a  cordial  intimacy 
between  the  two  Courts  and  that  the  causes  of  the  mis- 
understanding between  the  two  peoples  would  vanish 
with  the  past.  His  disillusionment,  therefore,  was  cruel 
when  he  saw  the  Cabinet  of  London  range  itself  last 
year  on  the  side  of  France.  But  the  Kaiser  is  obstinate, 
and  has  not  abandoned  the  hope  of  reconquering  the 
confidence  of  the  English.1 

This  dispatch  is  so  far  borne  out  by  the  facts 
that  in  the  year  succeeding  the  Moroccan  crisis 
a  serious  attempt  was  made  to  improve  Anglo- 
German  relations,  and  there  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  on  both  sides  there  was  a  genuine 
desire  for  an  understanding.  How  that  under- 
standing failed  has  already  been  indicated.2 
But  even  that  failure  did  not  ruin  the  relations 
between  the  two  Powers.  In  the  Balkan  crisis, 
as  we  have  seen  and  as  is  admitted  on  both  sides, 
England  and  Germany  worked  together  for 
peace.  And  the  fact  that  a  European  conflagra- 
tion was  then  avoided,  in  spite  of  the  tension 
between  Russia  and  Austria,  is  a  strong  proof 
that  the  efforts  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  were  sin- 
cerely and  effectively  seconded  by   Germany.3 

1This  view  is  reaffirmed  by  Baron  Beyens  in  "L'Alle- 
magne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  29. 

2  See  above,  p.  76. 

3  Above,  p.  105. 


n6        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

1 6.  The  Last  Years 

We  have  reached,  then,  the  year  1913,  and 
the  end  of  the  Balkan  wars,  without  discover- 
ing in  German  policy  any  clear  signs  of  a  deter- 
mination to  produce  a  European  war.  We  have 
found  all  the  Powers,  Germany  included,  contend- 
ing for  territory  and  trade  at  the  risk  of  the 
peace  of  Europe;  we  have  found  Germany  suc- 
cessfully developing  her  interests  in  Turkey; 
we  have  found  England  annexing  the  South 
African  republics,  France  Morocco,  Italy  Tri- 
poli; we  have  found  all  the  Powers  stealing  in 
China,  and  in  all  these  transactions  we  have 
found  them  continually  on  the  point  of  being 
at  one  another's  throats.  Nevertheless,  some 
last  instinct  of  self-preservation  has  enabled 
them,  so  far,  to  pull  up  in  time.  The  crises  had 
been  overcome  without  a  war.  Yet  they  had, 
of  course,  produced  their  effects.  Some  states- 
men probably,  like  Sir  Edward  Grey,  had  had 
their  passion  for  peace  confirmed  by  the  dangers 
encountered.  In  others,  no  doubt,  an  opposite 
effect  had  been  produced,  and  very  likely  by 
1 913  there  were  prominent  men  in  Europe  con- 
vinced that  war  must  come,  and  manoeuvring 
only  that  it  should  come  at  the  time  and  occasion 
most  favourable  to  their  country.    That,  accord- 


THE  LAST  YEARS  117 

ing  to  M.  Cambon,  was  now  the  attitude  of  the 
German  Emperor.  M.  Cambon  bases  this  view 
on  an  alleged  conversation  between  the  Kaiser 
and  the  King  of  the  Belgians.1  The  conversa- 
tion has  been  denied  by  the  German  official 
organ,  but  that,  of  course,  is  no  proof  that  it  did 
not  take  place,  and  there  is  nothing  improbable 
in  what  M.  Cambon  narrates. 

The  conversation  is  supposed  to  have  occurred 
in  November,  191 3,  at  a  time  when,  as  we  have 
seen,2  there  was  a  distinct  outburst  in  France 
of  anti-German  chauvinism,  and  when  the  arm- 
ing and  counter-arming  of  that  year  had  exas- 
perated opinion  to  an  extreme  degree.  The 
Kaiser  is  reported  to  have  said  that  war  between 
Germany  and  France  was  inevitable.  If  he 
did,  it  is  clear  from  the  context  that  he  said  it 
in  the  belief  that  French  chauvinism  would 
produce  war.  For  the  King  of  the  Belgians, 
in  replying,  is  stated  to  have  said  that  it  was 
"a  travesty  of  the  French  Government  to  inter- 

1  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  6.  In  "L'Allemagne  avant 
la  guerre"  (p.  24)  Baron  Beyens  states  that  this  con- 
versation was  held  at  Potsdam  on  November  5th  or  6th; 
the  Kaiser  said  that  war  between  Germany  and  France 
was  "inevitable  and  near."  Baron  Beyens,  presumably, 
is  the  authority  from  whom  M.  Cambon  derives  his  in- 
formation. 

2  Above,  p.  28. 


n8        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

pret  it  in  that  sense,  and  to  let  oneself  be  mis- 
led as  to  the  sentiments  of  the  French  nation 
by  the  ebullitions  of  a  few  irresponsible  spirits 
or  the  intrigues  of  unscrupulous  agitators." 
It  should  be  observed  also  that  this  supposed 
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Kaiser  is  noted  as 
a  change,  and  that  he  is  credited  with  having 
previously  stood  for  peace  against  the  designs  of 
the  German  Jingoes.  His  personal  influence, 
says  the  dispatch,  "had  been  exerted  on  many 
critical  occasions  in  support  of  peace."  The 
fact  of  a  change  of  mind  in  the  Kaiser  is  ac- 
cepted also  by  Baron  Beyens. 

Whatever  may  be  the  truth  in  this  matter, 
neither  the  German  nor  the  French  nor  our  own 
Government  can  then  have  abandoned  the  effort 
at  peaceable  settlement.  For,  in  fact,  by  the 
summer  of  1914,  agreements  had  been  made 
between  the  Great  Powers  which  settled  for 
the  time  being  the  questions  immediately  out- 
standing. It  is  understood  that  a  new  parti- 
tion of  African  territory  had  been  arranged  to 
meet  the  claims  and  interests  of  Germany,  France, 
and  England  alike.  The  question  of  the  Bagdad 
railway  had  been  settled,  and  everything  seemed 
to  favour  the  maintenance  of  peace,  when,  sud- 
denly, the  murder  of  the  Archduke  sprang  upon 
a  dismayed  Europe  the  crisis  that  was  at  last 


THE  LAST  YEARS  119 

to  prove  fatal.  The  events  that  followed,  so 
far  as  they  can  be  ascertained  from  published 
documents,  have  been  so  fully  discussed  that  it 
would  be  superfluous  for  me  to  go  over  the  ground 
again  in  all  its  detail.  But  I  will  indicate  briefly 
what  appear  to  me  to  be  the  main  points  of 
importance  in  fixing  the  responsibility  for  what 
occurred. 

First,  the  German  view,  that  England  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  war  because  she  did  not  pre- 
vent Russia  from  entering  upon  it,  I  regard  as 
childish,  if  it  is  not  simply  sophistical.  The 
German  Powers  deliberately  take  an  action  which 
the  whole  past  history  of  Europe  shows  must 
almost  certainly  lead  to  a  European  war,  and 
they  then  turn  round  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and  put  the  blame  on  him  because  he  did  not 
succeed  in  preventing  the  consequences  of  their 
own  action.  "He  might  have  kept  Russia  out." 
Who  knows  whether  he  might?  What  we  do 
know  is  that  it  was  Austria  and  Germany  who 
brought  her  in.  The  German  view  is  really 
only  intelligible  upon  the  assumption  that  Ger- 
many has  a  right  to  do  what  she  pleases  and 
that  the  Powers  that  stand  in  her  way  are  by 
definition  peacebreakers.  It  is  this  extraordi- 
nary attitude  that  has  been  one  of  the  factors 
for  making  war  in  Europe. 


120        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

Secondly,  I  am  not,  and  have  not  been,  one 
of  the  critics  of  Sir  Edward  Grey.  It  is,  indeed, 
possible,  as  it  is  always  possible  after  the  event, 
to  suggest  that  some  other  course  might  have 
been  more  successful  in  avoiding  war.  But 
that  is  conjecture.  I,  at  any  rate,  am  convinced, 
as  I  believe  every  one  outside  Germany  is  con- 
vinced, that  Sir  Edward  Grey  throughout  the 
negotiations  had  one  object  only — to  avoid,  if 
he  could,  the  catastrophe  of  war. 

Thirdly,  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary  is  per- 
fectly clear.  She  was  determined  now,  as  in 
19 13,  to  have  out  her  quarrel  with  Serbia,  at 
the  risk  of  a  European  war.  Her  guilt  is  clear 
and  definite,  and  it  is  only  the  fact  that  we  are 
not  directly  fighting  her  with  British  troops  that 
has  prevented  British  opinion  from  fastening 
upon  it  as  the  main  occasion  of  the  war. 

But  this  time,  quite  clearly,  Austria  was  backed 
by  Germany.  Why  this  change  in  German 
policy?  So  far  as  the  Kaiser  himself  is  con- 
cerned, there  can  be  little  doubt  that  a  main 
cause  was  the  horror  he  felt  at  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  Archduke.  The  absurd  system  of 
autocracy  gives  to  the  emotional  reactions  of 
an  individual  a  preposterous  weight  in  deter- 
mining world-policy;  and  the  almost  insane 
feeling  of  the  Kaiser  about  the  sanctity  of  crowned 


THE  LAST  YEARS  121 

heads  was  no  doubt  a  main  reason  why  Ger- 
many backed  Austria  in  sending  her  ultimatum 
to  Serbia.  According  to  Baron  Beyens,  on  hearing 
the  news  of  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  the 
Kaiser  changed  colour,  and  exclaimed:  "All  the 
effort  of  my  life  for  twenty-five  years  must  be 
begun  over  again!"  *  A  tragic  cry  which  in- 
dicates, what  I  personally  believe  to  be  the  case, 
that  it  has  been  the  constant  effort  of  the  Kaiser 
to  keep  the  peace  in  Europe,  and  that  he  fore- 
saw now  that  he  would  no  longer  be  able  to  resist 
war. 

So  far,  however,  it  would  only  be  the  war 
between  Austria  and  Serbia  that  the  Kaiser 
would  be  prepared  to  sanction.  He  might  hope 
to  avoid  the  European  war.  And,  in  fact,  there 
is  good  reason  to  suppose  that  both  he  and  the 
German  Foreign  Office  did  cherish  that  hope 
or  delusion.  They  had  bluffed  Russia  off  in 
1908.  They  had  the  dangerous  idea  that  they 
might  bluff  her  off  again.  In  this  connection 
Baron  Beyens  records  a  conversation  with  his 
colleague,  M.  Bollati,  the  Italian  Ambassador 
at  Berlin,  in  which  the  latter  took  the  view  that 

at  Vienna  as  at  Berlin  they  were  persuaded  that  Russia, 
in  spite  of  the  official  assurances  exchanged  quite  re- 

1  "L'AUemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  273. 


122        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

cently  between  the  Tsar  and  M.  Poincare*,  as  to  the 
complete  preparations  of  the  armies  of  the  two  allies, 
was  not  in  a  position  to  sustain  a  European  war  and 
would  not  dare  to  plunge  into  so  perilous  an  adventure. 

Baron  Beyens  continues: — 

At  Berlin  the  opinion  that  Russia  was  unable  to  face 
a  European  war  prevailed  not  only  in  the  official  world 
and  in  society,  but  among  all  the  manufacturers  who 
specialized  in  the  construction  of  armaments.  M.  Krupp, 
the  best  qualified  among  them  to  express  an  opinion, 
announced  on  the  28th  July,  at  a  table  next  mine  at  the 
Hdtel  Bristol,  that  the  Russian  artillery  was  neither  good 
nor  complete,  while  that  of  the  German  army  had  never 
been  of  such  superior  quality.  It  would  be  folly  on  the 
part  of  Russia,  the  great  maker  of  guns  concluded,  to 
dare  to  make  war  on  Germany  and  Austria  in  these  con- 
ditions.1 

But  while  the  attitude  of  the  German  Foreign 
Office  and  (as  I  am  inclined  to  suppose)  of  the 
Kaiser  may  have  been  that  which  I  have  just 
suggested,  there  were  other  and  more  important 
factors  to  be  considered.  It  appears  almost 
certain  that  at  some  point  in  the  crisis  the  con- 
trol of  the  situation  was  taken  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  civilians  by  the  military.  The  position 
of  the  military  is  not  difficult  to  understand. 
They  believed,   as  professional  soldiers  usually 


1 « 


L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  280  seq. 


THE  LAST  YEARS  123 

do,  in  the  "inevitability"  of  war,  and  they  had, 
of  course,  a  professional  interest  in  making  war. 
Their  attitude  may  be  illustrated  from  a  state- 
ment attributed  by  M.  Bourdon  to  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  in  1912:1  "The  soldiers  think  about 
war.  It  is  their  business  and  their  duty.  They 
tell  us  that  the  German  army  is  in  good  order, 
that  the  Russian  army  has  not  completed  its  or- 
ganization, that  it  would  be  a  good  moment  .  .  . 
but  for  twenty  years  they  have  been  saying  the 
same  thing."  The  passage  is  significant.  It 
shows  us  exactly  what  it  is  we  have  to  dread 
in  "militarism."  The  danger  in  a  military  State 
is  always  that  when  a  crisis  comes  the  soldiers 
will  get  control,  as  they  seem  to  have  done  on 
this  occasion.  From  their  point  of  view  there 
was  good  reason.  They  knew  that  France  and 
Russia,  on  a  common  understanding,  were  mak- 
ing enormous  military  preparations;  they  knew 
that  these  preparations  would  mature  by  the 
beginning  of  191 7;  they  knew  that  Germany 
would  fight  then  at  a  less  advantage;  they  be- 
lieved she  would  then  have  to  fight,  and  they 
said,  "Better  fight  now."  The  following  dis- 
patch of  Baron  Beyens,  dated  July  26th,  may 
probably  be  taken  as  fairly  representing  their 
attitude : — 

1  See  "L'finigme  Allemande,"  p.  96. 


i24        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

To  justify  these  conclusions  I  must  remind  you  of  the 
opinion  which  prevails  in  the  German  General  Staff, 
that  war  with  France  and  Russia  is  unavoidable  and 
near,  an  opinion  which  the  Emperor  has  been  induced  to 
share.  Such  a  war,  ardently  desired  by  the  military  and 
Pangerman  party,  might  be  undertaken  to-day,  as  this 
party  think,  in  circumstances  which  are  extremely  favour- 
able to  Germany,  and  which  probably  will  not  again 
present  themselves  for  some  time.  Germany  has  finished 
the  strengthening  of  her  army  which  was  decreed  by  the 
law  of  19 1 2,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  she  feels  that  she 
cannot  carry  on  indefinitely  a  race  in  armaments  with 
Russia  and  France  which  would  end  by  her  ruin.  The 
Wehrbeitrag  has  been  a  disappointment  for  the  Imperial 
Government,  to  whom  it  has  demonstrated  the  limits  of 
the  national  wealth.  Russia  has  made  the  mistake  of 
making  a  display  of  her  strength  before  having  finished 
her  military  reorganization.  That  strength  will  not  be 
formidable  for  several  years:  at  the  present  moment 
it  lacks  the  railway  lines  necessary  for  its  deployment. 
As  to  France,  M.  Charles  Humbert  has  revealed  her 
deficiency  in  guns  of  large  calibre,  but  apparently  it  is 
this  arm  that  will  decide  the  fate  of  battles.  For  the 
rest,  England,  which  during  the  last  two  years  Germany 
has  been  trying,  not  without  some  success,  to  detach 
from  France  and  Russia,  is  paralysed  by  internal  dis- 
sensions and  her  Irish  quarrels.1 

It  will  be  noticed  that  Baron  Beyens  sup- 
poses the  Kaiser  to  have  been  in  the  hands  of 
the  soldiers  as  early  as  July  26th.    On  the  other 

1  Second  Belgian  Grey  Book,  No.  8. 


THE  LAST  YEARS  125 

hand,  as  late  as  August  5th  Beyens  believed 
that  the  German  Foreign  Office  had  been  work- 
ing throughout  for  peace.  Describing  an  inter- 
view he  had  had  on  that  day  with  Herr  Zimmer- 
mann,  he  writes: — 

From  this  interview  I  brought  away  the  impression 
that  Herr  Zimmermann  spoke  to  me  with  his  customary 
sincerity,  and  that  the  Department  for  Foreign  Affairs 
since  the  opening  of  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict  had 
been  on  the  side  of  a  peaceful  solution,  and  that  it  was 
not  due  to  it  that  its  views  and  counsels  had  not  pre- 
vailed. ...  A  superior  power  intervened  to  precipitate 
the  march  of  events.  It  was  the  ultimatum  from  Ger- 
many to  Russia,  sent  to  St.  Petersburg  at  the  very  mo- 
ment when  the  Vienna  Cabinet  was  showing  itself  more 
disposed  to  conciliation,  which  let  loose  the  war.1 

Why  was  that  ultimatum  sent?  According 
to  the  German  apologists,  it  was  sent  because 
Russia  had  mobilized  on  the  German  frontier 
at  the  critical  moment,  and  so  made  war  in- 
evitable. There  is,  indeed,  no  doubt  that  the 
tension  was  enormously  increased  throughout 
the  critical  days  by  mobilization  and  rumours 
of  mobilization.  The  danger  was  clearly  pointed 
out  as  early  as  July  26th  in  a  dispatch  of  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  to  his  Gov- 
ernment:— 

1  Second  Belgian  Grey  Book,  No.  52. 


126        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

As  the  result  of  reports  about  measures  taken  for  mob- 
ilization of  Russian  troops,  Count  Pourtales  [German 
Ambassador  at  Petrograd]  has  called  the  Russian  Minis- 
ter's attention  in  the  most  serious  manner  to  the  fact 
that  nowadays  measures  of  mobilization  would  be  a 
highly  dangerous  form  of  diplomatic  pressure.  For  in  that 
event  the  purely  military  consideration  of  the  question 
by  the  General  Staffs  would  find  expression,  and  if  that 
button  were  once  touched  in  Germany  the  situation  would 
get  out  of  control.1 

On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  in  1909  Austria  had  mobilized  against  Serbia 
and  Montenegro,2  and  in  191 2-13  Russia  and 
Austria  had  mobilized  against  one  another  with- 
out war  ensuing  in  either  case.  Moreover,  in 
view  of  the  slowness  of  Russian  mobilization, 
it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  a  day  or  two  would 
make  the  difference  between  security  and  ruin 
to  Germany.  However,  it  is  possible  that  the 
Kaiser  was  so  advised  by  his  soldiers,  and  gen- 
uinely believed  the  country  to  be  in  danger. 
We  do  not  definitely  know.  What  we  do  know 
is,  that  it  was  the  German  ultimatum  that  pre- 
cipitated the  war. 

We  are  informed,  however,  by  Baron  Beyens 
that  even  at  the  last  moment  the  German  Foreign 
Office  made  one  more  effort  for  peace: — 

1  Austrian  Red  Book,  No.  28.  2  See  p.  103. 


THE  MORAL  127 

As  no  reply  had  been  received  from  St.  Petersburg 
by  noon  the  next  day  [after  the  dispatch  of  the  German 
ultimatum],  MM.  de  Jagow  and  Zimmermann  (I  have  it 
from  the  latter)  hurried  to  the  Chancellor  and  the  Kaiser 
to  prevent  the  issue  of  the  order  for  general  mobilization, 
and  to  persuade  his  Majesty  to  wait  till  the  following  day. 
It  was  the  last  effort  of  their  dying  pacifism,  or  the  last 
awakening  of  their  conscience.  Their  efforts  were  broken 
against  the  irreducible  obstinacy  of  the  Minister  of  War 
and  the  army  chiefs,  who  represented  to  the  Kaiser  the 
disastrous  consequences  of  a  delay  of  twenty-four  hours.1 

17.  The  Responsibility  and  the  Moral 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  brief  account  that 
so  far  as  the  published  evidence  goes  I  agree 
with  the  general  view  outside  Germany  that 
the  responsibility  for  the  war  at  the  last  moment 
rests  with  the  Powers  of  Central  Europe.  The 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  which  there  can 
be  no  reasonable  doubt  was  known  to  and  ap- 
proved by  the  German  Government,  was  the 
first  crime.  And  it  is  hardly  palliated  by  the 
hope,  which  no  well-informed  men  ought  to 
have  entertained,  that  Russia  could  be  kept 
out  and  the  war  limited  to  Austria  and  Serbia. 
The  second  crime  was  the  German  ultimatum 
to  Russia  and  to  France.    I  have  no  desire  what- 

1  "L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,"  p.  301. 


128   THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

ever  to  explain  away  or  palliate  these  clear  facts. 
But  it  was  not  my  object  in  writing  this  pamph- 
let to  reiterate  a  judgment  which  must  already 
be  that  of  all  my  readers.  What  I  have  wanted 
to  do  is  to  set  the  tragic  events  of  those  few 
days  of  diplomacy  in  their  proper  place  in  the 
whole  complex  of  international  politics.  And 
what  I  do  dispute  with  full  conviction  is  the 
view  which  seems  to  be  almost  universally  held 
in  England,  that  Germany  had  been  pursuing  for 
years  past  a  policy  of  war,  while  all  the  other 
Powers  had  been  pursuing  a  policy  of  peace. 
The  war  finally  provoked  by  Germany  was,  I 
am  convinced,  conceived  as  a  "preventive  war." 
And  that  means  that  it  was  due  to  the  belief 
that  if  Germany  did  not  fight  then  she  would 
be  compelled  to  fight  at  a  great  disadvantage 
later.  I  have  written  in  vain  if  I  have  not  con- 
vinced the  reader  that  the  European  anarchy 
inevitably  provokes  that  state  of  mind  in  the 
Powers,  and  that  they  all  live  constantly  under 
the  threat  of  war.  To  understand  the  action 
of  those  who  had  power  in  Germany  during  the 
critical  days  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  all 
that  I  have  brought  into  relief  in  the  preceding 
pages:  the  general  situation,  which  grouped 
the  Powers  of  the  Entente  against  those  of  the 
Triple   Alliance;   the   armaments   and   counter- 


THE  MORAL  129 

armaments;  the  colonial  and  economic  rivalry; 
the  racial  and  national  problems  in  South-East 
Europe;  and  the  long  series  of  previous  crises, 
in  each  case  tided  over,  but  leaving  behind, 
every  one  of  them,  a  legacy  of  fresh  mistrust 
and  fear,  which  made  every  new  crisis  worse 
than  the  one  before.  I  do  not  palliate  the  re- 
sponsibility of  Germany  for  the  outbreak  of 
war.  But  that  responsibility  is  embedded  in 
and  conditioned  by  a  responsibility  deeper  and 
more  general — the  responsibility  of  all  the  Powers 
alike  for  the  European  anarchy. 

If  I  have  convinced  the  reader  of  this  he  will, 
I  think,  feel  no  difficulty  in  following  me  to  a 
further  conclusion.  Since  the  causes  of  this 
war,  and  of  all  wars,  lie  so  deep  in  the  whole 
international  system,  they  cannot  be  perma- 
nently removed  by  the  "punishment"  or  the 
"crushing"  or  any  other  drastic  treatment  of 
any  Power,  let  that  Power  be  as  guilty  as  you 
please.  Whatever  be  the  issue  of  this  war,  one 
thing  is  certain:  it  will  bring  no  lasting  peace 
to  Europe  unless  it  brings  a  radical  change  both 
in  the  spirit  and  in  the  organization  of  inter- 
national politics. 

What  that  change  must  be  may  be  deduced 
from  the  foregoing  discussion  of  the  causes  of 
the  war.     The  war  arose  from  the  rivalry  of 


i3o        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

States  in  the  pursuit  of  power  and  wealth.  This 
is  universally  admitted.  Whatever  be  the  di- 
versities of  opinion  that  prevail  in  the  different 
countries  concerned,  nobody  pretends  that  the 
war  arose  out  of  any  need  of  civilization,  out 
of  any  generous  impulse  or  noble  ambition.  It 
arose,  according  to  the  popular  view  in  Eng- 
land, solely  and  exclusively  out  of  the  ambition 
of  Germany  to  seize  territory  and  power.  It 
arose,  according  to  the  popular  German  view, 
out  of  the  ambition  of  England  to  attack  and 
destroy  the  rising  power  and  wealth  of  Germany. 
Thus  to  each  set  of  belligerents  the  war  appears 
as  one  forced  upon  them  by  sheer  wickedness, 
and  from  neither  point  of  view  has  it  any  kind 
of  moral  justification.  These  views,  it  is  true,  are 
both  too  simple  for  the  facts.  But  the  account 
given  in  the  preceding  pages,  imperfect  as  it 
is,  shows  clearly,  what  further  knowledge  will 
only  make  more  explicit,  that  the  war  proceeded 
out  of  rivalry  for  empire  between  all  the  Great 
Powers  in  every  part  of  the  world.  The  con- 
tention between  France  and  Germany  for  the 
control  of  Morocco,  the  contention  between 
Russia  and  Austria  for  the  control  of  the  Balkans, 
the  contention  between  Germany  and  the  other 
Powers  for  the  control  of  Turkey — these  were 
the   causes   of   the   war.     And   this   contention 


THE  MORAL  131 

for  control  is  prompted  at  once  by  the  desire 
for  power  and  the  desire  for  wealth.  In  practice 
the  two  motives  are  found  conjoined.  But  to 
different  minds  they  appeal  in  different  pro- 
portions. There  is  such  a  thing  as  the  love  of 
power  for  its  own  sake.  It  is  known  in  individ- 
uals, and  it  is  known  in  States,  and  it  is  the  most 
disastrous,  if  not  the  most  evil,  of  the  human 
passions.  The  modern  German  philosophy  of 
the  State  turns  almost  exclusively  upon  this 
idea;  and  here,  as  elsewhere,  by  giving  to  a  pas- 
sion an  intellectual  form,  the  Germans  have 
magnified  its  force  and  enhanced  its  monstrosity. 
But  the  passion  itself  is  not  peculiar  to  Germans, 
nor  is  it  only  they  to  whom  it  is  and  has  been 
a  motive  of  State.  Power  has  been  the  fetish 
of  kings  and  emperors  from  the  beginning  of 
political  history,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
it  will  not  continue  to  inspire  democracies.  The 
passion  for  empire  ruined  the  Athenian  democ- 
racy, no  less  than  the  Spartan  or  the  Venetian 
oligarchy,  or  the  Spain  of  Philip  II,  or  the  France 
of  the  Monarchy  and  the  Empire.  But  it  still 
makes  its  appeal  to  the  romantic  imagination. 
Its  intoxication  has  lain  behind  this  war,  and 
it  will  prompt  many  others  if  it  survives,  when 
the  war  is  over,  either  in  the  defeated  or  the 
conquering  nations.    It  is  not  only  the  jingoism 


i32         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

of  Germany  that  Europe  has  to  fear.  It  is  the 
jingoism  that  success  may  make  supreme  in 
any  country  that  may  be  victorious. 

But  while  power  may  be  sought  for  its  own 
sake,  it  is  commonly  sought  by  modern  States 
as  a  means  to  wealth.  It  is  the  pursuit  of  mar- 
kets and  concession  and  outlets  for  capital  that 
lies  behind  the  colonial  policy  that  leads  to  wars. 
States  compete  for  the  right  to  exploit  the  weak, 
and  in  this  competition  Governments  are  prompted 
or  controlled  by  financial  interests.  The  British 
went  to  Egypt  for  the  sake  of  the  bondholders, 
the  French  to  Morocco  for  the  sake  of  its  min- 
erals and  wealth.  In  the  Near  East  and  the  Far 
it  is  commerce,  concessions,  loans  that  have  led 
to  the  rivalry  of  the  Powers,  to  war  after  war, 
to  "punitive  expeditions  "  and — irony  of  ironies! — 
to  "indemnities"  exacted  as  a  new  and  special 
form  of  robbery  from  peoples  who  rose  in  the 
endeavour  to  defend  themselves  against  rob- 
bery. The  Powers  combine  for  a  moment  to 
suppress  the  common  victim,  the  next  they  are 
at  one  another's  throats  over  the  spoil.  That 
really  is  the  simple  fact  about  the  quarrels  of 
States  over  colonial  and  commercial  policy.  So 
long  as  the  exploitation  of  undeveloped  coun- 
tries is  directed  by  companies  having  no  object 
in  view  except  dividends,  so  long  as  financiers 


THE  SETTLEMENT  133 

prompt  the  policy  of  Governments,  so  long  as 
military  expeditions,  leading  up  to  annexations, 
are  undertaken  behind  the  back  of  the  public 
for  reasons  that  cannot  be  avowed,  so  long  will 
the  nations  end  with  war,  where  they  have  begun 
by  theft,  and  so  long  will  thousands  and  millions 
of  innocent  and  generous  lives,  the  best  of  Europe, 
be  thrown  away  to  no  purpose,  because,  in  the 
dark,  sinister  interests  have  been  risking  the  peace 
of  the  world  for  the  sake  of  money  in  their  pockets. 
It  is  these  tremendous  underlying  facts  and 
tendencies  that  suggest  the  true  moral  of  this 
war.  It  is  these  that  have  to  be  altered  if  we 
are  to  avoid  future  wars  on  a  scale  as  great. 

18.  The  Settlement 

And  now,  with  all  this  in  our  minds,  let  us 
turn  to  consider  the  vexed  question  of  the  settle- 
ment after  the  war.  There  lies  before  the  Western 
world  the  greatest  of  all  choices,  the  choice  be- 
tween destruction  and  salvation.  But  that  choice 
does  not  depend  merely  on  the  issue  of  the  war. 
It  depends  upon  what  is  done  or  left  undone  by 
the  co-operation  of  all  when  the  war  does  at 
last  stop.  Two  conceptions  of  the  future  are 
contending  in  all  nations.  One  is  the  old  bad 
one,  that  which  has  presided  hitherto  at  every 


134        THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

peace  and  prepared  every  new  war.  It  assumes 
that  the  object  of  war  is  solely  to  win  victory, 
and  the  object  of  victory  solely  to  acquire  more 
power  and  territory.  On  this  view,  if  the  Germans 
win,  they  are  to  annex  territory  east  and  west: 
Belgium  and  half  France,  say  the  more  violent; 
the  Baltic  provinces  of  Russia,  strategic  points 
of  advantage,  say  the  more  moderate.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  Allies  win,  the  Allies  are  to 
divide  the  German  colonies,  the  French  are  to 
regain  Alsace-Lorraine,  and,  as  the  jingoes  add, 
they  are  to  take  the  whole  of  the  German  prov- 
inces on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  even 
territory  beyond  it.  The  Italians  are  to  have 
not  only  Italia  Irredenta  but  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  reluctant  Slavs  in  Dalmatia;  the  Russians 
Constantinople,  and  perhaps  Posen  and  Galicia. 
Further,  such  money  indemnities  are  to  be  taken 
as  it  may  prove  possible  to  exact  from  an  already 
ruined  foe;  trade  and  commerce  with  the  enemy 
is  to  be  discouraged  or  prohibited;  and,  above 
all,  a  bitter  and  unforgiving  hatred  is  to  reign 
for  ever  between  the  victor  and  the  vanquished. 
This  is  the  kind  of  view  of  the  settlement  of  Eu- 
rope that  is  constantly  appearing  in  the  articles 
and  correspondence  of  the  Press  of  all  countries. 
Ministers  are  not  as  careful  as  they  should  be 
to  repudiate  it.    The  nationalist  and  imperialist 


THE  SETTLEMENT  135 

cliques  of  all  nations  endorse  it.  It  is,  one  could 
almost  fear,  for  something  like  this  that  the  peo- 
ples are  being  kept  at  war,  and  the  very  existence 
of  civilization  jeopardized. 

Now,  whether  anything  of  this  kind  really  can 
be  achieved  by  the  war,  whether  there  is  the 
least  probability  that  either  group  of  Powers  can 
win  such  a  victory  as  would  make  the  programme 
on  either  side  a  reality,  I  will  not  here  discuss. 
The  reader  will  have  his  own  opinion.  What 
I  am  concerned  with  is  the  effect  any  such  solu- 
tion would  have  upon  the  future  of  Europe.  Those 
who  desire  such  a  close  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes.  The  one  frankly  believes  in  war,  in  domi- 
nation, and  in  power.  It  accepts  as  inevitable, 
and  welcomes  as  desirable,  the  perpetual  armed 
conflict  of  nations  for  territory  and  trade.  It 
does  not  believe  in,  and  it  does  not  want,  a  dura- 
ble peace.  It  holds  that  all  peace  is,  must  be, 
and  ought  to  be,  a  precarious  and  regrettable 
interval  between  wars.  I  do  not  discuss  this 
view.  Those  who  hold  it  are  not  accessible  to 
argument,  and  can  only  be  met  by  action.  There 
are  others,  however,  who  do  think  war  an  evil, 
who  do  want  a  durable  peace,  but  who  genuinely 
believe  that  the  way  indicated  is  the  best  way  to 
achieve  it.  With  them  it  is  permitted  to  discuss, 
and  it  should  be  possible  to  do  so  without  bitter- 


136         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

ness  or  rage  on  either  side.  For  as  to  the  end, 
there  is  agreement;  the  difference  of  opinion  is 
as  to  the  means.  The  position  taken  is  this: 
The  enemy  deliberately  made  this  war  of  aggres- 
sion against  us,  without  provocation,  in  order 
to  destroy  us.  If  it  had  not  been  for  this  wicked- 
ness there  would  have  been  no  war.  The  enemy, 
therefore,  must  be  punished;  and  his  punishment 
must  make  him  permanently  impotent  to  repeat 
the  offence.  That  having  been  done,  Europe  will 
have  durable  peace,  for  there  will  be  no  one  left 
able  to  break  it  who  will  also  want  to  break  it. 
Now,  I  believe  all  this  to  be  demonstrably  a 
miscalculation.  It  is  contradicted  both  by  our 
knowledge  of  the  way  human  nature  works  and 
by  the  evidence  of  history.  In  the  first  place, 
wars  do  not  arise  because  only  one  nation  or  group 
of  nations  is  wicked,  the  others  being  good.  For 
the  actual  outbreak  of  this  war,  I  believe,  as  I 
have  already  said,  that  a  few  powerful  individuals 
in  Austria  and  in  Germany  were  responsible. 
But  the  ultimate  causes  of  war  lie  much  deeper. 
In  them  all  States  are  implicated.  And  the  punish- 
ment, or  even  the  annihilation,  of  any  one  nation 
would  leave  those  causes  still  subsisting.  Wipe 
out  Germany  from  the  map,  and,  if  you  do  noth- 
ing else,  the  other  nations  will  be  at  one  another's 
throats  in  the  old  way,  for  the  old  causes.    They 


THE  SETTLEMENT  137 

would  be  quarrelling,  if  about  nothing  else,  about 
the  division  of  the  spoil.  While  nations  continue 
to  contend  for  power,  while  they  refuse  to  sub- 
titute  law  for  force,  there  will  continue  to  be 
wars.  And  while  they  devote  the  best  of  their 
brains  and  the  chief  of  their  resources  to  arma- 
ments and  military  and  naval  organization,  each 
war  will  become  more  terrible,  more  destructive, 
and  more  ruthless  than  the  last.  This  is  irrefut- 
able truth.  I  do  not  believe  there  is  a  man  or 
woman  able  to  understand  the  statement  who 
will  deny  it. 

In  the  second  place,  the  enemy  nation  cannot, 
in  fact,  be  annihilated,  nor  even  so  far  weakened, 
relatively  to  the  rest,  as  to  be  incapable  of  recover- 
ing and  putting  up  another  fight.  The  notions 
of  dividing  up  Germany  among  the  Allies,  or  of 
adding  France  and  the  British  Empire  to  Ger- 
many, are  sheerly  fantastic.  There  will  remain, 
when  all  is  done,  the  defeated  nations — if,  in- 
deed, any  nation  be  defeated.  Their  territories 
cannot  be  permanently  occupied  by  enemy  troops; 
they  themselves  cannot  be  permanently  prevented 
by  physical  force  from  building  up  new  armaments. 
So  long  as  they  want  their  revenge,  they  will 
be  able  sooner  or  later  to  take  it.  If  evidence  of 
this  were  wanted,  the  often-quoted  case  of  Prussia 
after  Jena  will  suffice. 


138         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

And,  in  the  third  place,  the  defeated  nations, 
so  treated,  will,  in  fact,  want  their  revenge.  There 
seems  to  be  a  curious  illusion  abroad,  among  the 
English  and  their  allies,  that  not  only  is  Germany 
guilty  of  the  war,  but  that  all  Germans  know  it 
in  their  hearts;  that,  being  guilty,  they  will  fully 
accept  punishment,  bow  patiently  beneath  the 
yoke,  and  become  in  future  good,  harmonious 
members  of  the  European  family.  The  illusion 
is  grotesque.  There  is  hardly  a  German  who 
does  not  believe  that  the  war  was  made  by  Russia 
and  by  England;  that  Germany  is  the  innocent 
victim;  that  all  right  is  on  her  side,  and  all  wrong 
on  that  of  the  Allies.  If,  indeed,  she  were  beaten, 
and  treated  as  her  "punishers"  desire,  this  belief 
would  be  strengthened,  not  weakened.  In  every 
German  heart  would  abide,  deep  and  strong,  the 
sense  of  an  iniquitous  triumph  of  what  they  be- 
lieve to  be  wrong  over  right,  and  of  a  duty  to 
redress  that  iniquity.  Outraged  national  pride 
would  be  reinforced  by  the  sense  of  injustice; 
and  the  next  war,  the  war  of  revenge,  would  be 
prepared  for,  not  only  by  every  consideration  of 
interest  and  of  passion,  but  by  every  cogency  of 
righteousness.  The  fact  that  the  Germans  are 
mistaken  in  their  view  of  the  origin  of  the  war 
has  really  nothing  to  do  with  the  case.  It  is  not 
the  truth,  it  is  what  men  believe  to  be  the  truth, 


THE  SETTLEMENT  139 

that  influences  their  action.  And  I  do  not  think 
any  study  of  dispatches  is  going  to  alter  the 
German  view  of  the  facts. 

But  it  is  sometimes  urged  that  the  war  was 
made  by  the  German  militarists,  that  it  is  unpop- 
ular with  the  mass  of  the  people,  and  that  if 
Germany  is  utterly  defeated  the  people  will  rise 
and  depose  their  rulers,  become  a  true  democracy, 
and  join  fraternal  hands  with  the  other  nations 
of  Europe.  That  Germany  should  become  a  true 
democracy  might,  indeed,  be  as  great  a  guarantee 
of  peace  as  it  might  be  that  other  nations,  called 
democratic,  should  really  become  so  in  their  for- 
eign policy  as  well  as  in  their  domestic  affairs. 
But  what  proud  nation  will  accept  democracy 
as  a  gift  from  insolent  conquerors?  One  thing 
that  the  war  has  done,  and  one  of  the  worst,  is 
to  make  of  the  Kaiser,  to  every  German,  a  symbol 
of  their  national  unity  and  national  force.  Just 
because  we  abuse  their  militarism,  they  affirm 
and  acclaim  it;  just  because  we  attack  their  gov- 
erning class,  they  rally  round  it.  Nothing  could 
be  better  calculated  than  this  war  to  strengthen 
the  hold  of  militarism  in  Germany,  unless  it  be 
the  attempt  of  her  enemies  to  destroy  her  mili- 
tarism by  force.  For  consider!  In  the  view  we 
are  examining  it  is  proposed,  first  to  kill  the 
greater  part  of  her  combatants,  next  to  invade 


i4o    THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

her  territory,  destroy  her  towns  and  villages,  and 
exact  (for  there  are  those  who  demand  it)  penal- 
ties in  kind,  actual  tit  for  tat,  for  what  Germans 
have  done  in  Belgium.  It  is  proposed  to  enter 
the  capital  in  triumph.  It  is  proposed  to  shear 
away  huge  pieces  of  German  territory.  And  then, 
when  all  this  has  been  done,  the  conquerors  are 
to  turn  to  the  German  nation  and  say:  "Now, 
all  this  we  have  done  for  your  good!  Depose 
your  wicked  rulers!  Become  a  democracy!  Shake 
hands  and  be  a  good  fellow!"  Does  it  not  sound 
grotesque?  But,  really,  that  is  what  is  proposed. 
I  have  spoken  about  British  and  French  pro- 
posals for  the  treatment  of  Germany.  But  all 
that  I  have  said  applies,  of  course,  equally  to 
German  proposals  of  the  same  kind  for  the  treat- 
ment of  the  conquered  Allies.  That  way  is  no 
way  towards  a  durable  peace.  If  it  be  replied 
that  a  durable  peace  is  not  intended  or  desired, 
I  have  no  more  to  say.  If  it  be  replied  that  punish- 
ment for  its  own  sake  is  more  important  than 
civilization,  and  must  be  performed  at  all  costs 
— fiat  justitia,  ruat  cesium — then,  once  more,  I 
have  nothing  to  say.  I  speak  to  those,  and  to 
those  only,  who  do  desire  a  durable  peace,  and 
who  have  the  courage  and  the  imagination  to 
believe  it  to  be  possible,  and  the  determination 
to  work  for  it.     And  to  them  I  urge  that  the 


THE  CHANGE  NEEDED  141 

course  I  have  been  discussing  cannot  lead  to  their 
goal.    What  can? 


19.  The  Change  Needed 

First,  a  change  of  outlook.  We  must  give  up, 
in  all  nations,  this  habit  of  dwelling  on  the  unique 
and  peculiar  wickedness  of  the  enemy.  We  must 
recognize  that  behind  the  acts  that  led  up  to  the 
immediate  outbreak  of  war,  behind  the  crimes 
and  atrocities  to  which  the  war  has  led,  as  wars 
always  have  led,  and  always  will  lead — behind 
all  that  lies  a  great  complex  of  feeling,  prejudice, 
tradition,  false  theory,  in  which  all  nations  and 
all  individuals  of  all  nations  are  involved.  Most 
men  believe,  feel,  or  passively  accept  that  power 
and  wealth  are  the  objects  States  ought  to  pursue; 
that  in  pursuing  these  objects  they  are  bound  by 
no  code  of  right  in  their  relations  to  one  another; 
that  law  between  them  is,  and  must  be,  as  fragile 
as  a  cobweb  stretched  before  the  mouth  of  a  can- 
non; that  force  is  the  only  rule  and  the  only  de- 
terminant of  their  differences,  and  that  the  only 
real  question  is  when  and  how  the  appeal  to  force 
may  most  advantageously  be  made.  This  phi- 
losophy has  been  expressed  with  peculiar  frankness 
and  brutality  by  Germans.  But  most  honest  and 
candid  men,  I  believe,  will  agree  that  that  is 


i42         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

the  way  they,  too,  have  been  accustomed  to  think 
of  international  affairs.  And  if  illustration  were 
wanted,  let  them  remember  the  kind  of  triumphant 
satisfaction  with  which  the  failure  of  the  Hague 
conferences  to  achieve  any  radical  results  was 
generally  greeted,  and  the  contemptuous  and  al- 
most abhorring  pity  meted  out  to  the  people 
called  "pacifists."  Well,  the  war  has  come!  We 
see  now,  not  only  guess,  what  it  means.  If  that 
experience  has  not  made  a  deep  impression  on 
every  man  and  woman,  if  something  like  a  con- 
version is  not  being  generally  operated,  then,  in- 
deed, nothing  can  save  mankind  from  the  hell  of 
their  own  passions  and  imbecilities. 

But  if  otherwise,  if  that  change  is  going  on, 
then  the  way  to  deliverance  is  neither  difficult 
nor  obscure.  It  does  not  lie  in  the  direction  of 
crushing  anybody.  It  lies  in  the  taking  of  certain 
determinations,  and  the  embodying  of  them  in 
certain  institutions. 

First,  the  nations  must  submit  to  law  and  to 
right  in  the  settlement  of  their  disputes. 

Secondly,  they  must  reserve  force  for  the  coer- 
cion of  the  law-breaker;  and  that  implies  that 
they  should  construct  rules  to  determine  who  the 
law-breaker  is.  Let  him  be  defined  as  the  one 
who  appeals  to  force,  instead  of  appealing  to  law 
and  right  by  machinery  duly  provided  for  that 


THE  CHANGE  NEEDED  143 

purpose,  and  the  aggressor  is  immediately  under 
the  ban  of  the  civilized  world,  and  met  by  an 
overwhelming  force  to  coerce  him  into  order.  In 
constructing  machinery  of  this  kind  there  is  no 
intellectual  difficulty  greater  than  that  which  has 
confronted  every  attempt  everywhere  to  sub- 
stitute order  for  force.  The  difficulty  is  moral, 
and  lies  in  the  habits,  passions,  and  wills  of  men. 
But  it  should  not  be  concluded  that,  if  such  a 
moral  change  could  be  operated,  there  would  be 
no  need  for  the  machinery.  It  would  be  as  reason- 
able to  say  that  Governments,  law-courts,  and 
police  were  superfluous,  since,  if  men  were  good, 
they  would  not  require  them,  and  if  they  are 
bad  they  will  not  tolerate  them.  Whatever  new 
need,  desire,  and  conviction  comes  up  in  mankind, 
needs  embodiment  in  forms  before  it  can  become 
operative.  And,  as  the  separate  colonies  of  Amer- 
ica could  not  effectively  unite  until  they  had 
formed  a  Constitution,  so  will  the  States  of  Europe 
and  the  world  be  unable  to  maintain  the  peace, 
even  though  all  of  them  should  wish  to  maintain 
it,  unless  they  will  construct  some  kind  of  machin- 
ery for  settling  their  disputes  and  organizing  their 
common  purposes,  and  will  back  that  machinery 
by  force.  If  they  will  do  that  they  may  construct 
a  real  and  effective  counterpoise  to  aggression 
from  any  Power  in  the  future.    If  they  will  not 


144         THE  EUROPEAN  ANARCHY 

do  it,  their  precautions  against  any  one  Power 
will  be  idle,  for  it  will  be  from  some  other  Power 
that  the  danger  will  come.  I  put  it  to  the  reader 
at  the  end  of  this  study,  which  I  have  made  with 
all  the  candour  and  all  the  honesty  at  my  disposal, 
and  which  I  believe  to  represent  essentially  the 
truth,  whether  or  no  he  agrees  that  the  European 
anarchy  is  the  real  cause  of  European  wars,  and 
if  he  does,  whether  he  is  ready  for  his  part  to 
support  a  serious  effort  to  end  it. 

Printed  in  the  United  State*  of  Ammo*. 


'HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a 
few  of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects. 


The  Diplomacy  of  the  Great  War 

By  ARTHUR  BULLARD 

Cloth,  i2tno,  $1.50 

A  book  which  contributes  to  an  understanding 
of  the  war  by  revealing  something  of  the  diplo- 
matic negotiations  that  preceded  it.  The  author 
gives  the  history  of  international  politics  in  Europe 
since  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878,  and  considers 
the  new  ideals  that  have  grown  up  about  the 
function  of  diplomacy  during  the  last  generation, 
so  that  the  reader  is  in  full  possession  of  the  gen- 
eral trend  of  diplomatic  development.  There  is 
added  a  chapter  of  constructive  suggestions  in 
respect  to  the  probable  diplomatic  settlements 
resulting  from  the  war,  and  a  consideration  of  the 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Europe. 


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Roadside  Glimpses  of  the  Great  War 

By  ARTHUR  SWEETSER 

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Mr.  Sweetser's  experiences  as  prisoner  of  both 
the  Germans  and  the  French  are  perhaps  the 
most  exciting  adventures  any  American  has  yet 
described.  His  book  is  not  a  grim,  depressing 
picture  of  war,  but  a  real,  human  account  of  the 
great  conflict,  exhilarating  in  its  graphic  pictures 
of  the  armies  and  full  of  many  thrilling  and  hu- 
morous episodes. 

"A  valuable,  stirring  tale  of  adventure." — 
Boston  Transcript. 

"Few  equally  thrilling  stories  of  personal  ex- 
periences have  been  published." — Bellman. 

"A  vivid  picture."— N.  Y.  Post. 

"Will  enthrall  the  reader  from  the  first  page  to 
the  test"— Pittsburgh  Dispatch. 


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The  Aftermath  of  Battle 

By  E.  D.  TOLAND 

With  a  Preface  by  Owen  Wister.    With  16  full-page 
plates 

Cloth,  i2mo,  $1.00 

"  Most  of  the  pages  in  this  book,"  says  Owen  Wister  in 
his  preface,  "  are  like  the  photographs  which  go  with 
them,  torn  fresh  and  hot,  so  to  speak,  from  the  diary  of  a 
young  American  just  as  he  jotted  them  down  day  by  day 
in  the  war  hospitals  of  France."  Of  the  author's  service 
and  of  the  nature  of  his  record  of  it  Mr.  Wister  continues : 
"  In  those  hospitals  ...  he  served  the  wounded  Germans 
and  allies,  he  carried  them  upstairs  and  down,  or  in  from 
the  rain,  he  assisted  at  operations,  he  held  basins,  he  gave 
ether,  he  built  the  kitchen  fire,  he  pumped  the  water,  he 
was  chauffeur,  forager,  commissariat,  he  helped  in  what 
ways  he  could,  as  he  was  ordered  and  also  as  his  own 
intelligence  prompted  in  the  not  infrequent  absence  of 
orders.  He  saw  the  wounded  die,  he  saw  them  get  well, 
and  he  tells  about  them,  their  sufferings,  their  courage, 
their  patience.  ...  As  page  succeeds  page,  written  with- 
out art,  yet  with  the  effect  of  high  art,  with  the  effect,  for 
example,  of  DeFoe's  account  of  the  Plague,  the  reader 
ceases  to  be  looking  at  a  picture ;  he  is  himself  in  the  pic- 
ture, its  terrific  realities  surround  him  as  if  he  were  walk- 
ing among  them." 

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By  FREDERICK  SCOTT  OLIVER 

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deals,  and  deals  worthily  and  greatly,  with  the 
mightiest  issues  ever  known  to  the  world.  .  .  . 
By  one  of  those  rare  men  in  whom  hard  thinking 
and  clear  writing  go  together.  .  .  .  Alive  and 
luminous;  adorned  with  portraits,  enriched  with 
studies  of  character  and  performance." — New 
York  Tribune. 

"A  genuine  book,  a  great  and  necessary  adven- 
ture in  difficult  truth- telling." — London  Saturday 
Review. 

"A  rare  eloquence  and  a  wealth  of  illustration 
which  recalls  Burke.  ...  A  storehouse  of  polit- 
ical thought,  set  out  with  a  precision  and  an  elo- 
quence which  have  been  absent  from  the  literature 
of  politics.  .  .  .  Every  page  is  lit  up  by  some 
memorable  phrase."  — The  London  Times. 

"A  big  book  and  a  valuable  book.  A  stirring 
appeal,  able,  eloquent,  vigorous  and  sincere.  Here 
at  last  is  a  man  who  has  a  definite  thesis  to  main- 
tain."— New  Republic. 


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